This case concerns public access to income-adjusted property tax records. Appellee Joseph O’Dea sought a copy of the Town of Manchester's state property tax adjustment report, which contains a list of the property tax adjustments of Town taxpayers based in most instances on their income. Appellee requested a copy of the "HS-122" (named for the bill under which the report is required) report for the Town of Manchester from the Town Treasurer. The Town denied Appellee's request, asserting that the HS-122 report is exempt from disclosure under various provisions of 1 V.S.A. 317(c). The Town does provide the total property tax bill of each taxpayer but redacts the information showing the amount paid by the state and the amount paid by the taxpayer. Appellee appealed to Bennington Superior Court which held a hearing on the merits. The court issued an opinion declaring the report to be public information and ordering the Town to produce the report. The Town appealed the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the report consists of "return information" that is confidential and not subject to disclosure. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's decision.

Defendant, an immigrant, cleaned houses. She formed a cleaning service in 1992. Defendant would deposit customers' checks in the business checking account, keep some money as a fee, and withdraw the remaining amount to pay individual cleaners. The bank informed her of the requirement (31 C.F.R. 103.22(b)(1)) that it document and report transactions involving withdrawals of cash greater than $10,000. After being informed of the requirement, defendant would often withdraw more than $10,000 over the course of two days, but less than 24 hours; she withdrew amounts over $9,000 and less than $10,000 on 244 occasions in about six years. She was convicted of 23 counts of structuring transactions to avoid bank reporting, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3). The court gave an "ostrich" instruction, concerning defendant's knowledge. The jury returned a special verdict subjecting $279,500 to forfeiture; the court imposed a sentence of three years of probation as well as an additional judgment of $4,800. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no constitutional violation in weighing the forfeiture against the severity of the crime. Any error in giving the ostrich instruction was harmless.

Petitioners Anschutz Company and Philip and Nancy Anschutz appealed a Tax Court decision to hold them responsible for substantial income tax deficiencies for the taxable years 2000 and 2001. Those deficiencies, the Tax Court concluded, resulted from their failure to recognize taxable gain when a subsidiary of the Anschutz Company entered into a series of related agreements that included a variable prepaid forward contract for the sale of certain shares of stock and accompanying share-lending agreements. Finding no error in the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

In 1997 plaintiff held a 25% stake in a utility in the United Kingdom that was one of 32 U.K. companies subject to a one-time "windfall tax." After it paid that tax, plaintiff claimed a foreign tax credit on its U.S. tax return under I.R.C. 901. The windfall tax emerged from a backlash against the privatization of British utilities and transit operators. In concept, the windfall tax was a one-time 23% tax on the difference between each company’s "profit-making value" and the price for which the U.K. government had sold it. The public believed that the government had sold the companies too cheaply. In 2007, the IRS denied plaintiff's claim and issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax Court agreed that plaintiff was entitled to a foreign tax credit. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the windfall tax does not qualify for a foreign tax credit. Whether a foreign tax qualifies requires analysis of the timing and the base of the foreign tax; a realization requirement, one of timing, ensures that the taxpayer has received income before being obligated to pay taxes on it.

In a consolidated appeal, the Commonwealth's Department of Revenue appealed the Commonwealth Court's decisions which held Appellees Northeastern Pennsylvania Imaging Center and Medical Associates of the Lehigh Valley P.C.'s MRI and PET/CT systems were not tangible personal property subject to sales tax under the Tax Reform Code of 1971 because they were part of real estate structures. Finding that the preparation for the installation of the systems and the special way the systems were "annexed" to the buildings in which they were placed, the Commonwealth Court concluded the systems were not tangible personal property subject to the tax but parts to the realty. The Department appealed both decisions. Upon review of the applicable sections of the Tax Code, the Supreme Court found that the equipment was subject to sales tax, and reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision.

Missouri law provides for two sales tax rates: a standard rate of four percent that applies to most retail sales, and a reduced rate of one percent that applies to some, but not all, sales of food. Krispy Kreme sought review of a decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that Krispy Kreme must collect tax at the four percent rate on all retail food sales at its Missouri locations. At issue on appeal was whether Krispy Kreme's product fell under the definition of "food" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014.1, which establishes the lower sales tax rate for purchases of food. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the phrase "food prepared by such establishment for immediate consumption on and off the premises" in section 144.014.1 means all food that is eaten at the place of preparation and purchase, or while traveling to, or immediately upon arrival at another location without any further preparation; (2) affirmed the AHC's decision to overrule Krispy Kreme's motion for summary decision because neither party was entitled to summary decision; and (3) reversed the portion of the AHC's decision sustaining the director's motion. Remanded.

Humboldt Field Research Institute and Eagle Hill foundation applied for a property tax exemption pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 36, 652(1)(A) and (B), which the Town assessors denied. The county commissioners upheld the Town's denial, and the superior court affirmed. Humboldt and Eagle Hill appealed, arguing (1) the Town was required to continue Humboldt's and Eagle Hill's tax exemptions from the prior year, which were based on their status as charitable institutions, absent evidence of an organizational change; and (2) the organizations were exempt as literary and scientific institutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Maine law consistently places the burden on the taxpayer to prove entitlement to a tax exemption, even when an exemption has been granted in prior years, if the assessor challenges the exemption; and (2) the commissioners did not err in determining that Humboldt and Eagle Hill did not meet their burden to prove entitlement to an exemption.

Defendant appealed from a conviction of 16 counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false federal income tax returns and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 41 months incarceration, three years' supervised release, and restitution and a special assessment. The court affirmed the conviction except with respect to certain aspects of the sentence, as to which the judgment was vacated and remanded for: (1) resentencing within the range authorized by statute, and (2) amendment of the restitution order to: (a) determine whether the State and the City of New York were victims entitled to restitution, (b) exclude payments already made by the five taxpayer-clients to the IRS, and (c) exclude losses associated with a 2001 tax return that did not serve as a basis for any of the 16 counts of conviction.

Utah's exemption statute provides that a retirement plan "that is described in" I.R.C. 401(a) is exempt from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. Upon filing for bankruptcy, Douglas Reinhart claimed that the funds in his Keogh retirement plan were exempt from bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court determined that the Keogh plan was not technically tax qualified under I.R.C. 401(a) due to certain operational defects. Although the Keogh plan was operationally in default, the bankruptcy court found the plan was described in section 401(a), and thus, the funds in the plan were exempt under the exemption statute. The bankruptcy court entered an exemption order, and the trustee of Reinhart's bankruptcy estate appealed. The U.S. district court affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer the question of whether a retirement plan can be "described in" section 401(a) when it fails to fulfill that section's requirements for tax qualification. The Court held that a retirement plan is "described in" section 401(a) if it substantially complies with that section.

This case involved the regulations of the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, limiting rates that could be charged by owners of taxicabs who leased those cabs to drivers. Owners challenged a Commission regulation that prohibited owners from collecting sales tax in addition to the maximum permitted lease rates. The court held that the regulation must be annulled because the Commission had not shown any rational basis for it.