Appellants, contractors and engineers, filed a declaratory judgment action against Appellee, the tax commissioner of Ohio, seeking a judgment declaring that the Ohio commercial activity tax (CAT), as it related to motor-vehicle-fuel sales, violated Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a. The trial court granted summary judgment for the tax commissioner. The appellate court affirmed, applying the rationale of Ohio Grocers Ass'n v. Levin, concluding that the background and history of Section 5a did not support the contention that the CAT was a tax "relating to" motor vehicle fuel sales. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expenditure of the CAT revenue that was derived from motor-vehicle-fuel sales were "related to" fuels used for propelling motor vehicles on a highway, within the meaning of Section 5a, and consequently, the excise tax violated the Ohio Constitution to the extent that the revenue raised was used for purposes other than those specified in Section 5a. View "Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa" on Justia Law

On October 10, 2011 the board of revision issued a decision ordering reductions in the valuation of property owed by a county club. The local school district board of education (school board) attempted to appeal that decision to the board of tax appeals (BTA) by sending the appropriate notices by certified mail on October 14, 2011. That same day, the country club physically presented its notices of appeal to the common pleas court and the BOR. The school board argued that it had filed its appeal first because it placed its notices in the mail earlier on October 14 than the country club had filed its appeals at the courthouse and the BOR. The BTA ruled that the country club had filed its appeal first, determining that the time of the mailing was immaterial and that the probative force of the school board evidence of the time of mailing was questionable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in determining that the school board had not proven the time when its notice of appeal was mailed, it properly held that the country club's filing in the common pleas court had priority for jurisdictional purposes. View "Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Hamilton County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Preacely pleaded guilty in 2009 to tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The district court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release, with a special condition, prohibiting him from participating in his former occupation of tax preparer. When the district court imposed the special condition, counsel asked: “may he own the business if he himself does not prepare any taxes himself?” The court responded, “No … you should not engage in the business of tax preparation directly or indirectly.” After his release from prison, Preacely transferred ownership of his business to his wife, but when an undercover IRS agent asked to speak to the vice-president, he was directed to Preacely. The IRS also executed a search warrant at the business and interviewed a number of employees. The district court revoked Preacely’s supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and that Preacely was involved only administratively with the business by doing things such as dropping off food, office supplies, and signing paychecks. View "United States v. Preacely" on Justia Law

In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the city school district board of education challenged a decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA) that affirmed the county board of revision's (BOR) adoption of a sale price as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2007. The school board argued in part that the BOR lacked jurisdiction because the valuation complaint had been signed and submitted by the property owner's spouse, who was not a lawyer. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA's decision, holding (1) the filing of a valuation complaint by the owner's spouse validly invokes the BOR's jurisdiction; and (2) the record furnished a sufficient basis to support the BTA's finding. View "Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

SEW operated 113 franchise Waffle House restaurants when it filed its Chapter 11 petition in 2008. From January, 2005, to the Petition Date, SEW did not pay federal income tax withholding, social security (FICA), or unemployment (FUTA) taxes or timely file returns. During four years before the Petition Date, the IRS assessed penalties of more than $1,500,000. SEW subsequently made payments that were applied to its tax obligations and also made undesignated prepetition payments that were applied in partial satisfaction of the assessed penalties. SEW later sought recovery of prepetition tax penalty payments of $637,652.07 or an offset against the tax amounts still owed. SEW alleged that payment of these penalties provided no value to SEW; that SEW did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Penalty Payments; that at the time that of the payments, SEW was insolvent; and cited 11 U.S.C. 548 and 544. The government argued that dollar-for-dollar reduction in SEW’s antecedent tax-penalty liabilities constituted reasonably equivalent value. SEW did not allege that the penalty obligations were themselves avoidable. The Bankruptcy court dismissed SEW’s adversary petition for failure to state a clam. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "SE Waffles, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine when a well "started" under Utah Code 59-5-102. Although that statute imposes a severance tax on oil or gas produced from a well, section 59-5-102(5)(c) permits an exemption for "the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." Summit Operating, LLC argued that a well starts when it begins commercial production. Under this interpretation, Summit asserted that it was entitled to a six-month tax exemption for its well, which started commercial production in 2008. The Utah State Tax Commission asserted that a well starts on the date that drilling begins, and thus, Summit was not entitled to the tax exemption because drilling for Summit's well began in 1983. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order granting summary judgment to the Auditing Division of the Commission, holding that under the Tax Exemption Statute, a well "starts" when drilling begins. View "Summit Operating v. State Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue in this matter was whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. Upon review of the applicable legislative history of the statute in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriff’s office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. The decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves " on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from issues involving the school-funding system and the disbursement of uniform rate of tax (URT) revenues to Arkansas's public-school districts. Appellees, school districts and their taxpayers ("School Districts"), filed a complaint seeking a declaration that any attempt by Appellants, the commissioner of the department of education and the state treasurer ("ADE"), to demand URT revenues in excess of the foundation-funding amount from Appellees was unconstitutional. The circuit court enjoined ADE from (1) seeking repayment of any portion of the URT revenues assessed for purposes of school funding from Appellees, and (2) withholding monies belonging to Appellees for the repayment of the URT revenues required for school funding from state or federal monies owed to the districts. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found that ADE was not authorized by the legislature to recoup and redistribute any URT revenues received from the School Districts that were in excess of the foundation-funding amount; (2) did not err in finding that ADE lacked the authority to withhold monies from the School Districts; and (3) erred in finding that the revenues generated by the URT were state-tax revenues. View "Kimbrell v. McCleskey" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determined whether Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a permits the use of motor vehicle and gas tax (MVGT) funds to pay those costs of a county's joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. The Supreme Court concluded that Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a authorizes the use of MVGT funds to pay a county's cost of participating in a joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded. View "Stockberger v. Henry" on Justia Law

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law