Defendant was convicted of eight counts of filing a false income tax return (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court applied the wrong standard in determining whether defendant could assert good faith, the error was harmless given overwhelming evidence of a lack of good faith. The court properly held that he could not present evidence of good faith unless he waived his Fifth Amendment rights and testified and relied on acquitted conduct concerning his sisters' tax returns in determining the sentence to be imposed.

Appellants Wsbaldo Valdez and Linda Vargas owned property in joint tenancy and neglected to pay the 2005 property taxes. In 2006, Appellee Mae Ouellette purchased the property at a tax sale and later applied for a tax deed. She served notice on Vargas but not on Valdez. In 2008, Ouellette received a tax deed. Valdez and Vargas filed a petition to quiet title, for ejectment, and damages. They then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting the tax deed was void for failure to serve Valdez, and Valdez could redeem the entire property. In Ouellette's counter-motion for summary judgment and response to Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, her two main assertions were: (1) Valdez and Vargas were either an unincorporated association or a partnership and service on Vargas was good service on Valdez; and (2) the service on Vargas was at least valid and the tax deed was effective as to her interest, thereby severing the joint tenancy. Ouellette argued she and Valdez were tenants in common. The trial court held that service on Valdez was ineffective but agreed with Ouellette that Valdez could not redeem the entire property, and Valdez and Ouellette were tenants in common. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that service of a notice for application of tax deed is mandatory and must be made on all parties according to the applicable statute. Failure to make such service will render any issued tax deed void in its entirety. Accordingly, Valdez had the right to redeem the entire property. The Court reversed the trial court's decision.

Defendant was convicted of tax evasion, a felony (26 U.S.C. 7201), and failure to file a tax return for the 2004 tax year, a misdemeanor (26 U.S.C. 7203). The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Defendant waived his claim under the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. 3162) by failing to move to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. Defendant presented no support for arguing a Sixth Amendment violation caused by the pretrial delay and waived a multiplicity challenge to his indictment. The convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the sentence was reasonable. The district court has authority to impose restitution as a condition of supervised release; the court vacated and remanded for a determination of whether it had done so.

A jury convicted Lindsey Springer of one count of conspiring with Oscar Stilley to defraud the United States, three counts of tax evasion, and two counts of willful failure to file a tax return. Mr. Stilley was convicted of one count of conspiracy and two counts of aiding and abetting Mr. Springer’s tax evasion. The district court sentenced both men to fifteen years in prison, three years of supervised release, and restitution for tax losses exceeding $2 million. Mr. Springer and Mr. Stilley (Defendants) respectively challenged their convictions and sentences. Mr. Springer founded "Bondage Breakers Ministries" to offer legal and tax advice to individuals embroiled in tax disputes for which he was paid thousands upon thousands of dollars. He eventually met Mr. Stilley (now a disbarred lawyer) and together they devised a scheme to channel Mr. Springer's unreported income through Mr. Stilley's client trust account. "By 2005, Mr. Springer had gained the full attention of the IRS." The government executed a search warrant of Mr. Springer's residence, and Mr. Stilley was served with a grand jury subpoena. During the course of the investigation, Defendants denied receiving any income for their advice, representing instead that people simply made donations to Mr. Springer’s ministry, with no expectation of services in return. But at trial, the government refuted those statements, offering testimony from numerous witnesses who had paid large sums of money to defendants in exchange for their supposed tax and legal expertise. Based on this and other evidence, the jury convicted Defendants on all counts to which Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court. The Court affirmed Defendants' respective convictions and sentences.

Taxpayer, related corporations that operated a vertically-integrated poultry production business, sought an exemption from ad valorem taxes on five industrial personal property tax returns it filed with the State Tax Department, claiming it was exempt from such taxation under either the "subsistence of livestock" or the "farm" exemption under W. Va. Code 11-3-9-(a)(21), (28). The State Tax Commissioner concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to either exemption. The trial court (1) ruled that Taxpayer was entitled to claim the "subsistence of livestock" exemption in connection with its hatchery operation but not with regard to personal property used at its live haul center and feed mill operation; and (2) concluded that none of Taxpayer's operation qualified for the "farm" exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Taxpayer was not entitled to any exemptions from personal property taxation in connection with its commercial poultry operation other than the exemption afforded to its hatchery operation.

This case arose out of a dispute between Union Pacific, the owner of mineral rights to three parcels of land, and Linn Farms, the surface rights owner to the parcels who purchased the mineral rights from the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands. Union Pacific was unaware of the forfeiture of the mineral rights due to tax delinquency and leased the mineral rights to Chesapeake Exploration, who then recorded the lease. Discovering the lease, Linn Farms sued to quiet title to the mineral rights. The district court denied Linn Farms' motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Union Pacific and Chesapeake Exploration, concluding that the sale of the mineral rights by the state was invalid because the Commissioner failed to provide adequate notice of the impending forfeiture in violation of Union Pacific's due process rights. The court affirmed and held that the notice provided by the Commissioner was inadequate under the circumstances of the case even though it complied with Arkansas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its tax refund suit for mootness. Shortly after the litigation began, the IRS refunded the disputed taxes in full. Plaintiff claimed, however, that a live controversy still existed because it also sought declaratory and injunctive relief in order to obtain a favorable determination of its tax-exempt status. Plaintiff claimed that the failure of the IRS to recognize plaintiff as a tax-exempt organization had collateral consequences that prevented the tax refund from rendering the case moot. The court held that filing a claim for a tax refund suit was not simply a procedural hurdle that, once leapt over, allowed a party to seek other forward-looking relief against the IRS after the refund had been granted. Without a live refund claim, there was no way to distinguish the case from the kind of pre-enforcement suits that Congress had expressly forbidden taxpayers from bringing. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This appeal arose from a suit filed by the United States that asked the district court to reduce certain of Defendant-Appellant Jack Wilson’s tax liabilities to judgment, to set aside a fraudulent transfer of real property from Wilson to Defendant Joey Lee Dobbs-Wilson, and to enforce the government’s new liens, as well as one preexisting tax lien, against the real property by ordering a sale. Wilson appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States. Wilson argued in his response to the government’s motion for summary judgment and in his cross-motion for summary judgment that Ms. Dobbs-Wilson was not his nominee when he transferred the property to her in 1998 and, as a result, a 1997 lien became invalid when the government mistakenly released it in 2003, after he no longer owned the property. Assuming the validity of Wilson's argument, and after supplemental briefing on the matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate any injury to him that the Court could redress. Having determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, the case was dismissed.

Petitioner Charles Raymond Wheeler appealed a Tax Court decision finding him liable for (1) income-tax deficiencies for the years 2002, 2004, and 2005; (2) additions to tax for those years; and (3) a $25,000 sanction. Petitioner did not claim to have filed returns for the years in question, or to have paid taxes owing for those years, yet he urged the Tenth Circuit to overturn the Tax Court’s decision and determine that he had no liability. He contended on appeal that the Commissioner did not prove that he had failed to file returns, did not carry the burden of production on the additions to tax, and did not create a valid substitute return to support the taxes and additions imposed. In addition, he claimed that the Tax Court judge was biased against him. The Commissioner filed a motion for sanctions against Petitioner for filing a frivolous appeal maintained primarily for delay. Upon review of Petitioner's arguments, the Tenth Circuit found all without merit and affirmed the Tax Court's decisions and the imposition of sanctions.

Craig Griffith, state tax commissioner, appealed from an order entered by a circuit court that reversed an earlier order of the Office of Tax Appeals and found that Frontier West Virginia was entitled to a refund of its telecommunications tax for the 2004 year in the amount of over nine million dollars. The Supreme Court reinstated the order of the Office of Tax Appeals and (1) affirmed the circuit court's ruling finding the subject statute, W. Va. Code 11.13B02(b)(5), was plain and unambiguous; (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling finding the governing rule, W. Va. C.S.R. 110-13B-2.6, invalid; and (3) reversed the circuit court's determination that the West Virginia Public Service Commission's (PSC) list of competitive services that were exempt from the telecommunications tax applied to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year in which the PSC issued its list. Rather, the Court held that the PSC's list operated to define a taxpayer's gross income for the calendar year following the issuance of the list.