This case arose from a decision rendered by the State Board of Equalization (Board) concerning the valuation point for tax purposes of the natural gas production from the LaBarge Field. The Supreme Court remanded the issue to the Board of whether the meters located at the LaBarge Field well sites were "custody transfer meters" as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-203(b)(iv) or volume meters for Exxon's share of gas production. The Board held (1) the meters were not custody transfer meters for Exxon's share of gas production, and (2) the same meters were custody transfer meters for the gas produced by two other working interest owners, petroleum companies, who were not parties to the action. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Board's determination that the meters were not custody transfer meters for Exxon's gas where the Board's determination harmonized with precedent established in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue; but (2) reversed the Board's determination that the meters were custody transfer meters for the petroleum companies' gas because the Board did not have the authority to determine the valuation point for "non-party" persons or entities that do not appeal their tax assessments.

Appellant Philip Allen Worack, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that resulted in his conviction of two counts of filing fraudulent and false federal income tax returns. For tax years 1998-2002, Appellant reported income from LKS, a company in which he was president and treasurer, and owned half the stock. LKS listed Appellant's income on its 1099 forms for his personal income taxes. During that time period LKS set up multiple foreign-based business entities that Appellant helped manage. Once the entities folded, Appellant assumed the assets and used them to pay for his personal expenses. He did not report any of the money taken from the liquidated companies' bank accounts as income. Appellant argued that the money from the entities were corporately owned, and the monies paid were for his business related expenses. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty. The Court affirmed Appellant's convictions.

Appellee received a notice of deficiency from the IRS and she contested the assessments, asserting the time bar in 26 U.S.C. 6501(a). Claiming an interest in this issue, the government of the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) sought to intervene, either as of right under Civil Rule 24(a)(2), or permissively under Civil Rule 24(b)(2). The tax court denied intervention and the USVI appealed. The court concluded the USVI had standing to intervene where the IRS did not dispute the last two elements of standing, causation and redressability, and where the USVI had presented sufficient evidence of an injury in fact. The court also held that the tax court abused its discretion by using an incorrect legal standard to deny permissive intervention where the tax court erred by ignoring the principal consideration of whether the USVI's intervention would cause undue delay or prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment of the tax court was reversed.

A jury convicted Linda Abramson-Schmeiler of five counts of filing a false tax return. The charges were based on her alleged failure to report all of the income she received from her business of "diversionary sales" (purchasing and then reselling large quantities of hair-care products). The government alleged that she falsely underreported her business's gross receipts or sales, by more than $1.4 million during the years 2003, 2004, and 2005, which then resulted in her falsely underreporting her personal income for the same amount. At trial, Defendant’s main defense was that she did not intentionally underreport her sales and income. She admitted that she had failed to report payments her business received for selling hair-care products. But she asserted that many of her diversionary sales were in cash and unrecorded and that she lost money or broke even on many of these transactions. She testified that when she did not make money on a transaction, she would consider it a "wash" and she would not report the transaction to her accountant for reporting on her income tax returns. The jury convicted Defendant on all counts. She was sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered to pay restitution. Defendant challenged her convictions on three grounds: 1) the district court erred in precluding important lay witness testimony; 2) the district court erred in refusing to give defendant’s good-faith jury instruction; and 3) the government committed prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial. Finding that Defendant failed to show any error at trial, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

From 2005 to 2008, debtor, the owner of Waffle House Ffranchises, periodically failed to make all federal income tax withholding, social security, and unemployment payments due to the IRS and to timely file returns. The IRS assessed penalties in excess of $1.5 million; debtor made payments of $637,000 toward the penalty. In 2009 a chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed; the business continued to operate until its assets were sold. In 2010 debtor sued the IRS under 11 U.S.C. 548, 550 and the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 66-3-301, asserting that the penalty payments provided no value to debtor and were made at a time when the debtor was incurring debt beyond its ability to pay. The bankruptcy court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the payments resulted in a dollar-for-dollar reduction of debtor's undisputed tax debt. Payment of a fine or penalty is not an avoidable transfer, regardless of whether the penalty is a noncompensatory penalty.

Appellant contended that it was a "public utility" under OCGA 48-1-2 and, as such, was required under OCGA 48-5-511 to make an annual tax return of its Georgia property to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner rather than to the Chatham County tax authorities. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for writ of mandamus in superior court, seeking to have the trial court recognize appellant as a "public utility" and to order appellee to accept appellant's annual ad valorem property tax return. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint based on appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable to the claims. The court reversed and held that it need not address whether sovereign immunity would act as a bar to appellant's declaratory action, as it was clear that, if the declaratory action were barred by sovereign immunity, appellant's mandamus action would still remain viable.

Illinois law permits purchasers of tickets to sporting contests, concerts, and similar events to resell tickets via auction sites on the Internet. Chicago, which imposes an amusement tax on the original ticket price, contends that the websites through which tickets are resold must collect and remit an additional tax on the difference between the original price and the resale price. In parallel cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that Illinois law does not allow Chicago to collect its tax from the auction sites. In a case involving another online site, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment against the city and denied the city's motion for an extension to allow petition for rehearing to the Illinois Supreme Court.

Defendant was convicted of eight counts of filing a false income tax return (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court applied the wrong standard in determining whether defendant could assert good faith, the error was harmless given overwhelming evidence of a lack of good faith. The court properly held that he could not present evidence of good faith unless he waived his Fifth Amendment rights and testified and relied on acquitted conduct concerning his sisters' tax returns in determining the sentence to be imposed.

Appellants Wsbaldo Valdez and Linda Vargas owned property in joint tenancy and neglected to pay the 2005 property taxes. In 2006, Appellee Mae Ouellette purchased the property at a tax sale and later applied for a tax deed. She served notice on Vargas but not on Valdez. In 2008, Ouellette received a tax deed. Valdez and Vargas filed a petition to quiet title, for ejectment, and damages. They then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the tax deed was void for failure to serve Valdez, and Valdez could redeem the entire property. In Ouellette's counter-motion for summary judgment and response to Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, her two main assertions were: (1) Valdez and Vargas were either an unincorporated association or a partnership and service on Vargas was good service on Valdez; and (2) the service on Vargas was at least valid and the tax deed was effective as to her interest, thereby severing the joint tenancy. Ouellette argued she and Valdez were tenants in common. The trial court held that service on Valdez was ineffective but agreed with Ouellette that Valdez could not redeem the entire property, and Valdez and Ouellette were tenants in common. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that service of a notice for application of tax deed is mandatory and must be made on all parties according to the applicable statute. Failure to make such service will render any issued tax deed void in its entirety. Accordingly, Valdez had the right to redeem the entire property. The Court reversed the trial court's decision.

Defendant was convicted of tax evasion, a felony (26 U.S.C. 7201), and failure to file a tax return for the 2004 tax year, a misdemeanor (26 U.S.C. 7203). The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Defendant waived his claim under the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. 3162) by failing to move to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. Defendant presented no support for arguing a Sixth Amendment violation caused by the pretrial delay and waived a multiplicity challenge to his indictment. The convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the sentence was reasonable. The district court has authority to impose restitution as a condition of supervised release; the court vacated and remanded for a determination of whether it had done so.