The state tax auditor assigned a $3.6 million value to an 80-room hotel for the tax year 2005. The owner, KDM and Associates, LLC (KDM) challenged the valuation with the Board of Revision in March 2006. KDM sought to reduce the valuation to $2.4 million, the original purchase price of the hotel. The Hilliard City Schools Board cross complained, and sought to maintain the assessorâs original valuation. The Supreme Court affirmed the original $3.6 million valuation, finding that accounting discrepancies did not entitle KDM to the reduced assessed-value in the hotel.

The City of Atlanta ("city"), which required the payment of hotel occupancy taxes pursuant to OCGA 48-13-50 et seq., brought an action against Hotels.com and on-line travel companies (collectively, "OTCs"), which book hotel rooms and make other travel arrangements for customers who access their services over the internet, alleging that the retail room rate was the appropriate amount upon which to base the hotel occupancy tax and seeking injunctive relief, as well as back taxes. At issue was whether the trial court erred when it determined that the "rent" for occupying a city hotel room was the room rate paid by the consumer rather than the negotiated wholesale rate between the OTCs and the hotel; when it issued the injunctive relief; when it voided those portions of the OTCs' contracts which provided that hotel occupancy taxes would be collected and remitted based on the negotiated wholesale rate; and when it held that the city did not have a remedy for back taxes. The court affirmed the trial court and held that the retail room rate was the taxable amount of "rent" under the city's ordinance where the consumer could not obtain the right to occupy the room without paying the retail room rate charged by the OTCs. The court also held that the trial court did not err in issuing its injunctive order where there was no governmental authority in the city, or in the state, that required any OTCs to collect hotel occupancy taxes. The court further held that, because the injunction provided for the proper collection and remittance of the city's hotel occupancy taxes should the OTCs elect to continue to act as third-party tax collectors, the trial court's error in reaching a determination that the contracts at issue were void was improper but the error was effectively moot and provided no basis for removal. The court finally held that the city failed to identify a benefit it had conferred on the OTCs and, accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the OTCs was sustained.

Appellant filed requests with appellee for refunds of taxes that appellant paid on premiums derived from certain life insurance policies, for tax years 2001 to 2003. The Delaware Insurance Commissioner ("Commissioner") denied appellant's request on the basis that appellant could not aggregate the premium income from those insurance policies into one unitary "case" for tax purposes under section 702 of the Delaware Insurance Code. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the term "case," which appeared in section 702. The court held that the plain meaning of section 702(c)(2)b, both pre- and post-amendment, was that the premiums received from insurance policies could be aggregated into one "case" only if those policies were issued through the same private placement memorandum. Therefore, appellant could not aggregate the seven insurance policies that were issued via separate private placements into one "case."

Respondents, owners of a vendors lien on each of four tracts of land, sued to have their liens declared superior to petitioner's liens. At issue was whether petitioner's liens were not unenforceable pursuant to section 32.06 of the Texas Tax Code's requirements for transfer. The court held that petitioner's tax liens were not unenforceable when verified copies were recorded in lieu of originals; when the procedure wherein the tax collector made the required certification before a notary, sealed with a notarial seal, in lieu of a seal of his own, complied with section 32.06(d); and when the tax collector's record-keeping and receipts were irrelevant to the enforceability of petitioner's liens.

During 10 years in a 12-year period the defendant, an Ohio physician, filed federal income tax returns that showed she owed taxes â but she failed to pay them. The United States brought an action for judgment and to foreclose on its tax liens on defendant's real property. Defendant argued that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition discharged her tax liabilities for some of the years preceding the filing. The district court disagreed and entered a $319,698 judgment in favor of the United States, finding that she had willfully attempted to evade paying taxes for those years, preventing discharge of the obligations through her bankruptcy filing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the government did not establish willfulness as required by 11 U.S.C. 523(a). There was no evidence that the defendant lived lavishly; the district court incorrectly applied the test applicable only to student loans and made assumptions about her ability to earn more money and her husband's failure to contribute.

The Indiana Attorney General (AG) sought to recover a tax refund issued to Aisin USA Manufacturing, Inc. (Aisin) at the Superior Court. The AG appealed the courtâs decision in favor of Aisin, arguing that because it was a tax matter, the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to hear matters that âarose underâ the state tax laws. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the case could proceed in the Superior Court. The Court found that despite the AGâs characterization of the case, the refund was a result of accounting and clerical errors within the Department of Revenue that were wholly unrelated to any interpretation or application of tax law. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings in Superior Court.

Eden Prairie Mall (EPM) challenged the assessed value determinations of one of its anchor tenants. For the tax years 2005 and 2006, the court concluded that the market values of EPM and the tenant should have been assessed at higher rates than the assessments that were entered into evidence at trial. EPM argued that the tax court's valuations were excessive and not supported by the record. EPM filed for bankruptcy during the tax court proceedings and subsequently argued that the tax court violated the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code when the court increased its taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the tax court's reassessment did not violate the automatic stay of the bankruptcy code, but that the record did not support the reassessments. The Court reversed the tax court's holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2004 the bank made a loan secured by a mortgage and all rents from the property. Three years later the borrower defaulted. The IRS filed a tax lien against the property. A receiver, appointed at the request of the bank, rented the property and collected $82,675. The district court held that the IRS lien had priority. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The bank had perfected its security interest in the rents under Indiana law; 26.U.S.C. 6323 gives such an interest priority over a federal tax lien if the property subject to the interest was "in existence" when the federal tax lien was filed. The property at issue is the real estate, not the rental income, and was in existence at the time the lien was filed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment in which the district court found him guilty of four counts of aiding in the preparation of false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At issue was whether the district court unlawfully based its verdict on the guilty pleas of co-defendants, which were not evidence in the case, thereby depriving defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; whether the district court improperly credited testimony by the government's key witness that defendant contended was false; and whether the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant knew that the tax returns he prepared were fraudulent and that he willfully violated section 7206(2). The court held that the district court's erroneous references to the unadmitted guilty pleas of his co-defendants constituted harmless error where the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that defendant deliberately avoided learning of materially false representations on the tax returns at issue. The court also held that the district court did not err in its consideration of a key witness' testimony where the the testimony was the product of reliable principles and methods. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant purposefully "closed his eyes" to large accounting discrepancies, which strongly indicated that the tax forms he prepared during the years in question contained materially false financial information.

The City of Indianapolis abandoned the âBarrett Lawâ method of financing sewer improvements in favor of a new system that imposes less of a financial burden on property owners. To ease the transition, the City discharged all outstanding Barnett Law assessments owing as of November 1, 2005, but did not give refunds to those property owners who had previously paid their Barrett Law assessments in full or in part. Plaintiffs Christine Armour and other property owners who had paid their Barrett Law assessments in full petitioned the City for refunds in the amount equal to the assessments discharged in 2005. In their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that the City had violated their federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. At trial, the court granted Plaintiffsâ motion for summary judgment, and the City appealed. On appeal, Plaintiffs abandoned their due process claim and sought to have the equal protection claim sustained. The appellate court affirmed the trial courtâs judgment. The City appealed again. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the City did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because forgiving the outstanding assessment balances was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.