Plaintiffs, landowners, challenged special assessments against their property for public improvements to a residential subdivision made by the city. Plaintiffs argued that the city council's decision to make public improvements within a subdivision rendered the city unable to assess the costs of the improvements to the landowners when a city ordinance provided for the improvements to be made by the subdivider. The district court (1) determined the city failed to enforce a subdivision ordinance requiring the subdivider to pay for street improvements but concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a city cannot be sued for its failure to enforce ordinances; and (2) found the assessments were not excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, (2) the city's failure to require the subdivider to personally make all improvements did not invalidate the authority of the city to assess property owners, and (3) the Plaintiffs did not establish the assessments to their property exceeded the special benefits provided by the improvement.

A sausage manufacturer brought claims against its former business partner, Pizza Hut, in 1993. In 2002 the manufacturer agreed to drop its last remaining claim, trade secret misappropriation, in exchange for a $15.3 million payment. When it received its $6.12 million take-home portion of the settlement, C&F, a shareholder and an S corporation, reported the income as long-term capital gain. Its shareholders reported their passed-through pro rata shares the same way. The IRS concluded that the settlement income should have been taxed as ordinary income and issued each of the shareholders a deficiency notice. The tax court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The tax court found that Pizza Hut paid for lost profits, lost opportunities, operating losses and expenditures and rightly concluded that the settlement did not represent the final phase of a 13-year-long transfer of a capital asset. Because there was not a complete transfer of all substantial rights, there was no sale of a capital asset or long-term capital gain resulting therefrom.

Flight Options, LLC challenged the constitutional and statutory authority of the Department of Revenue to assess apportioned property taxes against a fleet of airplanes it managed. Specifically, Flight Options argued that its airplanes did not have a tax situs in Washington state, and that the due process clause of the federal constitution prohibited assessment of taxes on them. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court rejected each of Flight Options’ contentions and affirmed the lower court decision dismissing Flight Options’ case.

In 2007, Davison County adopted a county-wide plan to reassess agricultural structures. The County reassessed agricultural structures in four of its twelve townships that year. Donald and Gene Stehly, who owned agricultural structures in the four reassessed townships, initiated a declaratory judgment action, alleging that the plan to reassess four townships each year created an unconstitutional lack of uniform taxation within the county. The trial court concluded that the Stehlys' claim failed because they did not establish lack of uniformity within a single taxing district as required by the South Dakota Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) townships are taxing districts under the Constitution, and (2) a reassessment plan that creates a temporary lack of uniform taxation among townships within a county is constitutional.

Berry and Co. petitioned the tax court for relief from the County's property tax assessment of its property for 2007 and 2008. At trial, Berry and the County each offered expert appraiser testimony as to the estimated market value of the property. Both appraisers used the market sales comparison approach to value the subject property. The tax county determined that the highest and best use for the subject property was redevelopment and agreed with the County's expert on the valuation, which was higher than the original assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's determination that the highest and best use of the subject property was redevelopment was not erroneous, and (2) the tax court's valuation of the subject property was supported in the record and was not clearly erroneous.

This tax case concerned the procedures to be followed when the IRS conducted a partnership proceeding under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), I.R.C. 6221-6233. Plaintiffs, individual taxpayers and limited partners in partnerships that were the subject of such proceedings, filed suit on grounds that the lack of deficiency notices rendered the IRS's assessments invalid. At issue was whether the IRS was required to issue notices of deficiency before assessing additional tax payments from plaintiffs. The court held that the assessments in this case amounted to computational adjustments and therefore, no deficiency notices were necessary. The court noted that the three remaining questions the court put to the parties as part of en banc rehearing each presumed that a deficiency notice was required. Because the court's holding here definitively contradicted that presumption, the court need not analyze those questions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the Court of Federal Claims.

This case arose from the IRS's investigation of a type of tax shelter known as a "Son-of-Boss" (a variant of the Bond and Options Sales Strategy (BOSS) shelter). Petitioner appealed the Tax Court's decision in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The court held that the IRS properly sent petitioner an affected item notice of deficiency because the deficiency required a partner-level determination. The court also held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to redetermine affected items based on the partnership item determinations in the Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA). Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court.

Appellant was the target of a grand jury investigation seeking to determine whether he used secret Swiss bank accounts to evade paying federal taxes. The district court granted a motion to compel appellant's compliance with a grand jury subpoena dueces tecum demanding that he produce certain records related to his foreign bank accounts. The court declined to condition its order compelling production upon a grant of limited immunity, and pursuant to the recalcitrant witness statute, 28 U.S.C. 1826, held appellant in contempt for refusing to comply. The court held that because the records sought through the subpoena fell under the Required Records Doctrine, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable, and appellant could not invoke it to resist compliance with the subpoena's command. The court also held that because appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege was not implicated, it need not address appellant's request for immunity. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

The executor paid estate taxes in October, 2003, and filed the estate tax return in September, 2004, but the IRS denied a second extension request and he did not file an amended return and refund request for overpaid estate taxes in the amount of $237,813.48 until September, 2007. The IRS denied the claim on the ground that the refund sought was outside the three-year look-back period set forth in 26 U.S.C. 6511(b)(2)(A). The district court dismissed and the First Circuit affirmed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The IRS correctly determined that it did not have the authority to and did not grant a second six-month extension. While the regulations do not explicitly say that there may be only one extension for executors who are not abroad, they provide for only one automatic extension. An equitable estoppel claim is not available and would have no merit.

Victor Tacke failed to pay real property taxes on his property in Lake County from 2005 to 2008. In 2006, the County conducted a tax sale for the year 2005, at which the County purchased the tax lien. In 2009, the County assigned its interest in the tax lien to Montana Lakeshore Properties (Lakeshore) in exchange for payment of the past due taxes and issued a tax sale certificate to Lakeshore. The County subsequently issued a tax deed to Lakeshore. In 2010, Tacke filed an action to quiet title in the property, seeking a judicial declaration that the tax deed was void. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lakeshore. At issue on appeal was whether Lakeshore violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-17-212(3) by paying the back taxes two hours and forty-five minutes short of two weeks after giving notice to Tacke. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment upholding the tax deed obtained by Lakeshore because this case fit within the general principle that "the law regards the day as an indivisible unit" and discards fractional days in most time computations.