In 2008, the Eastern District of Michigan ranked 79th of 90 judicial districts in successful completion of Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases. To improve the situation, the judges began entering orders in Chapter 13 plans that required the IRS to send tax refunds directly to the Chapter 13 trustees, not to the individuals as the Internal Revenue Code contemplates. 26 U.S.C. 6402(a). Chapter 13 plans repay creditors over three to five years, requiring the IRS to track debtors’ returns during several tax cycles. The burden became unmanageable when there were 4,966 affected returns in April 2009. The IRS obtained a declaratory judgment preventing the trustees from enforcing existing refund redirection provisions and a writ of mandamus prohibiting the bankruptcy court from including these provisions in future Chapter 13 plans. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction. The government sued the wrong parties, a group of bankruptcy trustees, but the harm it suffered flows from the bankruptcy court's orders. A judgment against the trustees will not eliminate the problem.

This was an administrative appeal by the Shawnee County Board of County Commissioners from a decision by the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) setting aside tax assessments the County claimed on three executive-style business aircraft for tax years 2000-2002. The dispute arose after the County had agreed in earlier proceedings that the aircraft were not subject to taxation and BOTA ordered them exempted. A few years later, the County attempted to reassess the aircraft for back taxes, interest, and penalties. The aircrafts' owners objected and commenced this action to avert the taxation. BOTA and the district court agreed with the owners but with different reasons for their rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim and issue preclusion barred the County from initiating new taxation efforts for the same tax years after the initial BOTA exemption orders became final. Remanded to BOTA for it to set aside the County's correction orders and assessment notices for the aircraft and tax years at issue.

Relators, two businesses, sought certiorari review of the Minnesota Tax Court's determination of the fair market value on the 2007, 2008, and 2009 assessment dates for an office building located in Ramsey County. At trial, the tax court heard expert testimony from Relators' appraiser and Ramsey County's appraiser. After trial, the County submitted a post-trial brief that argued for higher property valuations than the market values assigned to the property by either appraiser. The court then adopted, verbatim, the County's proposed market valuations on the three assessment dates. The Supreme Court reversed the tax court's decision, holding that the court's findings and conclusions failed to meet the standard articulated in Eden Prairie Mall, LLC v. County of Hennepin, which states that when the tax court rejects the testimony of both appraisers, the court must give a basis for its calculations and provide an adequate explanation and factual support in the record for its conclusions.

This case concerned the way by which the costs of financing the school district were apportioned among the city of New Bedford, the town of Dartmouth, and the town of Fairhaven, which were municipalities comprising the school district. Dartmouth commenced an action in the superior court against defendants challenging the funding obligations imposed on the member municipalities by the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L.c. 70, section 6. Fairhaven filed a cross claim asserting that the funding obligations imposed by the Act were a disproportionate tax on property and income in violation of the state constitution. The court held that the complaint filed by Dartmouth and cross claim filed by Fairhaven were properly dismissed because Dartmouth and Fairhaven failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The United States appealed from a judgment of the district court invalidating two notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustments issued by the IRS. The district court so ruled because it concluded that the taxpayer's characterization of two tax-exempt Dutch banks as its partners in Castle Harbour LLC was proper under Internal Revenue Code 704(e)(1). The district court also concluded that, even if the banks did not qualify as partners under section 704(e)(1), the government was not entitled to impose a penalty pursuant to Internal Revenue Code 6662. The court held that the evidence compelled the conclusion that the banks did not qualify as partners under section 704(e)(1), and that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed.

In this original proceeding Allcat, a limited partnership, and one of its limited partners sought an order directing the Comptroller to refund franchise taxes Allcat paid that were attributable to partnership income allocated, but not distributed, to its natural-person partners. Allcat claimed it was entitled to a refund for two reasons. First, the tax facially violated Article VIII, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution because it was a tax on the net incomes of its natural-person partners that was not approved in a statewide referendum. Second, as applied by the Comptroller, to Allcat and its partners, the franchise tax violated Article VIII, Section 1(a) of the Constitution, which required taxation to be equal and uniform. The court held that: (1) the tax was not a tax imposed on the net incomes of the individual partners, thus it did not facially violated Article VIII, Section 24; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the equal and uniform challenge.

At issue in this appeal was the Privilege Tax Statute, which provides that an entity may be taxed on the privilege of beneficially using or possessing property in connection with a for-profit business when the owner of that property is exempt from taxation. But the tax may not be imposed unless the entity using or possessing the exempt property has "exclusive possession" of that property. Alliant Techsystems (ATK) challenged the imposition of a privilege tax on its use of government property. The district court granted summary judgment against ATK, concluding that ATK had "exclusive possession" of federal government property because there was no evidence that anyone other than the government, the landowner, had any possession, use, management or control of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the Statute, "exclusive possession" means exclusive as to all parties, including the property owner, and thus, exclusive possession exists when an entity has the present right to occupy and control property akin to that of an owner or lessee; and (2) because the record indicated disputed material facts regarding ATK's authority to control the government property, summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.

Defendants were convicted of failure to pay federal income tax. Neither attended sentencing. They did not respond to demands to surrender and remained holed up in their secluded home for about nine months. Marshals had information that defendants were armed and making threats, but eventually arrested the couple and found explosives, firearms, and ammunition, including rifles, armor piercing bullets, pipe bombs, and bombs nailed to trees. Convicted of conspiring to prevent federal officers from discharging their duties, 18 U.S.C. 372; conspiring to assault, resist or impede federal officers, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b) and 371; using or carrying a firearm or destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence; possessing a firearm or destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (B); being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1503; and failing to appear at sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146. They were sentenced to 35 and 37 years. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments relating to competency, defendants' beliefs that they were not obligated to pay taxes, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions.

The city of Winchester and its collector (Winchester) filed a class action lawsuit against Charter Communications on behalf of itself and other similarly situated Missouri municipal corporations and political subdivisions, seeking a declaratory judgment requiring Charter and other telephone service providers to comply with ordinances requiring them to pay a license tax on gross receipts derived from fees and services connected to their operations and an order requiring Charter to pay all license taxes owed to the class. The circuit court struck Winchester's claims on the basis of Mo. Rev. Stat. 71.675, which bars cities and towns from serving as class representatives in suits to enforce or collect business license taxes imposed on telecommunications companies. The Supreme Court quashed the court's preliminary writ of prohibition and granted Winchester's request for a permanent writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the court exceeded its authority in striking Winchester's class action allegations pursuant to section 71.675, as the statute violated Mo. Const. art. V, 5 because it amended a procedural rule of the Court.

Custom Hardware Engineering (CHE) appealed an Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) decision determining that CHE was liable for use tax plus interest and additions to tax on its purchases of parts for use in fulfilling maintenance contracts. CHE asserted that is was not liable for any use tax because it did not use the parts and, instead, retained them for "temporary storage" as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.605(13). The Supreme Court affirmed the AHC decision, holding (1) the record demonstrated that CHE used the parts for testing and certification on behalf of its customers; and (2) therefore, CHE was liable for use tax as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.610.