The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission appealed the decision of the Commonwealth Court to vacate an operations fee assessed against a public utility, appellee Mercury Trucking, Inc. for the operating period of July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006 (the "2005 annual assessment"). At the Supreme Court’s request, the parties also addressed issues related to the appropriate process by which disputes of this nature should proceed in the courts of the Commonwealth. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the Commonwealth Court record, the Supreme Court held that judicial review of a public utility’s challenge to its annual assessment shall proceed in the courts of this Commonwealth in accordance with the procedures of the Administrative Agency Law, Chapter 7, Subchapter A. Accordingly, the Court quashed the Commission’s direct appeal. However, given that the proper procedure was unclear, and that the underlying issue merited review, the Court treated the Commission’s notice of appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal, which the Court granted. On the merits, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, vacated its judgment in favor of the public utility, and reinstated the Commission’s adjudication. View "Mercury Trucking v. Public Utilities Comm'n" on Justia Law

Debtors appealed from the order of the bankruptcy court confirming their amended Chapter 13 plan. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court erred when it confirmed debtors' plan that did not provide for payment of unsecured non-priority tax claims and tax preparation fees ahead of other non-priority unsecured creditors. Because a plan proposed by debtors providing for special treatment of the tax claims would unfairly discriminate against other unsecured non-priority creditors, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the plan was proper. View "Copeland, et al v. Fink" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Los Angeles County (County) and forty-seven cities (Cities) within County regarding how County calculated and imposed property tax administration fees on Cities for their share of County's costs in administering the property tax system. Cities petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandate ordering County and its auditor-controller to reimburse Cities for the amount disputed in fiscal year 2006-2007. Following a trial, the referee ruled that County's method of calculating the disputed fee was consistent with legislative intent and did not violate Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 97.75. The court of appeal reversed, relying almost exclusively on the plain meaning of section 97.75 to conclude that County's method of calculation was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that County's method of calculating property tax administration fees violated the statutory scheme. View "City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

We, the Taxpayers, an unincorporated association of individual taxpayer residents of Effingham County ("Taxpayers"), appealed the trial court's order dismissing Taxpayers's complaint against the Board of Tax Assessors of Effingham County ("Board"). In a separate case, the Board appealed the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Former OCGA 48-5B-1 became law in 2009, and was effective until January 2011. It placed a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property subject to ad valorem taxation for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and continuing through January 9, 2011, but provided an exception from the moratorium for any county which performed or had performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county in 2008 or any county which in 2009 was under contract prior to February 28, 2009, to have performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county. The Board, believing that Effingham County met the exception set forth in former OCGA 48-5B-1 (c), did not impose a moratorium on increases in assessed values in the 2009 tax year, but in fact, increased assessed values of certain property. Taxpayers, believing that the exception did not apply and that the moratorium should have been imposed, filed a complaint under OCGA 48-5-296 seeking the removal of Board members. Taxpayers amended the complaint to include the equitable relief of eliminating the 2009 assessed values and imposing instead the 2008 tax year figures; by later amendment, Taxpayers dropped the request to remove Board members, and added a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to act in accordance with Taxpayers's interpretation of OCGA 48-5B-1. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, contending that the undisputed evidence showed that the exception to the moratorium did not apply; the Board also moved for summary judgment, asserting that OCGA 48-5B-1 was unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that the undisputed facts showed that the statutory exception applied. The trial court denied both motions. The Board then filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that the Taxpayers property owners were obligated to appeal their 2009 ad valorem assessments to the county Board of Equalization, or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial court's addressing the equitable and mandamus claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in denying Taxpayers's motion, and vacated the court's decision denying the Board's motion. View "We, The Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors Effingham Cty." on Justia Law

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an agricultural exemption for real property taxes was not available to Petitioner-Appellant Thompson Development, LLC because agricultural use of the property in question would violate a local zoning ordinance. Because the Supreme Court found that the zoning ordinance was irrelevant to qualifying for the exemption, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thompson Development v. Latah Co Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law

This appeal presented the question, among others, of what event triggered the running of the statute of limitations for a claim for wrongful disclosure of a tax return pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7431(d). The court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the government's allegedly unauthorized disclosures. The court also concluded, in the circumstances presented in this case, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run when plaintiffs became aware of a pending general investigation that would involve disclosures, but only later when they knew or should have known of the specific disclosures at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Aloe Vera of America, Inc., et al v. USA" on Justia Law

Relator challenged several personal liability assessments that the Commissioner of Revenue made against him based on unpaid petroleum and sales taxes owed by Twin Cities Avanti Stores, LLC (Avanti). On appeal, Relator asserted that the tax court erred by granting summary judgment to the Commissioner because (1) there were disputed, material questions of fact regarding his personal liability for the unpaid petroleum and sales taxes, and (2) the court abused its discretion in not allowing additional discovery to explore an estoppel defense. The Supreme Court reversed the tax court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and remanded for a trial, holding that there was a material dispute of fact whether Relator had the requisite control over the company's finances to be held personally liable for Avanti's tax liability. View "Stevens v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Relator challenged several personal liability assessments that the Commissioner of Revenue made against him based on unpaid petroleum and sales taxes owed by Twin Cities Avanti Stores, LLC. In his appeal, Relator did not dispute that he could be held personally liable but asserted that the tax court erred in granting summary judgment to the Commissioner because the court did not allow him additional discovery to explore an estoppel defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Relator could not establish the elements of equitable estoppel, the tax court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his request for additional discovery to pursue such a claim. View "Nelson v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court for a second time. Here the case was before the Court on a petition for writ of prohibition brought by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order requiring Roger Crandall, the president, CEO and chairman of Mass Mutual, to submit to deposition. The underlying lawsuits were part of a series of 412i retirement plan cases against multiple defendants, including MassMutual. Respondents alleged fraud and tax fraud in their complaints regarding annuities and pension plans that allegedly subjected Respondents to tax and compliance penalties and other collateral liabilities. In MassMutual I, the Court issued a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its orders that directed Crandall submit to deposition. In the instant appeal, MassMutual argued that the circuit court failed to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in MassMutual I in ordering its president to submit to deposition. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the circuit court and Respondents failed to follow the directive of the Court in MassMutual I, and therefore, the court was prohibited from enforcing its order requiring Crandall to submit to deposition. View "State ex rel. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law