The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff International Schools Services, Inc. (ISS) was properly denied a tax exemption for 2002 and 2003 under the state tax code. ISS has owned and occupied the West Windsor Township property at issue in this case since 1989. ISS is a nonprofit corporation and maintains a tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Service Code. Although West Windsor Township granted ISS a property tax exemption from 1990 through 2001 for the portions of ISS's property that it actually occupied, the exemption was denied for 2002 and 2003 based on the Township's review of ISS's activities. ISS appealed to the Tax Court which found that ISS had not satisfied the first prong of a three-part test (the "Paper Mill Playhouse" test) requiring that the entity seeking tax exemption be "organized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women, and children." The Appellate Division reversed that decision, and remanded for the Tax Court to address the remaining prongs of the test. On remand, the Tax Court held that ISS had not satisfied the second prong of the test because the schools, not ISS, were performing the activities sufficient for tax exemption, and ISS was merely assisting them. Focusing on the rates charged for rent to some of its for-profit affiliates, the Tax Court found also that ISS had not satisfied the third prong of the test. The Appellate Division disagreed with the Tax Court with regard to the second prong of the test, but found that ISS failed the third prong due to the subsidies it provided to its affiliates. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that West Windsor Township properly denied a property tax exemption to ISS for the tax years 2002 and 2003 because the commingling of its effort and entanglement of its activities and operations with its profit-making affiliates was significant and substantial, with the benefit in the form of direct and indirect subsidies flowing only one way-from ISS to the for-profit entities.

Taxpayers challenged three substantive bills and one appropriation bill, part of capital projects, signed by the governor in July 2009. The appellate court held that Public Act 96–34 violated the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution, and that the other acts were invalid because they were contingent on enactment of Public Act 96–34. The supreme court reversed, reinstating the trial court's dismissal. All of the substantive provisions in Act 96–34 are connected to capital projects; they establish revenue sources to be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund or are related to the overall subject of the Act in that they help implement other provisions. The court upheld the other acts against single-subject challenges, including challenges based on the contingency clauses. Nothing in the state constitution prohibits making legislation contingent on a separate legislative enactment. The enactments did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, public funds clause, uniformity clause, or run afoul of constitutional veto procedures. An enactment that authorizes expenditure of public funds for a public purpose is not unconstitutional for incidental benefit to private interests. There is nothing constitutionally impermissible about the inclusion of the "as approximated below" language.

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and two counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return. At trial, the government offered, without objection, evidence that defendant had failed to file personal income tax returns from 2002 to 2007. Defendant argued that his personal filing history was impermissible specific-act character evidence. The court held that defendant's failure to file tax returns from 2002 through 2007, when compared with the similar failures of his co-conspirators, were probative of the existence of a conspiracy. Although the court was skeptical of the government's argument that the jury did not view those failures in a negative light, the court could not conclude that any unfair prejudice derived from their admission substantially outweighed their probative value. Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial, the court could not conclude that the admission of the testimony affected defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of aiding and abetting the preparation of false federal income tax returns and was sentenced to 72 months imprisonment. Defendant argued that his experiences in Somalia during the violent Somali civil war entitled him to a sentence well below the advisory Guidelines range. At issue was whether the district court's sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court not only considered defendant's personal history and circumstances in fashioning a sentence, but reduced the sentence it would have otherwised assessed defendant in light thereof. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 72 months imprisonment.

WCI Steel appealed a final assessment of its personal property valuation for tax purposes to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA dismissed WCI's appeal on the authority of Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin because its notice of appeal failed to specify error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) a notice of appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of personal property invokes the jurisdiction of the BTA to review that determination if the notice states the appellant's objection to the commissioner's actions in valuing property and identifies the treatment that the commissioner should have applied; (2) BTA's jurisdiction in the appeal permitted it to consider evidence in addition to that considered by the tax commissioner; and (3) the BTA misapplied Ohio Bell to this situation. Remanded.

American Home Shield of Nevada (AHS) sought a refund on insurance premium taxes it had erroneously paid on service contracts for four years exempt from taxation under statute. The department of taxation granted AHS a refund for two years but denied AHS a refund for the other years based on a statutory one-year limitations period. The department also denied AHS interest. The district court granted AHS's petition for judicial review, concluding that (1) Humboldt County v. Lander County obligated the department to refund the taxes, and (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.2935 entitled AHS to interest. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the department did not err when it determined that AHS's refund taxes for certain years were barred by the one-year limitation period, (2) the district court's reliance on Humboldt County in determining that AHS was entitled to a refund of all of its erroneous tax payments was misplaced, and (3) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 680B.120 is the applicable statute governing AHS's refund request and it does not provide for interest, the district court erred by determining that AHS was entitled to interest on its refunds.

This appeal arose out of an ongoing conflict between Washoe County and certain taxpayers in Incline Village and Crystal Bay regarding property tax valuation, equalization, and collection. At issue was whether the district court properly issued a writ of mandamus requiring the county treasurer to refund excess taxes paid by the respondent taxpayers for the 2006-2007 tax year. The taxpayers paid the excess taxes because of a stay imposed in a pending appeal challenging a prior year's assessments. The Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly issued the writ of mandamus because the taxpayers paid more than was due and typical administrative remedies to recover overpaid taxes do not apply where the taxpayers were successful at all levels below; and (2) the treasurer had a duty to refund the excess taxes pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.2935.

Illinois riverboat casinos filed a RICO suit (18 U.S.C. 1961) against racetracks, charging that the owner of two tracks, in cahoots with then-governor, Blagojevich, "bought" statutes requiring casinos to deposit three percent of their revenues to the "Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund" for disbursement to racetracks for use to increase purses and improve the tracks. The district judge issued, then dissolved, a temporary restraining order. The Seventh Circuit reinstated, so that no money is being disbursed, but on rehearing en banc, affirmed. The Tax Injunction Act forbids federal district courts to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law," if an adequate remedy is available in the state courts, as it is in Illinois 28 U.S.C. 1341. If unlawfulness can be traced to the racetracks, the casinos can seek damages from them. The Act does not bar federal monetary relief, but federal courts cannot freeze the state’s tax moneys by imposition of a constructive trust. The court extended the TRO for 30 days pending petition for certiorari.

After illegally collecting a three percent excise tax, the IRS created a refund procedure for taxpayers to recoup their money. Appellants argued that the procedure was unlawful. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction and whether appellants stated a valid claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that it had federal question jurisdiction and neither the Anti Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), nor the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), provided a limitation on the court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Therefore, because appellants had no other adequate remedy at law, the district court should consider the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., claim on remand.

Property owner Riser Foods Company appealed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in which the BTA determined the true value of Riser's real estate to be $450,000 for tax year 2005 rather than $73,700 as determined by the county auditor and the County Board of Revision (BOR). The BTA's determination of value was predicated on the price paid for the property in 2005 in accordance with a buy-out option agreed to by the parties in a ground lease. The ground lease was entered into in 1998, and ownership was transferred in 2005. The BTA regarded the buy-out-option price as a recent, arm's-length sale price that furnished the criterion of value for the property as of 2005 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) Riser had the initial burden to show that the 2005 sale was either not recent or not at arm's length; (2) Riser failed to negate the recency of the sale; and (3) Riser did not show that the long-standing contractual obligation to purchase made the sale involuntary or that a lack of open-market elements was significant.