Confronting a statewide budget crisis, the Nevada Legislature undertook several revenue-adjustment and cost cutting measures in an effort to balance the State's budget. Those measures were codified in Assembly Bill 6 (AB 6). In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked whether parts of AB 6 violated the Nevada Constitution. The disputed section of the bill applied only to Appellant Clean Water Coalition (CWC), and converted money collected as user fees into a tax. The CWC used moneys it collected from households and businesses to implement the Systems Conveyance and Operations Program (SCOP) which involved the planning, design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a regional system to convey effluent from existing and future wastewater treatment facilities to its outfall in the Colorado River system. The CWC collected fees from 2002 until 2010. SCOP was tabled, and the funds collected for the wastewater facilities were transferred to the State's General Fund. M Resort and other businesses that had paid the fees sued the State, challenging the conversion of the CWC fees into what they argued was essentially a special tax. "Special taxes" are prohibited by the state constitution. The Supreme Court held that because AB 6 "burdens only the CWC in its efforts to raise revenue for the state, it is an impermissible local and special tax" under the state constitution. The Court found AB 6 unconstitutional.

After the Nevada Tax Commission denied Petitioner Southern California Edison's claims for refunds of use taxes, Edison filed a complaint in the district court seeking relief. The district court ordered that the matter should proceed on the administrative record as a petition for judicial review pursuant to the state Administrative Procedures Act. Edison petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the lower court to treat Edison's complaint as an independent civil action. The Supreme Court concluded that a "petition for judicial review" is the proper vehicle for challenging the Tax Commission's decisions on claims for sales and use tax refunds. However, the Department of Taxation was "judicially estopped" from requesting that Edison proceed in such a manner in this case because it specifically told Edison that trial de novo would be available if Edison was unhappy with the Commission's decision. The Court granted Edison the writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA), appealed a Superior Court ruling. Money distributions from the Lyme Timber Company (Lyme) paid to limited partners that lived in New Hampshire were not considered taxable income under the state tax code. The court reasoned that the Lyme partners' interests were not "transferable shares" within the meaning of the tax code, and therefore not taxable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the DRA argued that the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the tax regulations, and failed to consider portions of the Lyme partnership agreement. In its review, the Supreme Court engaged in defining the pertinent terms of the tax code and the Lyme partnership agreement. The Court concluded that the trial court did misinterpret many of the pertinent terms that were the basis of this appeal. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff imported the LCD monitors and entered them under a subheading of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States for "Automatic data processing machines and units thereof; magnetic or optical readers, machines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form and machines for processing such data, not elsewhere specified or included: Input or output units, whether or not containing storage units in the same housing: Other: Display units: Other: Other." The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection classified and reliquidated the monitors under a subheading, dutiable at 5% ad valorem, for: "Reception apparatus for television, whether or not incorporating radiobroadcast receivers or sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus; video monitors and video projectors: video monitors: Color: With a flat panel screen: Other: Other. " The Court of International Trade upheld the designation. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded because the Court of International Trade expressly did not reach the issue of the adequacy of the evidence for either a principal use or principal function.

The Supreme Court consolidated nine separate cases for review. In each, Plaintiffs own property that was subject to state property taxes. Each Plaintiff described the property as âmachinery and equipment.â For the 2008 tax year, the local assessors classified the property for tax-assessment purposes as âindustrial real propertyâ or âcommercial personal property.â Plaintiffs petitioned the relevant boards-of-review to reclassify the property as âindustrial personal property.â That reclassification would permit them to take advantage of recently enacted tax exemptions or credits. In each case, the board denied the request. Plaintiffs then petitioned the State Tax Commission (STC) to reclassify the property. In each case, the STC denied the requests. Plaintiffs then sought and obtained relief in various state circuit courts. The STC appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the court reversed each of the circuit court judgments. The appellate court held that state law barred an appeal of the STC classifications to any state court. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, to ask whether the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals of STC classification decisions. The Supreme Court found the state legislature has not provided for other means for judicial review of STC classification decisions. Accordingly, the Court held that the circuit courts do have jurisdiction over appeals from the STC.

Pursuant to an oil and gas lease with Appellee Trees Oil Company (Trees), Appellant Arthur Hockett had a 1/8-royalty interest in the production from a Haskell County well that produced natural gas. Trees operated the well, and sold the gas produced to âfirst purchasers.â Before paying Trees for production, the first purchasers deduct taxes and fees imposed by the state. Trees then pays Appellant 1/8 of the net sales proceeds. In 2009, Appellant filed a complaint against Trees, seeking recovery of the amount in tax deducted from the sales proceeds from the first purchasers. Trees moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it could not be held liable for complying with state law by paying the sales taxes. The district court held that the taxes and fees were to be imposed on all owners in the venture, including royalty owners. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court found that state law does not require royalty owners pay the oil and gas taxes and fees if they do not operate the well. The fees withheld by the first purchaser are an expense attributable to the oil company as the well operator. In computing Appellantâs royalties, Trees was not permitted to deduct the amount of its fees expenses from the gross sale price under contract with the first purchaser. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in ruling in favor of Trees. The Court remanded the remanded the case for further proceedings.

Washington Imaging Services is a medical imaging company that retains Overlake Imaging Associates as an independent contractor. Overlakeâs radiologists interpret the images that Washington Imaging generates. Washington Imaging pays Overlake a percentage of net receipts pursuant to the terms of a contract between them. Though patients know that doctors interpret the images taken by Washington Imaging, they do not know that Overlakeâs doctors review their images. The issue for review by the Supreme Court centered on whether Washington Imaging must pay business and occupation (B&O) tax on the entire amount it received from patients, or whether the amounts that Washington Imaging paid Overlake qualify as âpass throughâ payments on which Washington Imaging does not owe the tax. The trial court ruled in the Department of Revenueâs favor, holding that the amounts paid to Overlake do not qualify for pass-through treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court found that âWashington Imaging does not act in an agentâs capacity to pass payments from the patients through to Overlake. All of the payments received by Washington Imaging constitute gross income. . . and the B&O tax is owed on the entire amount that Washington Imaging receives.â

Defendant Manikhone Saignaphone pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government. The district court sentenced her to 26 monthsâ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing that her sentence was unreasonable in light of the lesser sentences given to her co-conspirators. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the record and found that Defendant failed to overcome the presumption that her sentence was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision and Defendantâs sentence.

This case came before the Supreme Court twice. The property owner challenged the Board of Tax Appeals' (BTA) use of a propertyâs sale price as an indicator of its value, arguing that it was an unreliable way to value property. The BTA rejected that challenge and adopted use of the sale price. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the BTA failed to give full consideration to whether the sale was "recent" which was one of the criteria that must be satisfied before a sale price may be used to value a property for tax purposes. The BTA responded by relying solely on the temporal proximity of the sale to the tax-lien dates. Because proximity was not the only factor affecting recency, and because the property owner made a persuasive argument, the Supreme Court vacated the BTA's decision and remanded the case for a proper determination of "recency" based on the entire record. BTA then issued its decision on remand. The BTA again adopted the sale price as the value of a property based on a conclusion that "recency" had not be rebutted. The property owner appealed again to the Supreme Court, arguing that the BTA disregarded the Supreme Court's earlier holding. The Supreme Court reviewed the BTA's findings of fact and found that its decision was "reasonable and lawful," and that it "fulfilled the instruction of the Court." The Court affirmed the decision of the BTA.

Tax valuation objection cases, filed between 2000 and 2005, settled with a 2006 agreed order under which the Cook County treasurer was to refund overpaid taxes with interest. The Property Tax Code interest rate was 5% until December 31, 2005; legislation (35 ILCS 200/23-20) effective January 1, 2006, provides for interest of the lesser of 5% or the Consumer Price Index. The supreme court held: The circuit court retained jurisdiction to award judgment interest after an appeal was filed. Because the treasurer had not appealed the issue of interest on two refunds, the court upheld judgment requiring that interest be paid at 5% from the date the taxes were paid through December 31, 2005 and based on the lower CPI rate from January 1, 2006, forward. The court properly applied the amendment. An objector did not forfeit judgment interest by failing to raise the issue before the trial court. The Property Tax Code controls interest that must be paid until there is a full refund of taxes paid in protest; if interest on the tax refund is not paid in full, judgment interest under the Code of Civil Procedure is allowed on the amount of outstanding interest.