In 2008, Olmsted County changed the property tax classification of farmland owned by Frederick Farms from agricultural-homestead to agricultural-nonhomestead property. The tax court denied Frederick Farms' petition to change the classification of the property back to agricultural homestead for taxes payable in 2009 and later. Frederick Farms appealed, arguing that it was operating a joint family farm venture with its sole shareholder, James Frederick, and that the County must classify the property as agricultural homestead because it was used by the joint family farm venture. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court, concluding (1) that a joint family farm venture must own or lease, and not merely use, the property in order for a participant of the joint family farm venture to claim an agricultural-homestead classification; and (2) because the family farm corporation, not the joint family farm venture, owned the land in question, Frederick Farms was not entitled to claim an agricultural-homestead classification as a participant in a joint family farm venture.

In connection with an assessment of a taxpayer for unpaid taxes, the IRS began searching for the taxpayer's assets and issued a summons to a bank for a related third party's account information. The taxpayer and third party argued that 26 U.S.C 7609 required the IRS to notify them, which would have enabled them to seek a court order quashing the summons. Applying Ip v. United States, the court held that under the circumstances of the case, no notice was necessary. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted of four counts of tax evasion and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the government constructively amended the indictment through the evidence presented at trial; the instructions erroneously defined "taxable income" and "good faith"; and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The government appealed defendant's sentence, contending that the district court erroneously relied on a fact rejected by the jury in imposing a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. The court held that neither a constructive amendment nor a variance occurred; the jury was properly instructed and defendant's arguments to the contrary were rejected; and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant. The court also held that the district court did not commit a procedural error and that the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

A jury found defendant, a licensed attorney, responsible for trust fund recovery penalties imposed by the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.) 6672 for unpaid employment taxes owed by Iowa Trade Bindery, Inc. (ITB). Defendant appealed the district court's judgment and "all adverse rulings and orders in this case." The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's signed Form 2751 and an IRS officer's testimony about the form, or by instructing the jury with respect to the form and its effect. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law where the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that defendant's remaining claims were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose when taxpayer transferred membership units in a family-owned LLC partly as a gift and partly by a sale to two trusts and coupled the transfers with simultaneous gifts of LLC units to two charitable foundations. Subsequent to an IRS audit, which determined that the units had been undervalued, the foundations discovered they would receive additional units. At issue was whether the taxpayer was entitled to a charitable deduction equal to the value of the additional units the foundations would receive. The court held that Treasury Regulation 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1) did not bar a charitable deduction equal to the value of the additional units the foundations would receive. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Two taxpayers filed a petition for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 99.1205, the Distressed Areas Land Assemblage Tax Credit Act. The taxpayers claimed that the tax credits provided by the Act constituted an unconstitutional grant or lending of public money to private persons, associations, or corporations. The trial court declined to enter declaratory judgment, concluding that the taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the statute. On appeal, the taxpayers argued they had standing because the tax credits were direct expenditures of funds generated through taxation and that the tax credits given under the Act were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding (1) the taxpayers did not meet their burden to prove they had standing to bring a challenge to the statute as the issuance of tax credits does not constitute a direct expenditure of funds generated through taxation, and (2) in accordance with Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, tax credits are not government expenditures and any effect on taxpayers in general is "merely speculative."

The Township brought a putative class action on behalf of itself and similarly situated New Jersey municipalities, alleging that defendants, companies who operate hotel booking sites online, owe unpaid hotel occupancy taxes. Defendants calculate the tax owed based on the negotiated rate paid by a defendant (wholesale rate), not the higher rate charged consumers (retail rate). Defendants pay the tax to the hotel, which remits it to the state taxing authority.The district court dismissed on grounds of prudential standing, holding that state officials have the right to enforce the statutory tax scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Township is not the proper plaintiff. Authority to adopt a hotel tax is granted municipalities by N.J. Stat. 40:48F-1, but administration and collection are left to state officials.

Two corporations organized as multiple housing cooperatives appealed the classification of their real estate as commercial for property tax purposes to the Jasper County Board of Review. The board did not alter the classification of the properties, and the cooperatives appealed. The district court affirmed the board's determination, concluding that the cooperative was actually operating as a standard rental property. After granting the cooperatives' combined motion for amendment and enlargement of findings and for a new trial, the district court concluded the cooperatives had followed all proper corporate formalities and were set up exactly as prescribed by Iowa law. Accordingly, the court reversed its prior ruling and concluded the real estate should properly be classified as residential. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Iowa law requires property owned by residential cooperatives, properly organized under chapter Iowa Code chapter 499A, to be classified as residential and taxed at residential property rates; and (2) because the cooperatives were operating on a nonprofit basis, there was no basis for penetrating the corporate veil.

In 2008, Marlow Timberland (MT) filed a tax petition challenging the taxes payable in 2008 on the belief that Lake County's property tax assessment of MT's recently purchased land was too high. MT then filed tax petitions challenging the taxes payable in 2009 and 2010, which were dismissed due to MT's failure to pay the taxes. MT moved to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions based on its contention that the properties were overassessed and that it was unable to pay the taxes due. The Minnesota Tax Court issued an order granting Lake County's motion to dismiss the 2008 petition and denying MT's motion to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions. On review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the tax court erred by not allowing MT to amend its 2008 petition because an amendment would not result in any prejudice to Lake County; and (2) the tax court properly denied MT's motion to reinstate its 2009 and 2010 tax petitions, and reinstatement of those petitions was not required on an equitable basis. Remanded.

The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prevents states and their subdivisions from imposing discriminatory taxes against railroads. 49 U.S.C. 11501. In 2008, the drainage district, a subdivision of Illinois, changed its method for calculating assessments. All other owners are assessed on a per-acre formula, but railroad, pipeline, and utility land were to be assessed on the basis of "benefit," apparently based on the difference in value between land within the district and land outside the levees; annual crop rentals being paid; and agricultural production of lands within the district. Two rail carriers brought suit under a section of the Act, which prevents imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." The district court held that the assessment was prohibited by the Act, but concluded that it was powerless to enjoin the tax. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the court has authority to enjoin the tax, but, under principles of comity, should eliminate only the discriminatory aspects, not the entire scheme. The assessment is a tax that, raises general revenues; its ultimate use is for the whole district. It imposes a proportionately heavier tax on railroading than other activities.