801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Sideman, the legal representative for a taxpayer who was under criminal investigation by the IRS, appealed from the district court's order enforcing an IRS administrative summons to produce the taxpayer's documents. Sideman argued that producing the documents would be testimonial in violation of the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment rights. The district court's finding that the IRS could independently authenticate the tax records contained in the identified collection of boxes and folders currently held by Sideman was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in applying the foregone conclusion exception when enforcing Sideman's compliance with the summons. View "United States v. Sideman & Bancroft, LLP" on Justia Law

The pharmaceutical consulting group failed to pay taxes. By 2005, it accumulated over $1 million in unpaid liabilities. Revenue Officer Johnson pursued collection efforts, levied the group’s accounts, and sought to recover taxes withheld from employees (trust fund taxes) from Gessert personally. Gessert was the group’s creator, sole shareholder, and CEO, and presumably behind the refusal to pay. The group and Gessert sued, seeking refunds and abatements, and pursued damages under I.R.C. 7433 for improper collection efforts. They claimed that the group directed Johnson to apply a few voluntary payments toward its trust fund liability, but that Johnson applied the payments to the non-trust fund portion, increasing Gessert’s personal liability; that Johnson violated Internal Revenue Code and Treasury provisions; and that she improperly levied the accounts. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gessert lacked standing under I.R.C. 7433 because Johnson sought collection from the group. The group failed to allege economic harm, prerequisite to standing under I.R.C. 7433. Concerning the refund claim, the district court properly concluded the group filed its administrative claim too late. Gessert’s refund-and-abatement claim failed because the group did not provide specific written direction to the IRS effectuating a directed payment. View "Gessert v. United States" on Justia Law

The Idaho State Tax Commission appealed a district court judgment which held that PacifiCorp, an Oregon corporation, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Commission's valuation of its taxable operating property in Idaho was erroneous pursuant to I.C. 63-409(2). The Commission contended on appeal that the district court's decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence because the appraisal methodologies utilized by PacifiCorp's appraiser are so unreliable as to amount to incompetent evidence. Because the district court's judgment was not clearly erroneous and was supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "PacificCorp V. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The IRS assigned a taxpayer identification number to Crystal Cascades, LLC. The company changed its name to Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC (CCC), but did not notify the IRS and continued using the original number. A Nevada bank made loans to CCC and recorded trust deeds. CCC failed to pay employment taxes in 2003 and 2004. The IRS filed tax lien notices in 2004-2005, under the identification number and directed to “Crystal Cascades, LLC.” In 2005 RHB made loans to CCC. The Nevada bank initiated foreclosure. CCC filed under Chapter 11. RHB argued seniority over the tax liens. During foreclosure, RHB purchased the property. Under I.R.C. 7452(d), the IRS may redeem properties against which it has a valid tax lien. The parties negotiated for RHB to pay $100,000; the IRS released its right of redemption. The bankruptcy court concluded that the lien notices did not impart constructive notice to third parties and awarded RHB surplus sale proceeds. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. RHB sought return of the $100,000, asserting that the agreement was void for lack of consideration because the right of redemption was illusory. The Court of Federal Claims held that RHB failed to prove that the IRS acted in bad faith. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rd. & Hwy. Bldrs., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Relators represented a putative class including all residential property owners in three Minneapolis neighborhoods. Relators challenged the assessed values that the City placed on Relators' properties and alleged that because their properties were overvalued, Relators were required to overpay property taxes in 2009 through 2011. The tax court dismissed Relators' complaint, holding (1) because Relators alleged that the City's assessment practices were illegal, Minn. Stat. 278 provided the Realtors' exclusive remedy, (2) Relators' 2008 and 2009 claims were untimely under chapter 278, and (3) Relators' 2010 claims failed because chapter 278 did not allow multiple taxpayers to file a single action concerning multiple properties. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Relators' claims based on the 2008 and 2009 tax years were untimely pursuant to chapter 278; but (2) because the plain language of chapter 278 allows multiple taxpayers to file one tax action concerning multiple properties, the tax court erred in dismissing Relators' claims based on the 2010 tax year to the extent those claims alleged a violation of Minn. Stat. 273.11. View "Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

In this case, Metro disputed the determination of a deficiency by the Commissioner based on Metro's use of net operating losses (NOLs) accumulated in 2003 and 2004 to completely offset its 2002 taxable income. The court held that the plain meaning of the term "carryovers" prevented taxpayers from using NOLs that were carried back to 2001 or to 2002 from a later tax year to take advantage of section 56 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Relief Rule), which permitted taxpayers subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax to offset up to 100% of their taxable income with NOLs. Therefore, the court affirmed the Tax Court's assessment of a deficiency, because Metro could not take advantage of the Relief Rule with NOLs it carried back from the 2003 and 2004 tax years to 2002. View "Metro One Telecommunications, v. CIR" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of attempting to evade or defeat a tax; four counts of willful failure to file a tax return; and one count of attempting to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws. Defendant appealed. Although the court granted defendant's motion to reconsider the clerk's denial of his motion to extend the time for filing a reply and allowed the brief to be submitted to the court, the court nevertheless concluded that the district court did not err in any respect. Because the court held that there were no merits to any of defendant's substantive points, and because the court held that the statute of limitations accrued from the last evasive act under 26 U.S.C. 6531(2), the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Irby, Jr." on Justia Law

An underground mine with surface facilities located in Musselshell County (Musselshell) extended underground into Yellowstone County (Yellowstone) and produced coal mined from both Musselshell and Yellowstone. Based upon a report of the counties from which the coal was mined, the Department of Revenue allocated approximately two-thirds of the mine's taxable coal gross proceeds to Musselshell, for a tax of $328,617, and the remainder to Yellowstone, for a tax of $126,909. Musselshell sued Yellowstone and the Department seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department wrongfully allocated a portion of the tax to Yellowstone. The district court upheld the Department's apportionment of the tax between the two counties, holding that Montana law contemplates taxation of the gross proceeds of coal in the county where the coal is mined and that the Department was not required to adopt administrative rules prior to apportioning the tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department correctly apportioned the coal gross proceeds tax from the mine between Musselshell and Yellowstone and was not required by law to create an administrative rule before making that apportionment. View "Musselshell County v. Yellowstone County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an ordinance imposing a fixed tax on businesses with gross receipts over a certain threshold violated a statute prohibiting business privilege taxes "on gross receipts or parts thereof." Appellants argued that, because the ordinance imposed a flat tax for businesses earning over $1,000,000, while exempting businesses with gross receipts below that amount, it constituted a tax "on gross receipts or part thereof." The common pleas court upheld the ordinance, explaining that it imposed a flat tax with an exemption for any business earning no more than $1,000,000 in a particular year. Thus, because the tax is not levied as a percentage of a business's gross receipts, the court reasoned that it does not constitute an improper tax "on" gross receipts. The Commonwealth Court affirmed in an unpublished disposition, rejecting Appellants' contention that the ordinance levied a tax on that part of a taxpayer's annual gross receipts in excess of $1,000,000. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that, regardless of how well intentioned, the taxing authority's actions were contrary to statute. Accordingly the order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed, and the matter was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. View "Shelly Funeral Homes v. Warrington Twp." on Justia Law