Petitioner Accord Human Resources, Inc. (Accord) is a professional employer organization that transacts business in Colorado along with four related entities. In 2004, Accord transferred a portion of its Colorado employees to another Accord entity with a lower unemployment tax rate and in doing so, reduced its unemployment tax burden. The Colorado Division of Employment and Training determined that it had authority to treat the various Accord entities as one for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes, thus erasing any tax advantage that could be gained through the employee transfer. Under this rationale, the Division issued a delinquent tax notice to Accord. Accord appealed, and the hearing officer reversed. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's Final Order and reinstated the hearing officer's decision. The Division sought to reverse the court of appeals decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, finding that nothing gave the Division authority to combine separate employer tax accounts into one account for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes. View "Colorado Div. of Employment & Training v. Accord Human Resources, Inc" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed the Tax Court's order dismissing their action against the Government for lack of jurisdiction. At issue on appeal was whether the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction where petitioners failed to file their petition within the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act's (TEFRA), 26 U.S.C. 6226(a)-(b), express filing period. Because the court held that section 6226's 150-day limit was jurisdictional, the court had no authority to alter it. The plain language of the statue measured the 150-day filing period from the date the IRS mailed the final partnership administrative adjustments (FPAA) and it did not contemplate tolling. Petitioners filed the present petition 418 days after the FPAA was mailed, - over 250 days late. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "A.I.M. Controls, L.L.C., et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing two orders requiring the president and CEO of MassMutual to submit to depositions. MassMutual argued (1) the orders requiring its president to submit to depositions were properly the subject of a writ of prohibition, and (2) the orders compelling the depositions of this high-ranking corporate executive, despite his lack of any personal or unique knowledge about the cases, were clearly erroneous and constituted an abuse of the circuit court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued the writ after adopting the apex deposition rule, a framework for assessing whether the deposition of a high-ranking corporate official is proper, holding that because the circuit court, in this case, did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, there was an insufficient basis to sustain the circuit court's orders. View "State ex rel. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

After the IRS concluded its audit of the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership's tax returns for years 1993-1999 and adjusted various partnership items, the personal income tax liability of Wanda King, one of the limited partners, was lessened and she became eligible for a state tax refund totaling $173,364. King filed a claim for refund, but the Comptroller of the Treasury denied it, stating that the refund claim was not timely filed because the IRS's final report regarding adjustments to King's personal tax liability had been issued more than a year before King filed her refund. On appeal, the Maryland tax court ruled in favor of the Comptroller. The circuit court reversed the tax court, and the court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of special appeals, holding (1) the statute of limitations applicable to King's refund claim began to run when the IRS issued to her certain forms on January 3, 2006, and accordingly, King's refund claim had to have been filed within one year of that date; and (2) thus, King's submission on February 2, 2007 was untimely. View "King v. Comptroller" on Justia Law

A property owner, Sheldon Road Associates, filed a valuation complaint in December 2008 that challenged the auditor's June 2008 correction of a clerical error relating to the 2007 tax year. The county Board of Revision (BOR) issued a decision that treated the complaint as pertaining to the tax year 2008. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) decided that, because Sheldon's complaint was untimely as to the 2007 tax year, the BOR lacked jurisdiction. The BTA remanded with the instruction that the BOR dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding that the BOR did have jurisdiction under the particular facts of this case. Remanded. View "Sheldon Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied. View "Matter of Orange County Commr. of Fin. (Helseth)" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101 et seq., and certain employment taxes FICA imposed upon employers. After a bench trial on the merits, the district rendered a tax deficiency judgment against DEWPC for unpaid FICA taxes and DEWPC appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the government's expert testimony on the issue of reasonable compensation and, because the district court applied the correct legal standard, its determination on Watson's FICA wages was affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, natives and citizens of Japan who have been lawful permanent residents of the United States since 1984, appealed a removal order after husband pleaded guilty to one count of willfully making and subscribing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) and wife pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At issue was whether aliens who commit certain federal tax crimes were subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Court held that violations of section 7206(1) and (2) were crimes "involv[ing] fraud or deceit" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and were therefore aggravated felonies as that term was defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., when the loss to the Government exceeded $10,000. Because petitioners were subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Kawashima v. Holder" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Margaret Murray appealed a superior court's order that dismissed her tax abatement appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that she could not appeal the abatement decision because she failed to challenge the valuation of the property in the appraisal process.  Upon review, the Court concluded that Taxpayer's abatement appeal to the superior court was not foreclosed by her failure to appeal the valuation of her property, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Murray v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

RECAP, a tax-exempt charitable organization and owner of properties in the City of Middletown, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, challenging the legally of the City's tax assessments. In this appeal, the court was asked to determine the statute of limitations governing a taxpayer's claim against a school district for money had and received arising from an erroneous assessment of school taxes and when such claim accrued. The court held that Education Law 3813 (2-b)'s one-year statute of limitations applied and that the claim for money had and received accrued when the taxes were paid. Therefore, the court concluded that RECAP's cause of action for money had and received accrued when it paid the taxes. Even assuming RECAP's last payment was made "under protest" in October 2007, as RECAP claimed, RECAP did not commence this action until April 2009, outside the one-year statute of limitations, rendering RECAP's claim time-barred. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v Enlarged City School Dist. of Middletown" on Justia Law