Appellants, St. Louis County and St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC), filed suit against Prestige Travel and numerous other online travel companies that facilitate the booking of hotel and motel rooms via the internet. The appellants argued that Prestige and the other companies were required to pay hotel and tourism taxes imposed by the revised ordinances of St. Louis County and state law. Prestige moved to dismiss the petition, and the circuit court overruled the motion. Shortly thereafter, H.B. 1442, which specifically exempted online travel companies such as Prestige from the tax, was passed. Prestige filed a motion to reconsider its motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed the case. Appellants appealed, arguing the law violated the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) appellants waived their constitutional challenge to the law by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity; (2) the law does not violate the original purpose requirement of the state constitution; and (3) the argument that the title of the law is so general that the bill should be invalidated in its entirety is not supported by the current state of law.

Debtor filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in 1998 and submitted a plan of reorganization ("Plan"), continuing to operate as a debtor-in-possession. Article X of the confirmed Plan provided for the discharge of all debts pursuant to which debtor was the "primary obligor." In 2007, the IRS contacted debtor's principal officers regarding potential assessment of a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty ("TFRP") pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672. At issue was whether the collection of a TFRP from the principal officers violated the express terms of Article X discharging such claims. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction where the relief sought by debtor would effectively preclude the IRS's collection of a section 6672 assessment and therefore, fell squarely within the reach of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), and the court's holding in American Bicycle Ass'n v. United States. The court also held that, in light of the well-established principle that section 6672 liability was a separate and distinct liability, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court's alternative holding that, although a corporation could be the primary obligor on its own underlying tax obligation, it was not the primary obligor on the separate and distinct assessment under section 6672. Rather, the corporate officers were the primary obligors on the TFRP liabilities, as these liabilities were assessed independently under section 6672 for the officers' own willful conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the bankruptcy court was affirmed.

The German Village Society (GVS) filed an application for exemption of real property. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27(C), the school board became a party to the proceedings before the tax commission and to any appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). After the tax commissioner denied GVS's application, GVS appealed to the BTA but did not serve the school board with its notice of appeal. BTA reversed the decision of the tax commissioner and granted the exemption but did not transmit its decision to the school board. The tax commissioner then issued a determination giving effect to the BTA's decision. The school board filed a notice of appeal from the tax commissioner's order, asserting that the BTA's decision was void ab initio because the school board was not named or notified as to the existence of the appeal. The BTA held that because the period for appeal from its decision had expired, it did not have jurisdiction to address the validity of its earlier decision. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA's holding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief to the school board, vacated the BTA's decision along with the tax commissioner's related order, and remanded.

Mountain View Community School, Inc. appealed a trial court order that rejected its request for a property tax exemption for "lands owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public schools" under state law. Mountain View contended the court misinterpreted the law in denying the requested exemption. For a number of years, Mountain View operated a private nonsectarian school for students from preschool through eighth grade at two separate locations in the City of Rutland. Mountain View's only use of the properties was as a school. While maintaining that it was statutorily exempt from the payment of property taxes, Mountain View nevertheless paid them under protest from 1994 through 2007. When the school's assessed value increased dramatically in 2006 and 2007, however, it sought an exemption. The City declined to grant the exemption, and in response, Mountain View filed suit for declaratory relief and an injunction to prevent a threatened tax sale. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower the court mistakenly conflated the "public use" and "public school" exemptions in the statute, seeking to determine whether the school served "an indefinite class" under the former when, in fact, Mountain View was relying on the latter. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court.

Appellant defaulted on his mortgage payments and filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to prevent foreclosure on his home. In his proposed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, appellant sought to "modify" the Internal Revenue Service's secured claims for long-overdue tax deficiencies into long-term debt payable over a period of fifteen years. The court held that appellant could not do so because those tax deficiencies were not debts whose pre-bankruptcy payment terms included a final payment date that fell beyond the five-year term of appellant's Chapter 13 plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the challenged portion of the order of the bankruptcy court denying confirmation and remanded for further proceedings.

The county planning board approved a detailed site plan for a parcel of commercial property in Prince George's County. The county district council elected to review the planning board's approval, after which several individuals, including petitioners Rishi Gosain and Abid Chaudhry, filed with the district council an appeal of the planning board's approval. The district council ultimately affirmed the planning board's decision, and petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the final decision by the district council in the circuit court. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the petition, finding the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons than the lower courts. At issue was the meaning of the phrase "any person or taxpayer in Prince George's County" under Md. Ann. Code art. 28, 8-106(e), which authorizes appeals of final district council decisions. The Court found the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action because they neither resided or had a property interest in a residence in the county, nor owned or leased real property in the county, nor paid property taxes to the county.

"The Dawses' struggle with the IRS has a lengthy provenance." Decades ago, Donald and Phyllis Dawes pled guilty for failing to file their 1981 through 1983 tax returns. They also failed to pay their taxes from 1986 through 1988, and 1990. All this led to the IRS to seek and win a declaratory judgment that the Dawses fraudulently conveyed certain assets in an effort to avoid their creditors and that those conveyances were null and void. The IRS proceeded to execute this judgment to take possession of these assets, but before it could do so, the Dawses filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy protection. "And that brings us to the latest installment of this epic": with permission of the bankruptcy court, the Dawses sold several tracts of land. The sale created income tax liabilities. The Dawses submitted a bankruptcy reorganization plan in which they proposed to treat their newly incurred tax liabilities as general unsecured claims. The IRS opposed the plan "vigorously" but was unsuccessful at the bankruptcy and federal district court. The IRS brought its complaint to the Tenth Circuit, asking to "undo its earlier losses." Upon careful consideration of the lengthy record below, the Tenth Circuit found that the taxes at issue here were incurred by the Dawses after they petitioned for bankruptcy. "So it is that the Dawses must pay the tax collector his due." The post-petition income tax liabilities at issue were not eligible for treatment as unsecured claims under the Bankruptcy Code. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This appeal stemmed from a short sale transaction that raised UTA Management's outside basis in the UTAM partnership. On October 13, 2006, more than six years after the filing of UTAM's 1999 partnership return, but less than six years from the filing of the individual partner's 1999 individual return, the IRS mailed a notice of final partnershp administrative adjustment to DDM Management, UTAM's "tax matters" partner, pertaining to UTAM's 1999 tax year. At issue was whether the mailing of a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment by the IRS tolled an individual partner's limitation period under I.R.C. 6501. The court held that the six-year limitations period applied with regard to the individual partner's 1999 return and that the assessment period, suspended pursuant to I.R.C. 6229(d), was the partner's open assessment period under section 6501. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court on the statute of limitations issue was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Commissioner of the IRS appealed a decision of the Tax Court holding taxpayer was entitled to claim deductions in 2003 and 2004 for donating to the L'Enfant Trust, Inc. conservation easements on the facades of two buildings located in an historic district. At issue was whether taxpayer could take such deductions where the Commissioner argued that her contribution was not "exclusively for conservation purposes," as required by 26 U.S.C. 170(h)(1)(C), and where she failed to obtain "qualified appraisals" meeting the standards of Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii). The court held that the Tax Court did not clearly err in concluding the factual circumstances supporting taxpayer's deductions met the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements where the donated easements would prevent in perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes and where taxpayer provided the Commissioner with "qualified appraisals." Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court that taxpayer was entitled to claim the deductions at issue was affirmed.

The Commissioner of the IRS and appellees disagreed about appellees' 1999 gross income where the disagreement stemmed from appellees' sale of assets and centered primarily on the Commissioner's conclusion that appellees inflated its basis in those assets. At issue was whether the Commissioner waited too long to adjust appellees' gross income pursuant to sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2) of the Internal Tax Code. The court held that the Commissioner's regulations were validly promulgated, applied to the case, qualified for Chevron deference, and passed muster under the traditional Chevron two-step framework. Because the Tax Court concluded otherwise and failed to apply the Commissioner's interpretation of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2), the court reversed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment. The court remanded for the Tax Court to consider appellees' alternative argument made in the tax court but unaddressed there, that appellees avoided triggering the extended statute of limitations by "adequately disclos[ing] to the IRS the basis amount it applied in connection with the transaction at issue."