Victor Tacke failed to pay real property taxes on his property in Lake County from 2005 to 2008. In 2006, the County conducted a tax sale for the year 2005, at which the County purchased the tax lien. In 2009, the County assigned its interest in the tax lien to Montana Lakeshore Properties (Lakeshore) in exchange for payment of the past due taxes and issued a tax sale certificate to Lakeshore. The County subsequently issued a tax deed to Lakeshore. In 2010, Tacke filed an action to quiet title in the property, seeking a judicial declaration that the tax deed was void. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lakeshore. At issue on appeal was whether Lakeshore violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-17-212(3) by paying the back taxes two hours and forty-five minutes short of two weeks after giving notice to Tacke. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment upholding the tax deed obtained by Lakeshore because this case fit within the general principle that "the law regards the day as an indivisible unit" and discards fractional days in most time computations.

Continental Retail sought certiorari review of the market value determinations by the Minnesota Tax Court for a Continental commercial building for the assessment dates of 2006, 2007, and 2008. Continental filed petitions challenging the county assessor's estimated market value for the three years, and at trial, the tax court increased the market value determinations for all three years. On appeal, Continental argued that the tax court's value determinations were excessive and not supported by the record over the assessed value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court's value determinations were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous.

Continental Retail sought certiorari review of the market value determinations by the Minnesota Tax Court for a Continental commercial building for the assessment dates of 2006, 2007, and 2008. Continental filed petitions challenging the county assessor's estimated market value for the three years, and at trial, the tax court increased the market value determinations for all three years. On appeal, Continental argued that the tax court's value determinations were excessive and not supported by the record over the assessed value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court's value determinations were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous.

The United States brought this civil action under 26 U.S.C. 7408 to enjoin defendant from promoting several fraudulent tax schemes. After a court trial, the district court permanently enjoined defendant from promoting his schemes, ordered him to advise the IRS of any tax arrangements or business entities formed at his discretion, and required him to provide a copy of its order to his clients. On appeal, defendant argued that the injunction was not supported by adequate factual findings and legal conclusions, and that it was overbroad, an impermissible delegation of Article III power, and an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court rejected defendant's hypertechnical criticisms of the district court's order where section 6700 was a linguistically complex and intricate statute and where the district court need not include the entire statutory language in each of its findings and conclusions. Therefore, the court held that the district court's exhaustive order more than satisfied each of the requirements in section 6700 and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellant-Respondent Tykat, Inc. appealed an Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision that upheld Clarendon County's tax assessment on real property Tykat leased from the South Carolina Public Service Authority.  Tykat contended the leased property was exempt from tax because the South Carolina Public Service Authority is constitutionally exempt from paying taxes and because Tykat's use of the property may be classified as a public purpose.  Clarendon County (through its Assessor) cross-appealed the Administrative Law Court's denial of its request for attorneys' fees and costs. Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the ALC.  Based on the limited challenge raised by Tykat, its leasehold interest was subject to ad valorem taxation under the plain language of section 12-37-950 of the South Carolina Code (2000):  "[t]hus, [the Court was] bound to apply the statute as written." Furthermore, the Court affirmed the denial of Clarendon County's request for attorneys' fees and costs.

New Jersey uses a three-factor formula to calculate a multi-state corporation’s New Jersey Corporate Business Tax (CBT) by apportioning income between New Jersey and the rest of the world. For taxpayers with regular places of business outside of New Jersey, the portion of entire net worth and entire net income that is subject to New Jersey tax is determined by multiplying each by an allocation factor that is the sum of the property fraction, the payroll fraction, and two times the sales fraction, divided by four. The sales fraction is at issue in this case. Without the "Throw-Out Rule," the sales fraction is calculated by dividing the taxpayer’s receipts (sales of tangible personal property, services, and all other business receipts) in New Jersey by total receipts. The Throw-Out Rule increases a corporation’s New Jersey tax liability by “throwing out” sales receipts that are not taxed by other jurisdictions from the denominator of the sales fraction. This always increases the sales fraction, causing the apportionment formula and resulting CBT to increase. Whirlpool Properties, Inc. appealed its assessment from 2002, arguing that the Throw-Out Rule was unconstitutional. Upon review of the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court held that corporate taxpayers having a substantial nexus to New Jersey may constitutionally apply the Throw-Out Rule to untaxed receipts from states that lack jurisdiction to tax it due to an insufficient connection with the corporation but not to receipts that are untaxed because a state chooses not to impose an income tax.

Tellabs Operations, Inc. appealed an administrative agency's decision in its taxpayer's refund action from the circuit court. Tellabs unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund of allegedly overpaid sales taxes to the City of Bessemer. The case was originally filed in Montgomery Circuit Court. Bessemer filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to change venue to Jefferson Circuit Court. Without holding a hearing on the motion, the circuit court transferred the appeal to Jefferson Circuit Court. In its motion for reconsideration, Tellabs argued the Montgomery Court erred in transferring the appeal. The court responded that it had lost jurisdiction, and Tellabs' only remedy was to petition the Supreme Court. Upon review of the circuit court records, the Supreme Court concluded that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred in transferring the appeal to the Jefferson Court. The Supreme Court vacated the transfer order and remanded the case for further proceedings in Montgomery Circuit Court.

Defendant Jodi Hoskins was convicted of tax evasion after she and her husband failed to pay taxes for income they earned through their Salt Lake City escort service. The government contended the Hoskins' failed to account for more than one million dollars in income generated in cash payments and credit card receipts. At sentencing, the government's tax loss was relevant to potential jail time and restitution under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. To minimize the tax loss for sentencing purposes, the Hoskins' offered hypothetical tax returns to account for the unreported income and attempted to take deductions they claimed they would have been entitled to but for the tax evasion. The district court rejected the hypothetical tax returns and accepted the government's tax-loss estimate. Defendant appealed her eventual sentence, arguing the sentencing judge abused his discretion in establishing the lost taxes. Furthermore, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her and the reasonableness of her sentence. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support her sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction.

The Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (Band) sued the the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue (Commissioner) to prevent taxation of the out-of-state pension income of Band members. The state taxed a Band member's pension earned in Ohio but received on a reservation. The Band argued that the taxation violated due process and was preempted by federal law. The court held that because citizenship provided a constitutional nexus, Minnesota's taxation complied with due process. The court also held that Minnesota's taxation was not preempted where the case was controlled by the general rule: "Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state." Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Blue Lake Rancheria, an Indian tribe, sought a refund of Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(7), taxes paid by Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay), an employee leasing company wholly owned by the Tribe. At issue was the scope of section 3306(c)(7)'s exception from "employment" and also at issue was whether Mainstay was the common law employer of its leased employees. The court held that the services performed "in the employ of an Indian tribe" were excepted from FUTA's definition of "employment" by section 3306(c)(7) only where a tribe or its instrumentality was a common law employer of the worker performing the services. The court held that because Mainstay was a common law employer of its leased employees during the years in question, it was not required to pay FUTA taxes with respect to those employees. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Tribe.