Empower the Taxpayer, Charlene Nelson, and Robert Hale (collectively "Empower") appealed an order dismissing their request for injunctive relief against numerous state and local government officials and other entities. Empower supported North Dakota Initiated Constitutional Measure 2 to abolish property taxes which is on the June 2012 primary election ballot. In February 2012, Empower brought this action seeking injunctive relief against the defendants to prohibit them from, among other things, "advocating any position on Measure 2" and to declare them "no longer eligible to run for public office." Empower alleged the officials and entities had violated provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act by distributing false and misleading information about the effect of Measure 2. The district court dismissed the action, concluding "Empower lacks standing to bring this claim as the Corrupt Practices Act is a criminal law, the Defendants' actions did not violate Empower's legal rights, and the legislature did not imply a private right of action" for violation of the Act's provisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Empower failed to establish that there was a private right of action to enforce provisions of the North Dakota Corrupt Practices Act. View "Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint contending that the Department of Treasury lacked statutory authority to promulgate regulations imposing a user fee. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the Department's regulation's requirement that compensated tax return preparers obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) and its imposition of an annual fee for that number. Because in exchange for the user fee the Department assigned a PTIN and conferred a special benefit upon tax return preparers, the court held that the Department's user fee complied with 31 U.S.C. 9701. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Brannen, III, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Commissioner sought review of a U.S. Tax Court decision favoring Entergy for the taxable years of 1997 and 1998. By reference to a companion case, the Tax Court concluded that Entergy was entitled to a foreign income tax credit for its subsidiary's payment of the United Kingdom's Windfall Tax. At issue on appeal was whether the Windfall Tax constituted a creditable foreign income tax under I.R.C. 901, 26 U.S.C. 901. The court concluded that when judged on its predominant character, the Windfall Tax was based on excess profits - realized income derived from gross receipts less deductions for substantial business expenses incurred in earning those receipts. This satisfied the three-part net gain requirement, as the Tax Court accurately noted. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Entergy Corp. v. CIR" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Hamilton Township, a limited-home-rule township, was authorized under Ohio law to impose its system of impact fees upon applicants for zoning certificates for new construction or redevelopment within its unincorporated areas. Appellants, several development companies, brought this action against Appellees, the Township and its trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, alleging that the impact fees were contrary to Ohio law and were unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the impact fees charged by the Township in this case constituted taxes; and (2) since those taxes were not authorized by general law, the Township was unauthorized to impose them pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 504.04(A)(1). View "Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp." on Justia Law

Former Shareholders of Tarcon filed petitions in the Tax Court contesting the Commissioner's notices of transferee liability. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the Former Shareholders, applying Commissioner v. Stern, holding that the Commissioner could only collect from the Former Shareholders if, under North Carolina law, a Tarcon creditor could recover payments of Tarcon's debts from the Former Shareholders. The court concluded that the Tax Court properly identified and applied the controlling legal framework as set forth in Stern and it did not commit clear error in its factual findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Former Shareholders. View "Starnes v. Commissioner, IRS; Stroupe v. Commissioner, IRS; Naples v. Commissioner, IRS; Morelli, Sr. v. Commissioner, IRS" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dominion, a power company, replaced coal burners in two of its plants, temporarily removing the units from service for two to three months. During that time, Dominion incurred interest on debt unrelated to the improvements. On its tax returns, Dominion deducted some of that interest. The IRS disagreed, citing Treasury Regulation 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B), as requiring Dominion to capitalize half ($3.3 million) of that interest over several years, instead of deducting it in a single tax year. The Claims Court granted summary judgment to the IRS. The Federal Circuit reversed. The associated property rule in Treasury Regulation 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B), as applied to property temporarily withdrawn from service, is not a reasonable interpretation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. 263A (Capitalization and Inclusion in Inventory Costs of Certain Expenses). Treasury acted contrary to 5 U.S.C. 706(2) in failing to provide a reasoned explanation when it promulgated that regulation. View "Dominon Res., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

After the State Tax Commissioner (Tax Department) appraised Century Aluminum of West Virginia's aluminum plant, Century Aluminum objected to the valuations. The Jackson County Commission sitting as a Board of Equalization and Review advised the company that it would not make any adjustment to the Tax Department's valuations. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) upholding the Tax Department's policy of how it considers functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence for categories of assets other than machinery and equipment; and (2) ruling that the Tax Department's policy of artificially limiting its consideration of obsolescence to a fifty percent reduction in the case of machinery and equipment complied with the requirement that property be valued at fair market value. View "Century Aluminum of W. Va., Inc. v. County Comm'n" on Justia Law

A corporation settled its delinquent tax liability to the State of Mississippi by paying $100 million to the State, $4.2 million to a private charity, and $14 million to a private law firm hired by the Attorney General to pursue the claim. Mississippi's Auditor demanded that, because the $18.2 million paid to the private charity and the law firm constituted public funds, it must be turned over to the State. The charity complied; but the law firm refused, claiming the payment of its fees was not made with public funds and, in any case, the Auditor had waived the State’s claim. The Auditor filed suit and the trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm. The state Auditor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when the Attorney General pays special assistants, Mississippi statutory law requires that they be paid from the Attorney General’s contingent fund or from other funds appropriated to the Attorney General's office by the Legislature. Furthermore, the Mississippi constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury." Neither of these requirements was met in this case. Neither the Attorney General nor the Langston Firm provided sufficient evidence to establish that the Auditor waived the State’s claim to the funds. The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pickering v. Langston Law Firm, P.A." on Justia Law

A corporation settled a lawsuit by agreeing to pay the State of Mississippi $50 million, $10 million of which it disbursed directly to outside counsel retained by Attorney General Hood to pursue the litigation. The chancery court held that the payment was proper. But because the law requires that outside counsel retained by the Attorney General to pursue litigation in "the state or federal courts" be paid from his contingent fund or from other funds the Legislature appropriates to his office, and because the Mississippi Constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury," the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Attorney General failed to use his contingent fund. View "Pickering v. Hood" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was an appeal by the City of Cleveland of a judgment by the DeSoto County Chancery Court which denied the City's motion for attorney fees. The chancery court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that, after the Court of Appeals rendered the underlying case and the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, the case was at its end. The chancery court did not thereafter have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction. View "City of Cleveland, Mississippi v. Mid-South Associates, LLC" on Justia Law