Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The company wished to use cash reserves from subsidiaries in Ireland for activities such as stock repurchase. Foreign income is not taxable in the U.S. when earned, but is taxed if invested in U.S. property, 26 U.S.C. 951-965, including debt obligations of U.S. companies. To obtain use of the funds, the company entered into a 20-year interest rate swap. The IRS notice then in effect provided that, upon sale of one "leg" of a swap, the lump sum exchanged for the right to receive revenues over the remaining life of the swap, should not be recognized as income all at once, but should be accounted for over the life of the swap. Parties are now required to treat all such payments as loans. In 2004, the IRS assessed deficiencies of $472,870,042, characterizing the transactions as immediately-taxable loans, not sales. The district court agreed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The former notice did not apply because the transactions were loans. The parties structured the transactions expecting to recover principal; involvement of a third-party bank did not preclude characterization as a loan. Disparate treatment is not ordinarily considered a defense to tax liability.

In 2000 the plaintiff acquired CMP and its subsidiary; in 2002 it acquired RGS and its subsidiary. Plaintiff acquired all liabilities; the companies and subsidiaries became part of a group of affiliated companies filing consolidated income tax returns pursuant to I.R.C. sect. 1501. Prior to the acquisition, the subsidiaries had overpaid taxes in some years. The plaintiff had underpaid and, after paying the deficiency and interest, requested a refund of interest, claiming entitlement to a net interest rate of zero on its deficiency because sect. 6621(d) allowed it to offset its underpayment with the overpayments by the subsidiaries. The IRS ignored the request. The Court of Federal Claims rejected the claim, finding that the plaintiff was not the "same" taxpayer as had overpaid. The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the taxpayer must be the same at the time of the overpayments and underpayments.

In 2009, the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System (ATRS) petitioned the county court seeking a determination that a shopping center it owned was exempt from ad valorem taxation. The county court rejected ATRS's contention that the property qualified for an exemption. ATRS appealed. The circuit court held that the shopping center was not exempt under article 16, section 5 of the Arkansas Constitution because the property was not used exclusively for public purposes. ATRS appealed, arguing the shopping center is public property used exclusively for public purposes and therefore is exempt from taxation under the constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court's decision was not clearly erroneous. The evidence was undisputed that the property in question is a retail shopping center that is leased to private business. As such, the ATRS failed to demonstrate the structure is used exclusively for public purposes.

Anthony Smith died in a plane crash in 2001. His estate contained two separate life insurance policies. Mr. Smith's father Raymond was named as sole beneficiary of one policy, and Mr. Smith's ex-wife Ruth was named as beneficiary on the other. At the time of his death, Mr. Smith owned a life estate in 657 acres of land in Tate County. One hundred and sixty of the acres were set aside in fee simple for Raymond and his wife Dorothy as part of their homestead. This case came before an appellate court three separate times. Each time, the issue before the court involved the proper way to apportion the tax liability among the beneficiaries to the estate. The Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that taxes should be based on the taxable estate, rather than the gross estate. On remand, the Estate filed two motions demanding that Raymond and Ruth reimburse the Estate for taxes paid plus interest on the insurance policies. Raymond filed a motion demanding that the Estate pay him for rent for the time he was excluded from his homestead. The chancery court ultimately held that Raymond and Ruth were responsible for their portions of tax liability owed to the Estate, and that Raymond was entitled to twenty-four months' rent. The Estate appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the case record, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court.

Respondent Tim Norris failed to pay his 2005 property taxes on his restaurant in Jackson. In 2006, Sass Muni purchased the restaurant in a tax sale. When Mr. Norris did not redeem the property within the statutory two-year period, a tax deed was issued to Sass Muni, who then deeded the property to Petitioner Rebuild America, Inc. When Rebuild America filed suit to confirm its title, Mr. Norris intervened, arguing that he was never served with notice of the tax sale. He moved to have the tax sale set aside. The chancellor set the tax sale aside, and Rebuild America appealed. The appellate court affirmed the chancery court's ruling. Rebuild America appealed again to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's analysis of the issues presented on appeal, and affirmed its holding.

This appeal stemmed from a construction firm's attempt to obtain a refund of federal employment taxes and an abatement of interest and penalties. At issue was whether remittances of employment withholding taxes by plaintiff constituted tax payments or deposits. The court held that the district court correctly determined that the remittances were payments and refunds of these payments were subject to the time limitations of 26 U.S.C. 6511.

The Chapter 7 debtors' federal tax return listed: withholding of $6,777; total tax liability of $2,934, a non-refundable child tax credit of $2,903, an additional child tax credit of $1,097, and a total federal tax refund of $8,542. The credit allows some taxpayers to claim a tax credit of $1,000 for each qualifying child. If the taxpayers have tax liability, the non-refundable portion is applied to satisfy the tax liability. If the taxpayer qualifies, a portion of the refundable amount of the credit, not used to offset tax liability, is sent as an income tax refund. The refundable portion, unlike the non-refundable portion, is treated as an overpayment. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection that the $2,903 credit was not exempt. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under 26 U.S.C. 24(a) and (d), the non-refundable portion of the credit is not property of the estate cannot be exempted as a payment under Ohio Rev. Code 2329.66(A)(9)(g). The entire tax refund of $8,542 is property of the estate from which the debtors may exempt $1,097 as the refundable portion of the credit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Thomas filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that H.B.1804, the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizens Protection Act of 2007, was unconstitutional. Plaintiff sued Brad Henry, Governor of Oklahoma, and the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The trial judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial judge partially granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that part of the Act violated the single-subject rule. The trial judge severed that portion from the remainder of H.B.1804 and held that the remainder of H.B.1804 did not violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions urged by the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed and Defendant filed a counter-appeal, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the Act. Upon careful consideration of the arguments by both sides, and of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's assessment that H.B.1804 does not otherwise violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions as urged by Plaintiff. The Court declined "to concern itself with a statute's propriety, desirability, wisdom or its practicality as a working proposition; such questions are plainly and definitely established by fundamental law as functions of the legislative branch of government." The Court affirmed the trial court's holding for all but one section of H.B.1804, and remanded the case for further consideration.

After not paying taxes for several years and creating shell corporations to receive his income, the defendant, a commodities trader, entered a guilty plea to one count of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. The district court calculated an offense level of 21, carrying a range of 37-46 months' imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines and imposed a 24 month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting an argument that the government breached the plea agreement, the court reasoned that both parties understood that the losses stated in that agreement remained uncertain and open to recalculation. The record supported the tax losses upon which the sentence was based. Application of an enhancement for use of "sophisticated means" was appropriate.