Casey's Marketing Company was a convenience store engaged in the retail sale of gas, grocery items, nonfood items, and prepared foods. Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corporation was a utility that sold electricity to Casey's. Casey's filed a refund claim with the director of revenue for one month's tax paid for a portion of electricity Aquila sold to two Casey's locations. The director denied the claim. At Casey's request, Aquila challenged the director's final decision. The administrative hearing commission reversed, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, which provides a tax exemption for the "processing" of products," exempted Casey's food preparation operations. The Supreme Court reversed the commission, holding (1) the preparation of food for retail consumption is not "processing" within the meaning of section 144.054.2; and (2) therefore, Casey was not entitled to a sales and use tax exemption on electricity it purchased to power its food preparation operations. View "Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The debtor filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition and her Chapter 13 plan. A few weeks later, she filed her Michigan state income tax return, showing that she owed $4,900 for the 2008 tax year. She did not make payment, but later filed a proof-of-claim on behalf of the Michigan Department of Treasury, which meant that the tax debt would be paid through her Chapter 13 plan. Treasury objected, arguing that this was a post-petition claim under 11 U.S.C. 1305, which gives only a creditor the option of filing; debtor responded that the claim was permitted under section 501(c). The bankruptcy court overruled the objection; the district court affirmed The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The tax debt is entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), (i) and (iii), so the post-petition protective claim on behalf of Treasury is treated under section 502(i) as a prepetition claim. A debtor is permitted to file a prepetition claim on behalf of a creditor that fails to timely file.View "In re: Hight" on Justia Law

This case arose from two civil investigative demands (CIDs) issued to the University of Virginia and the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (collectively, UVA) by the attorney general, pursuant to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA). The CIDs sought information relating to the research of a climate scientist that had taught at UVA, received a series of grants to fund his research, and, with other climate scientists, had allegedly falsified data to indicate an upturn in the earth's surface temperatures due to the use of fossil fuels. UVA petitioned the circuit court to set aside the CIDs, arguing that the attorney general had no statutory authority to serve CIDs upon agencies of the Commonwealth and that the CIDs were defective because they failed to state the nature of the conduct alleged. The circuit court granted the petition and set aside the CIDs, without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, but, unlike the circuit court, set aside the CIDs with prejudice, holding that the University of Virginia, as an agency of the Commonwealth, did not constitute a "person" under the FATA and therefore could not be the proper subject of a CID. View "Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va." on Justia Law

SunTrust Bank and Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) owned two properties in the City of Richmond as tenants in common. The RRHA was exempt from taxation but SunTrust was not. In 2009, the City determined that SunTrust was liable not only for the taxes on its ownership interests, but also for the taxes on the RRHA's interests. The City accordingly corrected the assessments against SunTrust for 2006 through 2009 to reflect that it was liable for taxes on both its ownership interests and the RRHA's. SunTrust challenged the City's actions, and the circuit court ruled that the City had no authority to tax SunTrust for the RRHA's ownership interests in the properties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City had no authority pursuant to the parties' operating agreements, the state Constitution, or state law to tax SunTrust for the RRHA's ownership interests in the properties. View "City of Richmond v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

LaFarge Corporation operated a cement manufacturing facility on a tract of property that included a contiguous limestone quarry on one side at which LaFarge used its Caterpillar equipment to load the raw material and haul it across the property to the hammermills that performed the initial step in the cement manufacturing process. LaFarge paid sales taxes to Martin Tractor Company on the purchase of repair parts for its loaders and haulers, but then unsuccessfully sought a refund of the sales taxes from the Kansas Department of Revenue. Ultimately, the court of tax appeals (COTA) determined that the equipment, and therefore the repair parts, was exempt under Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-3606(kk)(2)(D) as being an integral or essential part of the integrated production operation of the cement manufacturing facility. The Supreme Court affirmed COTA's refund of sales taxes, agreeing that the equipment was being primarily used in the cement manufacturing business and at the manufacturing facility was was therefore subject to the exemption. View "In re Tax Appeal of LaFarge Midwest" on Justia Law

Ocean Pines Association, a non-stock corporation, oversees a subdivision of more than thirty-five hundred acres in Berlin, Maryland. The Association was exempt from federal income taxation as an organization "not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4)(A). The Tax Court subsequently determined that the net income from two parking lots and a beach club owned by a tax-exempt association constituted "unrelated business taxable income." The association appealed. Because the income derived from the parking lots and beach club was not "substantially related" to the association's tax-exempt purpose, the court affirmed. View "Ocean Pines Assoc. v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded. View "Rebuild America, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Accord Human Resources, Inc. (Accord) is a professional employer organization that transacts business in Colorado along with four related entities. In 2004, Accord transferred a portion of its Colorado employees to another Accord entity with a lower unemployment tax rate and in doing so, reduced its unemployment tax burden. The Colorado Division of Employment and Training determined that it had authority to treat the various Accord entities as one for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes, thus erasing any tax advantage that could be gained through the employee transfer. Under this rationale, the Division issued a delinquent tax notice to Accord. Accord appealed, and the hearing officer reversed. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's Final Order and reinstated the hearing officer's decision. The Division sought to reverse the court of appeals decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, finding that nothing gave the Division authority to combine separate employer tax accounts into one account for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes. View "Colorado Div. of Employment & Training v. Accord Human Resources, Inc" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed the Tax Court's order dismissing their action against the Government for lack of jurisdiction. At issue on appeal was whether the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction where petitioners failed to file their petition within the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act's (TEFRA), 26 U.S.C. 6226(a)-(b), express filing period. Because the court held that section 6226's 150-day limit was jurisdictional, the court had no authority to alter it. The plain language of the statue measured the 150-day filing period from the date the IRS mailed the final partnership administrative adjustments (FPAA) and it did not contemplate tolling. Petitioners filed the present petition 418 days after the FPAA was mailed, - over 250 days late. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "A.I.M. Controls, L.L.C., et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing two orders requiring the president and CEO of MassMutual to submit to depositions. MassMutual argued (1) the orders requiring its president to submit to depositions were properly the subject of a writ of prohibition, and (2) the orders compelling the depositions of this high-ranking corporate executive, despite his lack of any personal or unique knowledge about the cases, were clearly erroneous and constituted an abuse of the circuit court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued the writ after adopting the apex deposition rule, a framework for assessing whether the deposition of a high-ranking corporate official is proper, holding that because the circuit court, in this case, did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, there was an insufficient basis to sustain the circuit court's orders. View "State ex rel. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law