A jury convicted Lindsey Springer of one count of conspiring with Oscar Stilley to defraud the United States, three counts of tax evasion, and two counts of willful failure to file a tax return. Mr. Stilley was convicted of one count of conspiracy and two counts of aiding and abetting Mr. Springer’s tax evasion. The district court sentenced both men to fifteen years in prison, three years of supervised release, and restitution for tax losses exceeding $2 million. Mr. Springer and Mr. Stilley (Defendants) respectively challenged their convictions and sentences. Mr. Springer founded "Bondage Breakers Ministries" to offer legal and tax advice to individuals embroiled in tax disputes for which he was paid thousands upon thousands of dollars. He eventually met Mr. Stilley (now a disbarred lawyer) and together they devised a scheme to channel Mr. Springer's unreported income through Mr. Stilley's client trust account. "By 2005, Mr. Springer had gained the full attention of the IRS." The government executed a search warrant of Mr. Springer's residence, and Mr. Stilley was served with a grand jury subpoena. During the course of the investigation, Defendants denied receiving any income for their advice, representing instead that people simply made donations to Mr. Springer’s ministry, with no expectation of services in return. But at trial, the government refuted those statements, offering testimony from numerous witnesses who had paid large sums of money to defendants in exchange for their supposed tax and legal expertise. Based on this and other evidence, the jury convicted Defendants on all counts to which Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court. The Court affirmed Defendants' respective convictions and sentences.

Taxpayer, related corporations that operated a vertically-integrated poultry production business, sought an exemption from ad valorem taxes on five industrial personal property tax returns it filed with the State Tax Department, claiming it was exempt from such taxation under either the "subsistence of livestock" or the "farm" exemption under W. Va. Code 11-3-9-(a)(21), (28). The State Tax Commissioner concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to either exemption. The trial court (1) ruled that Taxpayer was entitled to claim the "subsistence of livestock" exemption in connection with its hatchery operation but not with regard to personal property used at its live haul center and feed mill operation; and (2) concluded that none of Taxpayer's operation qualified for the "farm" exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Taxpayer was not entitled to any exemptions from personal property taxation in connection with its commercial poultry operation other than the exemption afforded to its hatchery operation.

This case arose out of a dispute between Union Pacific, the owner of mineral rights to three parcels of land, and Linn Farms, the surface rights owner to the parcels who purchased the mineral rights from the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands. Union Pacific was unaware of the forfeiture of the mineral rights due to tax delinquency and leased the mineral rights to Chesapeake Exploration, who then recorded the lease. Discovering the lease, Linn Farms sued to quiet title to the mineral rights. The district court denied Linn Farms' motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Union Pacific and Chesapeake Exploration, concluding that the sale of the mineral rights by the state was invalid because the Commissioner failed to provide adequate notice of the impending forfeiture in violation of Union Pacific's due process rights. The court affirmed and held that the notice provided by the Commissioner was inadequate under the circumstances of the case even though it complied with Arkansas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its tax refund suit for mootness. Shortly after the litigation began, the IRS refunded the disputed taxes in full. Plaintiff claimed, however, that a live controversy still existed because it also sought declaratory and injunctive relief in order to obtain a favorable determination of its tax-exempt status. Plaintiff claimed that the failure of the IRS to recognize plaintiff as a tax-exempt organization had collateral consequences that prevented the tax refund from rendering the case moot. The court held that filing a claim for a tax refund suit was not simply a procedural hurdle that, once leapt over, allowed a party to seek other forward-looking relief against the IRS after the refund had been granted. Without a live refund claim, there was no way to distinguish the case from the kind of pre-enforcement suits that Congress had expressly forbidden taxpayers from bringing. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This appeal arose from a suit filed by the United States that asked the district court to reduce certain of Defendant-Appellant Jack Wilson’s tax liabilities to judgment, to set aside a fraudulent transfer of real property from Wilson to Defendant Joey Lee Dobbs-Wilson, and to enforce the government’s new liens, as well as one preexisting tax lien, against the real property by ordering a sale. Wilson appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States. Wilson argued in his response to the government’s motion for summary judgment and in his cross-motion for summary judgment that Ms. Dobbs-Wilson was not his nominee when he transferred the property to her in 1998 and, as a result, a 1997 lien became invalid when the government mistakenly released it in 2003, after he no longer owned the property. Assuming the validity of Wilson's argument, and after supplemental briefing on the matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate any injury to him that the Court could redress. Having determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, the case was dismissed.

Petitioner Charles Raymond Wheeler appealed a Tax Court decision finding him liable for (1) income-tax deficiencies for the years 2002, 2004, and 2005; (2) additions to tax for those years; and (3) a $25,000 sanction. Petitioner did not claim to have filed returns for the years in question, or to have paid taxes owing for those years, yet he urged the Tenth Circuit to overturn the Tax Court’s decision and determine that he had no liability. He contended on appeal that the Commissioner did not prove that he had failed to file returns, did not carry the burden of production on the additions to tax, and did not create a valid substitute return to support the taxes and additions imposed. In addition, he claimed that the Tax Court judge was biased against him. The Commissioner filed a motion for sanctions against Petitioner for filing a frivolous appeal maintained primarily for delay. Upon review of Petitioner's arguments, the Tenth Circuit found all without merit and affirmed the Tax Court's decisions and the imposition of sanctions.

Craig Griffith, state tax commissioner, appealed from an order entered by a circuit court that reversed an earlier order of the Office of Tax Appeals and found that Frontier West Virginia was entitled to a refund of its telecommunications tax for the 2004 year in the amount of over nine million dollars. The Supreme Court reinstated the order of the Office of Tax Appeals and (1) affirmed the circuit court's ruling finding the subject statute, W. Va. Code 11.13B02(b)(5), was plain and unambiguous; (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling finding the governing rule, W. Va. C.S.R. 110-13B-2.6, invalid; and (3) reversed the circuit court's determination that the West Virginia Public Service Commission's (PSC) list of competitive services that were exempt from the telecommunications tax applied to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year in which the PSC issued its list. Rather, the Court held that the PSC's list operated to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year following the issuance of the list.

Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees.

The City of Lewiston (City) enacted "Ordinance No. 4512" that created a stormwater utility and fee for the operation and maintenance of the its stormwater system. Five government entities (Entities) subject to the stormwater fee brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the fee was an unconstitutional tax requiring authorization by the Legislature. The Entities thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. The City filed its cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that the stormwater fee was authorized pursuant to the City’s police powers, the Revenue Bond Act, the Local Improvement District Code, and various other provisions of the Idaho Code. Relying primarily on "Brewster v. City of Pocatello," (768 P.2d 765 (1988)), and finding no legislative authorization for the stormwater fee, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Entities, holding that the stormwater fee was an unconstitutional tax. The City filed an appeal of the district court's decision. Because the Supreme Court concluded that stormwater fee was an unauthorized tax, it held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Entities.

Ohio State University filed an application to exempt a two-story building to which it had title, predicating the exemption claim on Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17, which provides that state-university property is exempt for real property taxation if it is "used for the support of such university." The tax commissioner granted tax-exempt status, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property, which generated rental income from a first-floor commercial tenant and second-floor residential tenants, qualified for exemption to the extent that the income generated by the property was devoted to university purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of exemption, holding that income-producing property may not be exempted under section 3345.17 unless the activity conducted on the property bears an operational relationship to university activities.