A tax employee of defendant, terminated after reporting an alleged tax fraud scheme to the company and federal enforcement agencies, filed suit asserting claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and 1962(d). The district court dismissed, finding that the predicate acts alleged were either unrelated or did not proximately cause plaintiff's injuries. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The retaliatory actions were related to the alleged tax fraud scheme, under the Supreme Court's "continuity plus relationship" test. Since enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) retaliation against an employee constitutes racketeering. Retaliatory acts are inherently connected to the underlying wrongdoing exposed by the whistleblower, even though they occur after the coverup is exposed. In this case, the retaliatory acts were not isolated events, separate from the tax fraud. Plaintiff properly alleged that his termination was proximately caused by a RICO predicate act of retaliation.

Gibraltar brought this action against Boston Private for specific performance of Boston Private's obligations under the tax allocation provision of the stock purchase agreement between the parties. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings under Court of Chancery Rule 12(c) on the question of how the tax payment provided for in the Stock Purchase Agreement should be calculated. In support of their respective motions, both parties argue that Section 5.5(d) of the Stock Purchase Agreement was unambiguous and that their respective interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. The court held that the relevant portion of Section 5.5(d) was ambiguous. Since each party had advanced a reading of Section 5.5(d) that was reasonable, neither party had met its burden of demonstrating that its interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings was denied.

Emerson Electric Company and its subsidiaries timely filed consolidated tax returns for South Carolina in fiscal years 1999 through 2002. The periods at issue in this appeal were tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001 (license tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002). In its initial returns, Emerson did not claim deductions for expenses related to its receipt of dividends from subsidiary corporations. Emerson later filed amended returns, claiming the deductions and seeking a refund. Emerson's claimed entitlement to the deductions on its South Carolina returns was the question before the Supreme Court. Emerson argued in the that section 12-6-2220(2), as applied, discriminated against non-resident taxpayers in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record revealed Emerson availed itself of these same deductions numerous times against its taxable income in various other taxing jurisdictions. The Administrative Law Court properly found Emerson failed to carry its burden of proving that the application of section 12-6-2220 violated the Commerce Clause. The Department of Revenue properly disallowed Emerson's related expense deductions. Emerson's related expense deductions were properly allocated to the state of its principal place of business, Missouri.

This case arose from a decision rendered by the State Board of Equalization (Board) concerning the valuation point for tax purposes of the natural gas production from the LaBarge Field. The Supreme Court remanded the issue to the Board of whether the meters located at the LaBarge Field well sites were "custody transfer meters" as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-203(b)(iv) or volume meters for Exxon's share of gas production. The Board held (1) the meters were not custody transfer meters for Exxon's share of gas production, and (2) the same meters were custody transfer meters for the gas produced by two other working interest owners, petroleum companies, who were not parties to the action. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the Board's determination that the meters were not custody transfer meters for Exxon's gas where the Board's determination harmonized with precedent established in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue; but (2) reversed the Board's determination that the meters were custody transfer meters for the petroleum companies' gas because the Board did not have the authority to determine the valuation point for "non-party" persons or entities that do not appeal their tax assessments.

Appellant Philip Allen Worack, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that resulted in his conviction of two counts of filing fraudulent and false federal income tax returns. For tax years 1998-2002, Appellant reported income from LKS, a company in which he was president and treasurer, and owned half the stock. LKS listed Appellant's income on its 1099 forms for his personal income taxes. During that time period LKS set up multiple foreign-based business entities that Appellant helped manage. Once the entities folded, Appellant assumed the assets and used them to pay for his personal expenses. He did not report any of the money taken from the liquidated companies' bank accounts as income. Appellant argued that the money from the entities were corporately owned, and the monies paid were for his business related expenses. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty. The Court affirmed Appellant's convictions.

Appellee received a notice of deficiency from the IRS and she contested the assessments, asserting the time bar in 26 U.S.C. 6501(a). Claiming an interest in this issue, the government of the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) sought to intervene, either as of right under Civil Rule 24(a)(2), or permissively under Civil Rule 24(b)(2). The tax court denied intervention and the USVI appealed. The court concluded the USVI had standing to intervene where the IRS did not dispute the last two elements of standing, causation and redressability, and where the USVI had presented sufficient evidence of an injury in fact. The court also held that the tax court abused its discretion by using an incorrect legal standard to deny permissive intervention where the tax court erred by ignoring the principal consideration of whether the USVI's intervention would cause undue delay or prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment of the tax court was reversed.

A jury convicted Linda Abramson-Schmeiler of five counts of filing a false tax return. The charges were based on her alleged failure to report all of the income she received from her business of "diversionary sales" (purchasing and then reselling large quantities of hair-care products). The government alleged that she falsely underreported her business's gross receipts or sales, by more than $1.4 million during the years 2003, 2004, and 2005, which then resulted in her falsely underreporting her personal income for the same amount. At trial, Defendant’s main defense was that she did not intentionally underreport her sales and income. She admitted that she had failed to report payments her business received for selling hair-care products. But she asserted that many of her diversionary sales were in cash and unrecorded and that she lost money or broke even on many of these transactions. She testified that when she did not make money on a transaction, she would consider it a "wash" and she would not report the transaction to her accountant for reporting on her income tax returns. The jury convicted Defendant on all counts. She was sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered to pay restitution. Defendant challenged her convictions on three grounds: 1) the district court erred in precluding important lay witness testimony; 2) the district court erred in refusing to give defendant’s good-faith jury instruction; and 3) the government committed prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial. Finding that Defendant failed to show any error at trial, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

From 2005 to 2008, debtor, the owner of Waffle House Ffranchises, periodically failed to make all federal income tax withholding, social security, and unemployment payments due to the IRS and to timely file returns. The IRS assessed penalties in excess of $1.5 million; debtor made payments of $637,000 toward the penalty. In 2009 a chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed; the business continued to operate until its assets were sold. In 2010 debtor sued the IRS under 11 U.S.C. 548, 550 and the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 66-3-301, asserting that the penalty payments provided no value to debtor and were made at a time when the debtor was incurring debt beyond its ability to pay. The bankruptcy court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the payments resulted in a dollar-for-dollar reduction of debtor's undisputed tax debt. Payment of a fine or penalty is not an avoidable transfer, regardless of whether the penalty is a noncompensatory penalty.

Appellant contended that it was a "public utility" under OCGA 48-1-2 and, as such, was required under OCGA 48-5-511 to make an annual tax return of its Georgia property to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner rather than to the Chatham County tax authorities. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for writ of mandamus in superior court, seeking to have the trial court recognize appellant as a "public utility" and to order appellee to accept appellant's annual ad valorem property tax return. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint based on appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable to the claims. The court reversed and held that it need not address whether sovereign immunity would act as a bar to appellant's declaratory action, as it was clear that, if the declaratory action were barred by sovereign immunity, appellant's mandamus action would still remain viable.

Illinois law permits purchasers of tickets to sporting contests, concerts, and similar events to resell tickets via auction sites on the Internet. Chicago, which imposes an amusement tax on the original ticket price, contends that the websites through which tickets are resold must collect and remit an additional tax on the difference between the original price and the resale price. In parallel cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that Illinois law does not allow Chicago to collect its tax from the auction sites. In a case involving another online site, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment against the city and denied the city's motion for an extension to allow petition for rehearing to the Illinois Supreme Court.