Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants in this case were three companies engaged in providing cable-television services to subscribers (collectively, "Charter"). In a consolidated petition for review, Charter challenged the Tax Division of Appellee Arkansas Public Service Commission's ad valorem assessments of its properties for the tax years 2006 through 2009. The Commission upheld the Tax Division's assessments, and the circuit court affirmed. Charter appealed, arguing (1) the assessments were erroneous because they included the valuation of intangible personal property, which it claimed was exempt from taxation, and (2) the assessment of intangible property was illegal because the tax Division failed to promulgate rules that would provide notice of the change to taxpayers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err by assessing the value of Charter's intangible personal property because the relevant statutes require the assessment of a cable-television company's intangible personal property, and the exemption provision exempting the taxation of intangible personal property did not apply; and (2) the Court was precluded from addressing Charter's second issue on appeal. View "Falcon Cable Media LP v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from issues involving the school-funding system and the disbursement of uniform rate of tax (URT) revenues to Arkansas's public-school districts. Appellees, school districts and their taxpayers ("School Districts"), filed a complaint seeking a declaration that any attempt by Appellants, the commissioner of the department of education and the state treasurer ("ADE"), to demand URT revenues in excess of the foundation-funding amount from Appellees was unconstitutional. The circuit court enjoined ADE from (1) seeking repayment of any portion of the URT revenues assessed for purposes of school funding from Appellees, and (2) withholding monies belonging to Appellees for the repayment of the URT revenues required for school funding from state or federal monies owed to the districts. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found that ADE was not authorized by the legislature to recoup and redistribute any URT revenues received from the School Districts that were in excess of the foundation-funding amount; (2) did not err in finding that ADE lacked the authority to withhold monies from the School Districts; and (3) erred in finding that the revenues generated by the URT were state-tax revenues. View "Kimbrell v. McCleskey" on Justia Law

A taxpayer class filed an illegal-exaction complaint. The case was remanded for the circuit court to ascertain a remedy consistent with the Supreme Court's decision that the taxpayers had proved a valid claim for illegal exaction of increased ad valorem library taxes for the 2007 ad valorem tax year. In this appeal, the taxpayers contended that the circuit court erred in applying the voluntary-payment rule to class members who paid the tax in question prior to the date the complaint for illegal exaction was filed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order appealed was not a final order and did not contain specific factual findings of any danger of hardship or injustice that could be alleviated by an immediate appeal, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Robinson v. Villines" on Justia Law

The Carnegie Public Library is located within Carroll County. It and two other libraries within the county are maintained through funds generated by an ad valorem tax. Appellees, the county officials responsible for distribution of the tax proceeds, divided the library tax evenly between the three libraries. Appellants, the Carnegie Library, library board, and two individuals, filed a complaint alleging that, pursuant to section 19 of Act 74 of 1883, the county was required to divide the tax proceeds based on the division of the county into the Eastern and Western Districts, which would result in fifty percent of all tax revenue collected being distributed wholly to the Carnegie Library as the only public library in the Western District. The circuit court dismissed Appellants' complaint, holding (1) section 19 of Act of 1883 was unconstitutional, and (2) the Act did nothing more than create two judicial districts. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a challenge to the distribution of the tax proceeds should have been raised in county court, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, as did the Supreme Court. View "Carnegie Pub. Library of Eureka Springs v. Carrroll County" on Justia Law

Appellant Taxpayers were the owners of all or a portion of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on, and under each of their real property located in the counties party to this lawsuit. Taxpayers filed a complaint against the Counties, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that an ad valorem property tax was an illegal exaction. The circuit court concluded that Taxpayers had failed to make a proper illegal-exaction challenge and dismissed their lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint where (1) the crux of Taxpayers' argument was that the tax assessed against them was illegal because the assessment was flawed; and (2) the Taxpayers' avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with each county's equalization board.

Comcast of Little Rock filed three petitions for review with the Arkansas Public Service Commission, asserting that Comcast's ad valorem tax assessment for the years 2006-08 erroneously included the value of its intangible personal property. The Commission's ALJ dismissed Comcast's petitions. Comcast subsequently filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the county court, asserting that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it and arguing that the Commission's tax division improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments. The county court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the claims. The circuit court also dismissed Comcasts's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Comcast's challenge to its assessment; and (2) because Comcasts's claim did not challenge the validity of the underlying tax, but rather alleged that the assessment was carried out in an illegal fashion, the suit did not come within Arkasnas's illegal-exaction provision, and therefore, Comcast's avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with the Commission.

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.

Howard Curry's property appraisal increased on two different occasions after his sixty-fifth birthday. After the second assessment, Curry unsuccessfully petitioned the Equalization Board of Pope County to reduce the appraisal on his property. Curry then filed a petition in the county court, stating that the valuation was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the property was incorrectly assessed under Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday, unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. The county court ruled only on the assessment value and did not rule on the amendment 79 issues. Curry appealed and also filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction. The two cases were merged for trial. The circuit court ruled on the assessment, which was higher than the assessment in place on Curry's sixty-fifth birthday, and found that the improvements Curry made to his residence before he turned age sixty-five were "substantial improvements" within the language of the amendment. In the first of Curry's two appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons stated in the second appeal, Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 408.

In 2009, the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System (ATRS) petitioned the county court seeking a determination that a shopping center it owned was exempt from ad valorem taxation. The county court rejected ATRS's contention that the property qualified for an exemption. ATRS appealed. The circuit court held that the shopping center was not exempt under article 16, section 5 of the Arkansas Constitution because the property was not used exclusively for public purposes. ATRS appealed, arguing the shopping center is public property used exclusively for public purposes and therefore is exempt from taxation under the constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court's decision was not clearly erroneous. The evidence was undisputed that the property in question is a retail shopping center that is leased to private business. As such, the ATRS failed to demonstrate the structure is used exclusively for public purposes.