This case presented two questions, each born of the efforts of Capital One, a credit card issuer, to defer significant tax liability. First, whether Capital One could retroactively change the method of accounting used to report credit-card late fees on its 1998-1999 tax returns in such a fashion as would reduce is taxable income for those years by roughly $400,000,000. Second, whether Capital One could deduct the estimated costs of coupon redemption related to its MilesOne credit card program before credit card customers actually redeemed those coupons. The court did not permit Capital One to retroactively change the method of accounting because allowing Capital One to do so would open the door to unilateral and retroactive changes in accounting methods with large and unpredictable implications for public revenue. The court also declined to permit the narrow coupon-with-sales exception to undermine the purposes of the all-events rule because little good and much mischief would ensue from upending the Commissioner's reasonable and longstanding interpretation of his regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court.

Taxpayer, the founder of EMC, a manufacturer of computer storage devices received non-qualified options to acquire EMC stock. When he exercised those options in 2001, they generated $162 million of ordinary income; it was estimated this could create a tax liability of over $63 million. Prior to exercising the options, taxpayer met with tax and accounting professionals and implemented a plan to form a partnership (Fidelity) with a foreign national; that partnership would engage in transactions that would generate losses largely offsetting gains without net risk. Gain would be principally allocated to the foreign national. Following a series of such transactions, the IRS disallowed taxpayer's losses on Fidelity option transactions for 2001 and 2002 and determined that the partnership was a sham that lacked economic substance. The district court sustained the adjustments and imposed a 40 percent penalty. The First Circuit affirmed

Taxpayer requested a tax refund from the Nevada Department of Taxation without filing a formal refund claim based on an understanding Taxpayer had with the Department. The Department denied the request. Taxpayer then filed a formal refund claim as part of a petition for redetermination. An ALJ determined that Taxpayer was entitled to a refund despite its late filing of the formal refund claim. The Tax Commission reversed, concluding that Taxpayer's failure to timely file a formal refund claim rendered a portion of its refund request time-barred. The district court reinstated the ALJ's determination that Taxypayer was entitled to a refund, concluding that the Tax Commission had improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the ALJ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Tax Commission improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the ALJ in reversing the ALJ's determination; and (2) because the Tax Department played an active role in causing Taxpayer's formal refund claim to be untimely, the statute of limitations was equitably tolled during the time in which the Department hindered Taxpayer from filing its formal written claim.

These consolidated appeals, which have been returned to the court on remand from the United States Supreme Court, once again called upon the court to consider whether - and, if so, on what grounds - the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN) was entitled to restrain the Counties from foreclosing upon certain fee-title properties, acquired on the open market by the OIN in the 1990's, for which the OIN had refused to pay property tax. The court held that the OIN had abandoned its claims premised on tribal sovereign immunity from suit as well as its claims based upon the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177. The court also held that the district court erred in ruling that the Counties' redemption-notice procedures failed to comport with due process. The court further held that the district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the OIN's state-law claims. The court finally affirmed as to several ancillary matters.

This case stemmed from a property dispute between the parties. White Springs appealed the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Glawson, challenging the grant of attorneys' fees, expert fees, and prejudgment interest and sought to vacate or modify the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10, 11. The court held that the arbitration panel had the power to decide Glawson's claims for attorneys' fees and that Glawson properly submitted the issue to the panel. The court was unable to grant White Springs' request that the court review the legality of the award of expert fees and prejudgment interest on the ad valorem taxes, as the FAA did not permit it to do so. Therefore, the court found no basis to overturn any portion of the panel's final arbitration award.

Midwest sued the Department, seeking a declaration that South Dakota had a taxation scheme that violated a provision of the federal Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4-R Act), 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4). The complaint alleged in part that the 4-R Act's bar on discriminatory taxes against rail carriers extended to Midwest. The district court denied Midwest's motion for summary judgment and granted the Department's, concluding that court precedent did not support extending the protections of the 4-R Act to Midwest. The court held that, in light of Midwest's bare assertions that South Dakota's tax had the effect of discriminating against rail carriers, the district court did not err in ruling as it did. Any ruling to the contrary would have required the district court to rely upon speculation with respect to whether South Dakota's taxes on railcar repair services performed by a privately owned, third-party service provider and any tangible personal property used therein impermissibly resulted in discriminatory treatment of a rail carrier. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Comcast of Little Rock filed three petitions for review with the Arkansas Public Service Commission, asserting that Comcast's ad valorem tax assessment for the years 2006-08 erroneously included the value of its intangible personal property. The Commission's ALJ dismissed Comcast's petitions. Comcast subsequently filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the county court, asserting that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it and arguing that the Commission's tax division improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments. The county court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the claims. The circuit court also dismissed Comcasts's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Comcast's challenge to its assessment; and (2) because Comcasts's claim did not challenge the validity of the underlying tax, but rather alleged that the assessment was carried out in an illegal fashion, the suit did not come within Arkasnas's illegal-exaction provision, and therefore, Comcast's avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with the Commission.

Appellants sued New York City and the State, along with a number of city and state officials, challenging a tax scheme that exempted New York City residents from a tax levied on parking services rendered in Manhattan. Appellees subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that comity barred the federal courts from hearing appellants' challenge to the state law. The district court granted the motion and the court affirmed, holding that because New York state courts have the ability to implement a remedy that the federal courts could not, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. counseled in favor of dismissing the complaint pursuant to comity.

Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence on two counts of attempted tax evasion. Appellant argued that the government failed to prove the element of tax loss because it relied upon a flawed calculation under the "cash method of proof" and attributed to appellant $1.9 million of alleged gain when those funds, as a matter of law, belonged to his two corporations. Appellant challenged his sentence to the extent it rested upon the allegedly incorrect calculation of tax loss. The court found no error in the district court's denial of defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal. The court also held that, because a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt a tax was due and owing on $300,000 of income, the court left for another day how best to interpret the dictum in James v. United States. The court affirmed the sentence because the district court made sufficient factual findings at sentencing to support the inclusion of the $1.9 million in the calculation of tax loss.

The company overpaid income tax for certain years. The IRS either refunded the overpayments or applied the overpayments as credits to other tax years or to liabilities for other types of taxes before the company contested a notice of deficiency the IRS issued for the years to which the credits were applied. The company claimed that the IRS did not pay it enough overpayment interest on those overpayments. The Third Circuit vacated the Tax Court ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction (26 U.S.C. 6512(b)(1) and (3)) over the claim. Interest owed to a taxpayer by the government, is not "a part of, or even related to, a taxpayer's tax liability" and is not "assimilated in treatment to the principal amount of a tax." The Tax Court erred in equating the question of interest with overpayment.