One petition for the writ of mandamus and three appeals were brought before the Supreme Court to challenge a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court awarding Hugh McInnish $196,625 in attorney fees and costs in his action against: (1) the Governor of the State of Alabama, (2) the State finance director, (3) the State comptroller, and (4) the State treasurer, all in their official capacities. The underlying case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the community-services grant-making process set forth in Ala. Code 1975, section 29-2-123. There, the Court held that "section 29-2-123, which authorizes a permanent joint legislative committee to award community-services grants, [as well as that portion of the annual education-appropriations act] by which those grants are funded," violated the separation-of-powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 925 So. 2d at 188, and the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case. Subsequently, McInnish filed a series of motions in the trial court, seeking "an award of attorney fees, reasonable expenses, and costs against the [State officials]." He also sought an order declaring that he was "a prevailing party, that this litigation provided a common benefit to all taxpayers of the state of Alabama, and that the amount that was prohibited from being disbursed illegally was in an amount of approximately $13.4 million." The State officials opposed McInnish's motions, arguing that "[t]he clear holding in Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro[, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006),] is that section 14 of the Alabama Constitution prohibits the awarding of attorney fees and expenses in any state court action against the State of Alabama or against state officials in their official capacities." The trial court entered a judgment awarding "counsel for Plaintiff McInnish a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $196,625.00 to be paid by the [State officials]." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that section 14 bars an award of attorney fees and costs even if a plaintiff has prevailed on a claim against State officials in their official capacities for a violation of the State constitution that results in preservation of significant funds in the State treasury. The trial court lacked authority to award such attorney fees and costs. Consequently, the judgment was reversed. View "McInnish v. Bentley " on Justia Law

Petitioners, husband and wife, sought review of a judgment of the Tax Court sustaining the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency, an accuracy-related penalty, and a penalty for filing a delinquent tax return. Husband worked for IBM and acquired IBM stock by exercising his employee stock options. Husband subsequently participated in a program operated by Derivium, whereby it would "lend" a client ninety percent of the value of securities that the client pledged to it as collateral. The court concluded that a combination of factors pointed decidedly to the conclusion that husband disposed of his stock by signing a Master Agreement and addenda and retained no real interest in his collateral or the "loan" after Derivium had transferred the proceeds to him. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith when they declared their income from the sale of IBM shares to Derivium. Consequently, the court affirmed the Tax Court's imposition of an accuracy-related penalty. Further, plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing reasonable cause for failing to timely file their return and therefore, the Commissioner's assessment of a late-filing penalty was appropriate. View "Calloway v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from a decision of the United States tax court concluding that he owed $128,292 in income tax for the 2004 taxable year. Petitioner entered into an agreement with Optech Limited pursuant to which he transferred floating rate notes (FRNs) worth approximately $1 million to Optech in return for a nonrecourse loan of ninety percent of the FRNs' value. The agreement gave Optech the right to receive all dividends and interest on the FRNs and the right to sell the FRNs during the loan term without Petitioner's consent. Instead of holding the FRNs as collateral for the loan, Optech sold the FRNs and transferred ninety percent of the proceeds to Petitioner. Petitioner did not report that he had sold the FRNs in his 2004 federal income tax return. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that Petitioner's transaction with Optech constituted a sale for tax purposes despite its taking the form of a loan because the burdens and benefits of owning the FRNs were transferred to Optech. View "Sollberger v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) to Alex and Liset Meruelo a few days before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Alex was a partner in a partnership. The Meruelos petitioned the tax court challenging the deficiency contained in the NOD and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the IRS issued the NOD prematurely, making it invalid. The tax court held that the NOD was valid and not premature and that the items were affected items. The parties later reached an agreement as to all issues, except the validity of the NOD. The tax court then entered a final decision holding that the Meruelos were liable for $1,387,006 in additional income tax and $277,401 in penalties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) a NOD issued when no partnership-level proceeding or final partnership administrative adjustment have been issued is valid; (2) a NOD issued when the normal three-year statute of limitations has not expired is valid; and (3) therefore, the tax court had jurisdiction. View "Meruelo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the imposition of municipal taxes on SLAH, LLC, a business entity that owned a hotel located in the city of Woodson Terrace. The city appealed from the declaratory judgment entered against it on SLAH's claim that the city was prohibited by Mo. Rev. Stat. 94.270.3 from imposing a hotel license tax rate in excess of $13.50 per room, per year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the remedy afforded to SLAH under Mo. Rev. Stat. 139.031 was adequate under the circumstances, and accordingly, it was the exclusive remedy for challenging the legality of the city's hotel license tax rates; and (2) because a declaratory judgment action is improper when an adequate remedy exists at law, the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of SLAH. View "State ex rel. SLAH, LLC v. City of Woodson Terrace" on Justia Law

Vermont Golf Association challenged the superior court’s dismissal of its appeal from a decision by the Department of Taxes assessing sales and use tax on prior activities. The court based its dismissal on Vermont Golf’s failure to provide security to the Commissioner of Taxes to perfect its appeal to the superior court. Finding no error in the superior court's disposition of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont Golf Association, Inc. v. Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

After Claimant's attempt to obtain a refund of sales tax on building materials used in the construction of an ethanol production plant was administratively denied in part, Claimant sought judicial review. This appeal turned on a statutory limitation of the exemption for manufacturing machinery and equipment and the limited statutory authority for appointment of a purchasing agent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute limited the exemption to purchases by the manufacturer; and (2) a contractual provision purporting to entitle the manufacturer to all tax credits for taxes paid by a construction contractor was not effective as a purchasing agent appointment. View "Bridgeport Ethanol v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

In March 2006, the Washoe County Board of Equalization adjusted the property tax values of approximately 300 Incline Village and Crystal Bay taxpayers based on a determination that those properties' taxable values had been improperly assessed. The County Board determined that rolling back the 300 properties' taxable values had created an unequal rate of taxation for the 2006-2007 tax year and acted to fix the error. The Washoe County Assessor administratively appealed the equalization decision to the State Board of Equalization, but the State Board did not immediately consider the appeal because this court had imposed a stay temporarily enjoining the rollbacks pending a decision in a related appeal concerning the assessment methods. After the State Board ruled on Washoe County's motion, the Assessor made several objections to the taxpayers' involvement in the proceedings. Pertinent to this appeal, the Assessor argued that: (1) The Village League to Save Incline Assets, Inc., did not have standing to appear on behalf of any of the taxpayers; (2) any taxpayer not represented by counsel, absent from the State Board proceedings without an excuse, or represented by Village League should not be recognized as a party; and (3) none of the 300 taxpayers who previously obtained rollbacks should be recognized as parties. The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirement that a petitioner name, as respondents to a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, "all parties of record." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a party must strictly comply with the APA naming requirement as a prerequisite to invoking the district court's jurisdiction. Thus, when a petitioner fails to name in its petition each party of record to the underlying administrative proceedings, the petition is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed. Further, if the petitioner fails to invoke the district court's jurisdiction by naming the proper parties within the statutory time limit, the petition may not subsequently be amended to cure the jurisdictional defect. View "Washoe County v. Otto" on Justia Law

The 419 Plan was established as a multiple-employer welfare benefit plan, 26 U.S.C. 419A(f)(6). Businesses that enroll contribute to an account, which acquires and pays premiums on life insurance policies for covered employees. Each covered employee determines the type of insurance purchased on his behalf. Participating businesses can choose the number of years for which contributions will be required to fully pay for benefits. The Plan is listed as beneficiary on each policy and passes the death benefit to the covered employee. Participating businesses can withdraw at any time. Testimony indicated that "the beauty" of the Plan "is that you can put away extra money in good times” though the premium is not due, “get a tax deduction today and we don't put the premium in for years to come." Owners of four businesses, enrolled in the Plan, contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars and claimed tax deductions, although only the four owners and a stepson were covered. The IRS determined that the payments were not "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, which resulted in additional pass-through income on which the owners had not paid taxes. The tax court held that the owners owed deficiency payments and accuracy-related penalties. The Second Circuit affirmed.View "Curcio v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Alltel Entities (collectively Petitioners Alltel Communications, Inc. and its regional subsidiaries), were included in the definition of "telephone company" for the purpose of increased license fees in S.C. Code Ann. section 1220-100 (2000). Pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, finding that they were not telephone companies for purposes of section 12-20-100. Alternatively, the ALC found that if the statute were ambiguous, Petitioners would prevail under the rule that an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Though the court of appeals recognized that the application of section 12-20-100 to Petitioners was not "absolutely clear," it reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for additional fact finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ALC's grant of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. The term "telephone company" was not a defined term and its application to Petitioners was "doubtful." The presence of an ambiguity in a tax assessment statute requires that a court resolve that doubt in favor of the taxpayer. View "Alltel v. SCDOR" on Justia Law