This case concerned the way by which the costs of financing the school district were apportioned among the city of New Bedford, the town of Dartmouth, and the town of Fairhaven, which were municipalities comprising the school district. Dartmouth commenced an action in the superior court against defendants challenging the funding obligations imposed on the member municipalities by the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L.c. 70, section 6. Fairhaven filed a cross claim asserting that the funding obligations imposed by the Act were a disproportionate tax on property and income in violation of the state constitution. The court held that the complaint filed by Dartmouth and cross claim filed by Fairhaven were properly dismissed because Dartmouth and Fairhaven failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The United States appealed from a judgment of the district court invalidating two notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments issued by the IRS. The district court so ruled because it concluded that the taxpayer's characterization of two tax-exempt Dutch banks as its partners in Castle Harbour LLC was proper under Internal Revenue Code 704(e)(1). The district court also concluded that, even if the banks did not qualify as partners under section 704(e)(1), the government was not entitled to impose a penalty pursuant to Internal Revenue Code 6662. The court held that the evidence compelled the conclusion that the banks did not qualify as partners under section 704(e)(1), and that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed.

In this original proceeding Allcat, a limited partnership, and one of its limited partners sought an order directing the Comptroller to refund franchise taxes Allcat paid that were attributable to partnership income allocated, but not distributed, to its natural-person partners. Allcat claimed it was entitled to a refund for two reasons. First, the tax facially violated Article VIII, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution because it was a tax on the net incomes of its natural-person partners that was not approved in a statewide referendum. Second, as applied by the Comptroller, to Allcat and its partners, the franchise tax violated Article VIII, Section 1(a) of the Constitution, which required taxation to be equal and uniform. The court held that: (1) the tax was not a tax imposed on the net incomes of the individual partners, thus it did not facially violated Article VIII, Section 24; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the equal and uniform challenge.

At issue in this appeal was the Privilege Tax Statute, which provides that an entity may be taxed on the privilege of beneficially using or possessing property in connection with a for-profit business when the owner of that property is exempt from taxation. But the tax may not be imposed unless the entity using or possessing the exempt property has "exclusive possession" of that property. Alliant Techsystems (ATK) challenged the imposition of a privilege tax on its use of government property. The district court granted summary judgment against ATK, concluding that ATK had "exclusive possession" of federal government property because there was no evidence that anyone other than the government, the landowner, had any possession, use, management or control of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the Statute, "exclusive possession" means exclusive as to all parties, including the property owner, and thus, exclusive possession exists when an entity has the present right to occupy and control property akin to that of an owner or lessee; and (2) because the record indicated disputed material facts regarding ATK's authority to control the government property, summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.

Defendants were convicted of failure to pay federal income tax. Neither attended sentencing. They did not respond to demands to surrender and remained holed up in their secluded home for about nine months. Marshals had information that defendants were armed and making threats, but eventually arrested the couple and found explosives, firearms, and ammunition, including rifles, armor piercing bullets, pipe bombs, and bombs nailed to trees. Convicted of conspiring to prevent federal officers from discharging their duties, 18 U.S.C. 372; conspiring to assault, resist or impede federal officers, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b) and 371; using or carrying a firearm or destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence; possessing a firearm or destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (B); being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1503; and failing to appear at sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146. They were sentenced to 35 and 37 years. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments relating to competency, defendants' beliefs that they were not obligated to pay taxes, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions.

The city of Winchester and its collector (Winchester) filed a class action lawsuit against Charter Communications on behalf of itself and other similarly situated Missouri municipal corporations and political subdivisions, seeking a declaratory judgment requiring Charter and other telephone service providers to comply with ordinances requiring them to pay a license tax on gross receipts derived from fees and services connected to their operations and an order requiring Charter to pay all license taxes owed to the class. The circuit court struck Winchester's claims on the basis of Mo. Rev. Stat. 71.675, which bars cities and towns from serving as class representatives in suits to enforce or collect business license taxes imposed on telecommunications companies. The Supreme Court quashed the court's preliminary writ of prohibition and granted Winchester's request for a permanent writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the court exceeded its authority in striking Winchester's class action allegations pursuant to section 71.675, as the statute violated Mo. Const. art. V, 5 because it amended a procedural rule of the Court.

Custom Hardware Engineering (CHE) appealed an Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) decision determining that CHE was liable for use tax plus interest and additions to tax on its purchases of parts for use in fulfilling maintenance contracts. CHE asserted that is was not liable for any use tax because it did not use the parts and, instead, retained them for "temporary storage" as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.605(13). The Supreme Court affirmed the AHC decision, holding (1) the record demonstrated that CHE used the parts for testing and certification on behalf of its customers; and (2) therefore, CHE was liable for use tax as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.610.

Appellant Taxpayers were the owners of all or a portion of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on, and under each of their real property located in the counties party to this lawsuit. Taxpayers filed a complaint against the Counties, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that an ad valorem property tax was an illegal exaction. The circuit court concluded that Taxpayers had failed to make a proper illegal-exaction challenge and dismissed their lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint where (1) the crux of Taxpayers' argument was that the tax assessed against them was illegal because the assessment was flawed; and (2) the Taxpayers' avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with each county's equalization board.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deduction in RCW 82.04.433(1) applies to reduce Business and Occupation (B&O) taxes for manufacturing activities. Plaintiff Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company owns and operates a refinery in Washington state from which it processes crude oil from Alaska, Canada and other sources. The legislature created a tax deduction for the amount of tax "derived from the sales of fuel for consumption outside the territorial waters of the United States." On its monthly tax returns from 1999-2007, Tesoro reported its fuel sales on both the "Manufacturing" B&O tax line and the "Wholesaling and Retailing" B&O tax line. After completing an audit of the refinery, Tesoro requested a partial tax refund claiming the deduction against amounts paid in B&O tax on manufacturing from 1999 through 2004. The request was denied by the Department of Revenue's (DOR) appeals division on the ground that the deduction applied only to taxes paid under the "wholesaler and retailer" B&O tax line. Tesoro appealed to the superior court; the Court of Appeals held that the company could deduct the amount of its "offshore" bunker fuel sales from its B&O taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the DOR: "the plain language of RCW 82.04.433(1) … indicates that the B&O deduction applies only to ... taxes on wholesale and retail sales, not on manufacturing."

Appellants Ismael Chavez and Dolores Mercado (collectively Chavez) appealed the district court's granting their petition for judicial review, claiming that their original complaint should not have been converted into a petition for judicial review. Canyon County cross-appealed the district court's decision that the flat fee included on the County's notice of pending issue of tax deed was in violation of I.C. 63-1005(4)(d) requiring an itemized statement. In 2009, Chavez filed a class action complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and damages. Chavez alleged that Canyon County had violated a requirement in Idaho Code section 63-1005(4)(d) for an itemized statement of all costs and fees in its notice prior to an issuance of treasurer's tax deeds on two parcels of land they owned. In its Notice of Pending Issue of Tax Deed on the two parcels, the County charged a $500 flat fee for administration costs. In 2010, upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court denied the motion and found Chavez had failed to follow the proper procedures. The court allowed Chavez fourteen days to file the required Petition for Judicial Review. In its review, the Supreme Court held that the district court improperly converted Chavez's declaratory action into a petition for judicial review and was without jurisdiction to rule on the petition for judicial review. Furthermore, the Court declared the notices of pending issue of tax deed to be deficient and void and the corresponding fee was found as moot.