Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Monica Berlin was charged with felony stalking and six misdemeanors, including two restraining order violations and four protective order violations. In March 2020, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings and placed Berlin on mental health diversion. After successfully completing the diversion program, Berlin moved to dismiss the criminal charges in March 2022. However, the prosecution argued that the case could not be dismissed until the court awarded restitution. The court scheduled further proceedings on the motion to dismiss and the restitution issue.The trial court ruled in May 2022 that it had the authority to award restitution. Berlin's counsel objected, arguing that the court could not award restitution after the end of the period of diversion. After the court rejected her argument, Berlin's counsel stated that Berlin would prefer to withdraw from diversion and avoid a restitution award by winning an acquittal at trial. In August 2022, the trial court ordered Berlin to pay over $17,000 in restitution to the victim and the California Victim Compensation Board, dismissed the criminal charges, and ordered the case sealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five reversed the trial court's restitution orders. The appellate court found that the trial court had ordered the restitution after the end of the statutory maximum two-year period of diversion, which was not permitted under the relevant statute. The statute only allowed the trial court to order restitution "during the period of diversion." Therefore, the trial court's restitution orders were reversed, but its other orders were affirmed. View "People v. Berlin" on Justia Law

Keith Henyard was charged with eight drug-related felonies in Wisconsin. During his preliminary hearing, Court Commissioner Frank Parise presided. Later, Henyard hired Parise as his attorney. Parise secured a plea deal for Henyard, who pleaded guilty to four of the eight charges. The remaining four charges were dismissed but considered during sentencing. Henyard did not raise any objections about Parise's potential conflict of interest during these proceedings. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison followed by 5 years of extended supervision for one count, and 6 years of probation for the other three counts.Henyard later petitioned the Kenosha County Circuit Court for postconviction relief, arguing that Parise's previous role in his preliminary hearing constituted a conflict of interest, rendering his representation ineffective. The circuit court denied his petition, finding that Henyard had not demonstrated an actual or serious potential conflict of interest. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also rejected Henyard's petition, stating that he had failed to show that Parise's alleged conflict of interest had adversely affected his performance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Henyard's petition for review.Henyard then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which also denied his petition. The court found that Henyard needed to show a conflict that affected counsel's performance, as per the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court. The court concluded that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision complied with this precedent and reasonably applied the law to deny Henyard relief.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Henyard argued that Parise's conflict of interest rendered his representation ineffective. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, stating that Henyard had not demonstrated that Parise actively represented conflicting interests or that the alleged conflict adversely affected his performance. The court concluded that the state court's denial of Henyard's petition was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Henyard v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Tyren Cervenak pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Prior to this, Cervenak had been convicted of numerous crimes in Ohio state court, including two felony convictions: one in 2016 for two counts of robbery while using a firearm and another in 2020 for trafficking heroin. Prior to sentencing in the federal case, pretrial services recommended that the district court consider Cervenak a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. Cervenak objected to his career-offender designation, arguing that a conviction under Ohio’s robbery statute does not qualify as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.The district court overruled Cervenak’s objection and accepted the guidelines calculations recommended by pretrial services. The court agreed with the government and imposed a total sentence at the high end of the guidelines range: 188 months. After the hearing, the court issued an order explaining its reasoning for applying the career-offender enhancement to Cervenak’s guidelines calculations. The district court concluded that a conviction under Ohio Revised Code § 2911.02(A)(2) (“Ohio robbery”) falls within the definition of “robbery” included among the enumerated offenses in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), meaning that Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines. Cervenak timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under its recent decision in United States v. Carter, a conviction for Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines. The court found that Ohio robbery categorically matched generic “extortion,” which is also an enumerated offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The court rejected Cervenak's arguments that the Carter panel erred by failing to conduct the double-divisibility analysis mandated by Butts and Wilson and by assuming that “theft offense” under the Ohio statute categorically matches the “obtaining” element of generic extortion. The court concluded that Cervenak’s conviction for Ohio robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Cervenak" on Justia Law

The defendant, Antonio Santonastaso, was convicted of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The charges stemmed from a 2018 investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) into allegations that Santonastaso was flying a helicopter without the necessary certifications. During the investigation, Santonastaso falsely claimed that he had the requisite certifications to fly and that his previous involvement in a 2000 helicopter theft was part of an undercover operation.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, where Santonastaso was found guilty. He appealed the decision, arguing that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt and that the district court erred by not giving a materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak v. United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The court also ruled that the district court did not commit instructional error in rejecting Santonastaso's proposed materiality instruction. The court held that the law-of-the-circuit doctrine foreclosed the application of the Maslenjak materiality standard to § 1001(a) prosecutions, and that the district court's instruction correctly stated the controlling law on materiality. View "United States v. Santonastaso" on Justia Law

The case involves Reynaldo Rosa-Borges, who was sentenced to 72 months for unlawful firearm possession and 36 months for violating the terms of his supervised release from a previous conviction. The firearm and ammunition were discovered during two separate incidents. The first incident occurred when Rosa-Borges was found with a firearm during a police patrol at a beach. The second incident happened the following day when police searched Rosa-Borges' residence and found additional ammunition. Rosa-Borges' brother, Naim, claimed that the ammunition belonged to Rosa-Borges.In the lower courts, Rosa-Borges pleaded guilty to the charges. However, he disputed the claim that he possessed the additional 100 rounds of ammunition found at his residence, arguing that the information was derived from unreliable hearsay from his brother, who had a motive to avoid his own criminal liability. Despite these objections, the district court sentenced Rosa-Borges to a total of 108 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. The appellate court found that the district court had relied on unreliable hearsay evidence from Rosa-Borges' brother to extend Rosa-Borges' sentence. The court concluded that the brother's statement was self-serving and inconsistent with the government's version of events, and therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to find the statement reliable. The court did not address Rosa-Borges' argument that his limited confrontation right under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) was violated. View "United States v. Rosa-Borges" on Justia Law

The case involves a man, Dominic N., who was involuntarily committed for mental health treatment. Dominic N. has a history of being charged with sexual abuse of a minor and has been deemed incompetent to stand trial multiple times. He has been diagnosed with numerous mental health and behavioral conditions, including major depressive disorder, selective mutism, and borderline intellectual functioning. In 2021, he was again charged with sexual abuse of a minor and found mentally incompetent to stand trial. While at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for competency restoration, he was diagnosed with additional disorders, including antisocial personality disorder.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a competency hearing and found Dominic mentally incompetent. The court ordered his commitment to API for further evaluation and restoration. The State petitioned for an order authorizing Dominic’s evaluation to determine whether he was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to others. The court granted the petition, and API staff filed a petition for 30-day civil commitment. After a hearing, the court found that Dominic was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to others, and ordered his commitment to API for 30 days.Dominic appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, arguing that the State failed to prove that he was mentally ill as defined by statute and that his diagnoses were the type of intellectual and developmental disabilities excluded from the definition. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order, concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Dominic suffered from mental illness that is more than his excluded disabilities. The court found that Dominic’s impulse control disorder and pedophilic disorder were distinct from his intellectual and developmental disabilities, satisfying the statutory definition of mental illness. View "In re Hospitalization of Dominic N." on Justia Law

In 2010, Jason Meade was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life, with all but fourteen-to-twenty years suspended. As part of his probation conditions, he was required to complete the Cognitive Self Change (CSC) Program. However, the CSC program was discontinued and replaced with the Risk Reduction Programming (RRP). In 2022, Meade's probation officer moved to modify his probation condition to require him to undergo screening for RRP and complete the program if directed by his probation officer. Meade did not agree to the requested modification.The trial court heard evidence on the motion and subsequently issued an order granting the motion and modifying the probation condition. The court concluded that RRP was consistent with the sentencing goals articulated by the sentencing court and that the modification did not impose harsher or more restrictive conditions on Meade. It therefore modified the condition to require “Risk Reduction Programming as deemed appropriate by PO.”Meade appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the plain language of the original condition did not require him to participate in RRP and there was no change in circumstances sufficient to justify modifying the condition. He further claimed that the modified condition violated his right to due process because it was vague and placed compliance outside his control.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the original probation condition could not be construed to require Meade to participate in RRP. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court erred in modifying the condition over Meade’s objection because the State failed to demonstrate that there had been a change in Meade’s circumstances or that RRP was not harsher or more restrictive than CSC. View "State v. Meade" on Justia Law

Edbert Neal Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder in the death of Genelda Campeau and the attack on her adult granddaughter, S.C. Williams was sentenced to life in prison for murder and received a 180-month consecutive sentence for attempted murder. He appealed, and his convictions were affirmed. In this postconviction proceeding, Williams seeks a new trial or an evidentiary hearing based on new DNA evidence not available at the time of trial. Williams asserts the DNA evidence exonerates him and implicates an alternative perpetrator.Williams had previously filed multiple postconviction relief petitions, all of which were denied. In 2019, Williams filed a motion seeking forensic testing of evidence from the 1996 crime scene. The district court granted the motion, and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”) analyzed evidence that it had retained from the crime scene. The BCA released three reports in August 2020, September 2020, and November 2022, and a private lab Williams hired released one report in October 2022. Williams asserts that these reports corroborate his claims that he was not at the scene of the crime when it occurred and that an alternative perpetrator killed Genelda.The district court summarily denied his petition. The court concluded that Williams’s petition was barred by the 2-year time limit for postconviction relief petitions set out in Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2022), and that neither the newly-discovered-evidence exception nor the interests-of-justice exception to the time bar applied.The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the new DNA evidence did not meet the clear and convincing standard for newly discovered evidence and, in fact, some of the additional testing points towards Williams as the perpetrator rather than excludes him. The court also rejected Williams's claim that he is entitled to relief based on the interests-of-justice exception because his mental illness prevented him from timely filing his petition. The court noted that Williams had been sufficiently competent to file his direct appeal from his conviction, postconviction petitions, and appeals from postconviction petitions. View "Williams vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

The case revolves around William P. Spangler, who was initially convicted of second-degree murder for his role in the shooting death of Faustino Martinez. After serving a prison term longer than his sentence, Spangler was retried and convicted of a lesser charge, involuntary manslaughter. He then sought compensation for the extra time he spent in prison.Spangler's initial conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals. However, he later filed a motion arguing that he received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. The district court agreed, finding that Spangler's trial counsel failed to investigate his mental health status and its effect on his state of mind when he shot Martinez. This failure was deemed prejudicial to Spangler, and a new trial was ordered. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.In the retrial, Spangler was again convicted, but this time of involuntary manslaughter rather than second-degree murder. He was released based on time served, having served about four-and-a-half years beyond the sentence imposed for his involuntary manslaughter conviction. Spangler then filed a civil action seeking compensation for the time he spent in prison beyond his involuntary manslaughter sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the district court's decision that Spangler's own conduct caused or brought about his conviction, thus precluding any recovery. The court interpreted the statute to reflect the Legislature's intent to impose a common-sense limitation: Only someone innocent of the criminal conduct supporting the underlying conviction may pursue a claim for damages. Therefore, a claimant like Spangler, who stands convicted of a lesser included offense based on the same charge as a previous conviction, is not eligible to seek relief. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Spangler" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jose Garcia-Martinez, who was convicted for first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, and battery. The incident occurred on July 1, 2020, when Garcia-Martinez and others attacked Roy Hayden, suspecting him to be a law enforcement officer. The group beat Hayden, confined him in a bathroom, and later moved him to the trunk of a car. Hayden's decomposed body was found days later in the abandoned car.The case was initially tried in Sedgwick District Court, where Garcia-Martinez was found guilty. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the State presented alternative means of committing aggravated kidnapping and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt on each of the alternative means. He also argued that the district court erred in refusing to give a unanimity instruction because the jury heard evidence of multiple acts that could have supported his aggravated kidnapping conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the phrase "taking or confining" in K.S.A. 21-5408(a) does not present alternative means of committing kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping; rather, it presents options within a means merely describing the factual circumstances that may prove the material element of holding the victim to accomplish one of the four alternative means of committing kidnapping set forth in the statute. The court also found that a unanimity instruction was not required because the evidence established a single continuous incident of aggravated kidnapping, not multiple acts. View "State v. Garcia-Martinez" on Justia Law