The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision.

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In 2002 one of the company's founders informed the company that he wanted the company to buy out his 23 percent stock ownership interest. The company agreed to pay $255,908 plus $400,000, the equivalent of one year's salary, for a one-year covenant not to compete. The company amortized the covenant payments over the 12-month duration, which straddled tax years 2002 and 2003. The IRS determined that the covenant was an amortizable section 197 intangible, amortizable over 15 years and not over the duration of the covenant. The tax court upheld the decision. The First Circuit affirmed. A "section 197 intangible" includes any covenant not to compete entered into in connection with the acquisition of any shares, substantial or not, of stock in a corporation that is engaged in a trade or business.

In 2005 the Department of Revenue denied Permanent Fund Dividends (PDFs) to Appellants In and Peggy Harrod and their children. The Harrods appealed to the superior court where they argued that the Department lacked the authority to adopt residency requirements for the dividend program, that the denial of their applications violated the U.S. and State constitutions, and that their 2002 and 2003 dividend applications were wrongfully denied. The superior court affirmed the denial of the dividends. From 1997 to 2000, the Harrods resided outside of Alaska and did not apply for PDFs. In 2001 they unsuccessfully applied. Because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years, a presumption arose that they did not intend to return and remain in state. The DOR applied the presumption and the Harrods did not rebut it. The presumption was applied in the Harrods' 2002 and 2003 applications, and the DOR found that despite returning in state on infrequent or short trips, the Harrods had not remained in-state for five years. Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the record on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.

Defendant was convicted of failing to account for and pay employment taxes under 26 U.S.C. 7202, sentenced to 48 months imprisonment and fined $75,000. Defendant appealed his conviction, the calculation of loss to the government, and his fine. The court held that the district court did not err under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in admitting evidence relating to defendant's compliance with Minnesota tax law. The court held however, that the district court made insufficient findings to conclude that defendant had violated section 7206(2). Accordingly, the court vacated the calculation of loss and remanded for resentencing on the existing record. Because the court remanded for resentencing, it did not reach defendant's remaining arguments.

Covenant Healthcare, the sole member of a regional medical center that owns an outpatient clinic, constructed a building in the City of Wauwatosa to house the outpatient clinic. Covenant sought a tax exemption with the City for the clinic as property used exclusively for the purpose of a hospital under Wis. Stat. 70.11(4m)(a). The city assessor denied the exemption. After paying the assessed tax, Covenant brought an action to recover the amount of the City's allegedly unlawful assessment. The circuit court concluded that the clinic was exempt from taxation pursuant to the statute. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the outpatient clinic is used for the primary purposes of a hospital and therefore qualifies as tax-exempt property under the statute; (2) the outpatient clinic is neither a doctor's office nor a property used for commercial purposes within the meaning of the statute; and (3) no benefit inures to any member of the medical center because the term "member" under the statute does not include not-for-profit entities.

St. Louis County enacted an ordinance that established a new trash collection program in the county. Specifically, the ordinance authorized the county to establish trash collection areas in the county and allowed the county executive to advertise for bids or proposals to provide services for trash collection in the designated areas and award contracts to selected trash haulers. The County subsequently enacted an ordinance prohibiting trash haulers that were not selected in the bidding process from providing trash collection services within the eight designated collection areas. Taxpayers living in the waste collection areas then filed a class action petition, alleging (1) the County violated its charter and Mo. Rev. Stat. 260.247, violations that deemed the trash collection program void, and (2) the respondents violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MPA). The trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County did not violate its charter, (2) the taxpayers did not have standing to file a claim under Section 260.247, and (3) the taxypayers' claim under the MPA was derivative of their claims that the trash collection program was void, so that claim also failed.

Appellants, owners of interstate natural gas pipelines subject to a 25% ad valorem tax under Louisiana Constitution article 7, section 18, brought and won a state court suit alleging certain intrastate pipelines were unconstitutionally given more favorable tax treatment by being taxed only 15% from 1994-2003. At issue was whether the state court's revaluation process violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses, via 42 U.S.C. 1983, where that court ordered appellants' tax liability to be recalculated under the same fair-market-value determination process to which the intrastate pipelines were subjected. The court held that the district court properly dismissed appellants' suit because their federal claims were barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, which deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that sought to interfere with the administration of state tax systems so long as the state provided an adequate procedural vehicle for raising the claims and where appellants have raised their claims in state court and the Louisiana courts did not cease to provide a plain, speedy, or efficient remedy for appellants' injuries. Accordingly, the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

This case stemmed from the transportation excise tax that National Airlines (National) owed the government. Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment determination that, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672, he was personally liable for the excise taxes that National collected from its passengers but failed to pay over to the United States during his tenure as National's CEO. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the district court properly found that plaintiff was a "responsible person" and that his failure to pay taxes was willful as defined by this circuit's precedents.