Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. 2201, alleging that the so-called "parsonage exemption" violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sued the Executive Office of the California Franchise Tax Board in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that California's parsonage exemption violated the Establishment Clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. Six days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, a minister of the gospel in the Sacramento area, who regularly claimed both the federal and state parsonage exemptions, moved to intervene as a defendant. At issue was whether an individual who claimed certain federal and state tax exemptions could intervene in an unrelated action challenging the constitutionality of those exemptions. The court held that the minister was not entitled to intervene as of right where the federal defendants adequately represented the minister's interest. The court also clarified that the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement did not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor was not raising new claims. Therefore, the court also held that the minister was not required to make any further showing that his intervention was supported by independent jurisdictional grounds where the district court's denial of permissive intervention was not an appropriate exercise in discretion because the district court did not apply the correct legal rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded that portion of the district court's order so that the district court could reassess the request for permissive intervention.

The Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), Unkechauge Indian Nation ("Unkechauge Nation"), St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe"), Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation"), and Oneida Nation of New York ("Oneida Nation") (collectively, "plaintiffs") sought to enjoin amendments to New York's tax law which were designed to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-member purchasers. At issue was whether New York's amended tax law interfered with plaintiffs' tribal sovereignty and violated their immunity from state taxation. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the precollection scheme impermissibly imposed a direct tax on tribal retailers, or alternatively, imposed an undue and unnecessary economic burden on tribal retailers; and that the coupon and prior approval systems interfered with their rights of self-government and rights to purchase cigarettes free from state taxation. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Oneida Nation's motion for preliminary injunction and correctly rejected the Seneca Nation's, Cayuga Nation's, Unkechauge Nation's, and Mohawk Tribe's motions for preliminary injunctions.

The Polm Family Foundation ("Foundation") filed a suit in district court for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). At issue was whether the Foundation qualified as a public charity under section 509(a)(3) of the IRC. The court held that, in light of the broad purposes mentioned in the Foundation's articles of incorporation, the court agreed with the government that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Foundation would receive oversight from a readily identifiable class of publicly supported organizations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Foundation did not qualify as a public charity under section 509(a)(3).

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.

Appellants Daniel Luker and several other attorneys appealed the grant of summary judgment to the State Tax Assessor on their petitions for review of tax assessments for the 2004 and 2005 tax years. The firm for which they worked was organized as a Maine limited liability partnership (LLP), with its principal place of business in Portland. While the firm was a limited liability corporation (LLC), each attorney joined as a member, but each worked out of the firmâs New Hampshire office. As members of a Maine LLC, the attorneys were required to pay Maine income taxes. In December, 2003, each attorney formed a New Hampshire professional corporation (PC) to hold his respective interest in the Maine LLC. When the firm reorganized as a LLP, each attorney transferred his respective partnership interest in the firm to their individual PCs. Each PC then signed a partnership agreement with the firm. Each attorney was the sole shareholder and director for his PC, and served as the PCâs president, treasurer and secretary. None of the PCs employed office staff or other attorneys. Each PC entered into an arrangement through which it was designated a âco-employerâ of the attorney for purposes of firm profit sharing and benefits. In 2004 and 2005, each PC received partnership distributions from the firm. The size of the distribution depended on the performance of the attorney. The salary of each attorney roughly equated to the size of the distribution they received from the firm. Each PC deducted all payments to its respective attorney as a cost of doing business, thereby minimizing the PCâs taxable income. The State Tax Assessor viewed the creation of the PCs as an attempt to evade Maine income taxes, disregarded the corporate entities and assessed a tax on the distributions as income. The attorneys appealed the assessments. The district court granted summary judgment in the Assessorâs favor, and the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. The Supreme Court in affirming the lower courtâs decision, held that each attorney individually, not his respective PC, earned the income from the partnership distributions, and must pay income taxes.

Maverick Motorsports Group, LLC ("Maverick") challenged a decision of the State Board of Equalization ("SBOE") that certain sales by Maverick were subject to Wyoming sales tax. At issue was whether sales of recreational vehicles were taxable in Wyoming because possession was transferred in Wyoming. Also at issue was whether enforcement and collection of Wyoming sales taxes violated the Commerce Clause. The court affirmed the actions of the SBOE and held that the purchase of the various recreational vehicles at issue constituted a taxable event where buyers took possession of the vehicles in Wyoming and that collection of sales taxes on these vehicles met constitutional requirements and did not violate the Commerce Clause.

Appellee Betty Vandenberg owned a parcel of land which she leased to individuals who farmed the land. The parcel contained a well, a pump, motor, gear box, and pipe, all of which were used to irrigate the land. The central issue of this case involves the irrigation pump, which hanged inside a cased well and was secured to the land with a cement cap and bolts. The County assessor determined that the pump was taxable as Appelleeâs personal property. She appealed to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) which reversed the assessor and called the pump a fixture on the land. The County appealed TERCâs decision. The Supreme Court found that the pump is a trade fixture, a fixture that is taxed as personal property. The Court reversed TERCâs determination and remanded the case for further proceedings on the assessment of tax.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Corboy and a number of real property owners and taxpayers brought claims against various state and county Defendants-Appellants to get an exemption from property taxes equal to an exemption granted to Hawaiian homestead lessees under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA). Plaintiffs are not native Hawaiians, but argued that the tax exemptions for homestead lessees involve race-based discrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Federal civil rights laws because only native Hawaiians are eligible to become homestead lessees under the HHCA. Accordingly, they sought a refund of real property taxes paid in excess of what they would have been assessed had each of them been granted an exemption. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the disputed exemptions did not violate the equal protection clause because the exemptions were not based upon whether a taxpayer was a native Hawaiian, but instead they were based on whether the taxpayer was a homestead lessee of HHCA land. The tax appeal court granted the Stateâs motion, and on appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the courtâs awarding of the summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to the constitutionality of the tax exemption and the HHCA. The record reflected that the Plaintiffs were not interested in participating in the homestead lease program and therefore they could not establish an injury sufficient to give them standing to challenge the exemption. The Court vacated the tax appeal courtâs judgment, and ordered the lower court to dismiss Plaintiffsâ cases for lack of jurisdiction.

Victor Bravo Aviation is a Connecticut company founded and established by E. Brian Cleary and his wife Vicki in 2002. In 2004, Victor Bravo contracted to purchase an aircraft from Columbia Aircraft Sales in Connecticut. The aircraft was constructed in France. It was flown to the USA with scheduled stops in Maine and Connecticut in 2005. Victor Bravo took possession of the aircraft in Connecticut as its owner. The aircraft was flown its first twelve months in Maine and other surrounding states. The aircraft made thirty-seven flights to Maine. It was stationary in Maine for 156 days with approximately 121 overnight lay-overs. Victor Bravo never had the aircraft registered in Maine. Victor Bravo was assessed with Maine use taxes on the aircraft in February 2007. Victor Bravo appealed this assessment to the Superior Court which was upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court made the distinction between the facts of this case with those in the "Blue Yonder" case which was decided April 26, 2011. It was determined that the aircraft owned by Victor Bravo was used in a manner that went beyond having a âtemporary, transient presenceâ in Maine. The Court held that under these circumstances, the aircraft should be properly considered to have âcome to restâ in Maine, and therefore subject to the Maine use tax. The Court affirmed the Superior Court and Assessorâs decisions.

Blue Yonder is a company owned by Stephen Kahn and his wife. Blue Yonder purchased an aircraft from Cirrus Design Corporation in 2002 in Minnesota. Kahn flew the aircraft from Minnesota to Massachusetts. The aircraft was registered in Massachusetts. The aircraft has never been registered in Maine. No sales or use tax has been paid on the aircraft in any jurisdiction. Kahn rented the aircraft from Blue Yonder for his personal and business use, as well as for humanitarian purposes (delivering ill or injured patients to Massachusetts through a charity program). Kahn was the only operator of the aircraft. Kahn owned properties in Maine which he visited using the aircraft. The craft was present in the state for at least twenty-one full days in a twelve-month period. Maine Revenue Service assessed a use tax on the aircraft. Blue Yonder appealed the assessment to the Superior Court. The Superior Court entered judgment for the Assessor. Blue Yonder appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that because the aircraft was used only briefly in Maine, it was exempt from the use tax when it was purchased out-of-state, and was never registered in Maine. The Court vacated the lower courtâs decision.