Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of aiding and abetting the preparation of false federal income tax returns and was sentenced to 72 months imprisonment. Defendant argued that his experiences in Somalia during the violent Somali civil war entitled him to a sentence well below the advisory Guidelines range. At issue was whether the district court's sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court not only considered defendant's personal history and circumstances in fashioning a sentence, but reduced the sentence it would have otherwised assessed defendant in light thereof. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 72 months imprisonment.

WCI Steel appealed a final assessment of its personal property valuation for tax purposes to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA dismissed WCI's appeal on the authority of Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin because its notice of appeal failed to specify error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) a notice of appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of personal property invokes the jurisdiction of the BTA to review that determination if the notice states the appellant's objection to the commissioner's actions in valuing property and identifies the treatment that the commissioner should have applied; (2) BTA's jurisdiction in the appeal permitted it to consider evidence in addition to that considered by the tax commissioner; and (3) the BTA misapplied Ohio Bell to this situation. Remanded.

American Home Shield of Nevada (AHS) sought a refund on insurance premium taxes it had erroneously paid on service contracts for four years exempt from taxation under statute. The department of taxation granted AHS a refund for two years but denied AHS a refund for the other years based on a statutory one-year limitations period. The department also denied AHS interest. The district court granted AHS's petition for judicial review, concluding that (1) Humboldt County v. Lander County obligated the department to refund the taxes, and (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.2935 entitled AHS to interest. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the department did not err when it determined that AHS's refund taxes for certain years were barred by the one-year limitation period, (2) the district court's reliance on Humboldt County in determining that AHS was entitled to a refund of all of its erroneous tax payments was misplaced, and (3) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 680B.120 is the applicable statute governing AHS's refund request and it does not provide for interest, the district court erred by determining that AHS was entitled to interest on its refunds.

This appeal arose out of an ongoing conflict between Washoe County and certain taxpayers in Incline Village and Crystal Bay regarding property tax valuation, equalization, and collection. At issue was whether the district court properly issued a writ of mandamus requiring the county treasurer to refund excess taxes paid by the respondent taxpayers for the 2006-2007 tax year. The taxpayers paid the excess taxes because of a stay imposed in a pending appeal challenging a prior year's assessments. The Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly issued the writ of mandamus because the taxpayers paid more than was due and typical administrative remedies to recover overpaid taxes do not apply where the taxpayers were successful at all levels below; and (2) the treasurer had a duty to refund the excess taxes pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.2935.

Illinois riverboat casinos filed a RICO suit (18 U.S.C. 1961) against racetracks, charging that the owner of two tracks, in cahoots with then-governor, Blagojevich, "bought" statutes requiring casinos to deposit three percent of their revenues to the "Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund" for disbursement to racetracks for use to increase purses and improve the tracks. The district judge issued, then dissolved, a temporary restraining order. The Seventh Circuit reinstated, so that no money is being disbursed, but on rehearing en banc, affirmed. The Tax Injunction Act forbids federal district courts to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law," if an adequate remedy is available in the state courts, as it is in Illinois 28 U.S.C. 1341. If unlawfulness can be traced to the racetracks, the casinos can seek damages from them. The Act does not bar federal monetary relief, but federal courts cannot freeze the state’s tax moneys by imposition of a constructive trust. The court extended the TRO for 30 days pending petition for certiorari.

After illegally collecting a three percent excise tax, the IRS created a refund procedure for taxpayers to recoup their money. Appellants argued that the procedure was unlawful. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction and whether appellants stated a valid claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that it had federal question jurisdiction and neither the Anti Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), nor the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), provided a limitation on the court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Therefore, because appellants had no other adequate remedy at law, the district court should consider the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., claim on remand.

Property owner Riser Foods Company appealed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in which the BTA determined the true value of Riser's real estate to be $450,000 for tax year 2005 rather than $73,700 as determined by the county auditor and the County Board of Revision (BOR). The BTA's determination of value was predicated on the price paid for the property in 2005 in accordance with a buy-out option agreed to by the parties in a ground lease. The ground lease was entered into in 1998, and ownership was transferred in 2005. The BTA regarded the buy-out-option price as a recent, arm's-length sale price that furnished the criterion of value for the property as of 2005 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) Riser had the initial burden to show that the 2005 sale was either not recent or not at arm's length; (2) Riser failed to negate the recency of the sale; and (3) Riser did not show that the long-standing contractual obligation to purchase made the sale involuntary or that a lack of open-market elements was significant.

First Union National Bank of Florida (First Union) appealed a judgment in favor of the Lee County Commission (Commission) and Philip Summers. Mr. Summers executed a mortgage on property he owned within the County on which he built a summer home. The home was ultimately subject to a tax sale by the County. The trustee for Mid-State Trust IV sued the Commission and Mr. Summers in 2009 seeking the excess redemption proceeds from the tax sale of the Summers property. The trustee later filed a motion to substitute First Union as the real party in interest. The trial court eventually entered a judgment finding that Mr. Summers was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale because he was the last "owner" as defined by state law against whom the taxes were assessed. Upon careful consideration of the trial court’s record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Appellants, St. Louis County and St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC), filed suit against Prestige Travel and numerous other online travel companies that facilitate the booking of hotel and motel rooms via the internet. The appellants argued that Prestige and the other companies were required to pay hotel and tourism taxes imposed by the revised ordinances of St. Louis County and state law. Prestige moved to dismiss the petition, and the circuit court overruled the motion. Shortly thereafter, H.B. 1442, which specifically exempted online travel companies such as Prestige from the tax, was passed. Prestige filed a motion to reconsider its motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed the case. Appellants appealed, arguing the law violated the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) appellants waived their constitutional challenge to the law by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity; (2) the law does not violate the original purpose requirement of the state constitution; and (3) the argument that the title of the law is so general that the bill should be invalidated in its entirety is not supported by the current state of law.

Debtor filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in 1998 and submitted a plan of reorganization ("Plan"), continuing to operate as a debtor-in-possession. Article X of the confirmed Plan provided for the discharge of all debts pursuant to which debtor was the "primary obligor." In 2007, the IRS contacted debtor's principal officers regarding potential assessment of a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty ("TFRP") pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672. At issue was whether the collection of a TFRP from the principal officers violated the express terms of Article X discharging such claims. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction where the relief sought by debtor would effectively preclude the IRS's collection of a section 6672 assessment and therefore, fell squarely within the reach of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), and the court's holding in American Bicycle Ass'n v. United States. The court also held that, in light of the well-established principle that section 6672 liability was a separate and distinct liability, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court's alternative holding that, although a corporation could be the primary obligor on its own underlying tax obligation, it was not the primary obligor on the separate and distinct assessment under section 6672. Rather, the corporate officers were the primary obligors on the TFRP liabilities, as these liabilities were assessed independently under section 6672 for the officers' own willful conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the bankruptcy court was affirmed.