Appellant Fredrick Williams appealed the superior court's decision affirming the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's ruling that a house was not exempt from Ketchikan Gateway Borough taxation. In 2002 Williams received a grant to rebuild his house from the Bureau of Indian Affairs Housing Improvement Program. Because Williams has owned the home for ten years, the repayment amount annually decreased by ten percent of the original amount, resulting in no repayment for a transfer occurring 20 years or more after Williams received the grant. Williams executed a deed of trust securing the federal government's right to repayment under the grant. Williams claimed that under the grant and the deed of trust, "[t]he federal government own[ed] . . . the $115,000 it took to build the home," and that Williams was therefore exempt from paying property taxes on it. On appeal, the superior court rejected this argument, upholding the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's view that the deed of trust securing the grant did not divest Williams of the ownership interest in his real property. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusion and affirmed and adopted its decision. View "Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the 2007 tax-year valuation of six properties owned by Appellant. Appellant filed six valuation complaints regarding the properties. The county board of revision (BOR) retained the auditor's valuation for five parcels and ordered a reduction for one. On appeal, the board of tax appeals (BTA) concluded (1) in the case of the one parcel, the complaint's failure to state an actual dollar amount of value reduction was a jurisdictional defect, and thus the case was remanded to the BOR for dismissal; and (2) with respect to the other five parcels, the evidence offered by Appellant was insufficient to find a value different from that determined by the BOR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA properly ordered dismissal of Appellant's appeal of the case of the one parcel; and (2) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the BOR's valuation with respect to the other parcels. View "Shinkle v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Community Kollel, an educational institution for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 4709.121(A)(2), sought exemptions for three residential apartment buildings based on the claim that the properties were being used in furtherance of its educational purposes. The statute provides that real property belonging to an educational institution is exempt from taxation if it is made available under the direction of the institution for use in furtherance of or incidental to its educational purposes and not with a view to profit. The tax commissioner denied the exemptions, and the board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA applied the wrong legal standard and failed to cite reliable and probative evidence to support its decision. Remanded to the BTA to review the evidence submitted in this case and determine whether the subject property was used in furtherance of the kollel's educational purposes. View "Cincinnati Cmty. Kollel v. Levin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Signal Aviation Services, Inc. appealed a superior court order which granted a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Lebanon. The City entered into a twenty year lease with HL Leasing for certain municipal airport lands. HL Leasing assigned its rights to Sierra Nevada Helicopters, which then assigned the rights to its affiliate, Signal. In the lease, the City agreed it would not allow any other provider of commercial aeronautical services to operate at the airport under terms more favorable than those set forth in the lease. In 2006, the City increased the assessed value of Signal's leased land. Signal claimed that the city assessed its land disproportionately as compared to other entities operating and leasing land at the airport. Signal was unsuccessful in seeking an abatement of its 2006 and 2007 taxes. The New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) dismissed Signal's appeals, holding that Signal failed to present any evidence of the market value of its property. Signal did not appeal the BTLA's decision nor did it contest the City's 2008 and 2009 assessments. Signal then filed suit in superior court to challenge all of the assessments. The trial court concluded that though Signal's petition was styled as a breach of contract, but that it was actually a request for tax abatement and outside the court's jurisdiction. The trial court then dismissed Signal's petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision insofar as it related to Signal's allegations of "disproportionate taxation." However, to the extent that Signal's breach of contract claim sought relief from "unequal treatment," specifically with respect to the amount of taxable land the City attributed to Signal and to other airport tenants with which the City contracts, Signal could pursue this claim without complying with the tax abatement statutory process. View "Signal Aviation Services, Inc. v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

This dispute about the payment of a penalty imposed on them by the IRS arose out of Plaintiffs' underlying joint personal income tax liability for the tax year 1994. After the IRS audited Plaintiffs for that year, the tax court imposed a penalty on Plaintiffs for failing to timely file a return. Plaintiffs completed payment of their agreed 1994 tax liability under a payment plan. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an administrative claims for refused of the 1994 failure-to-pay penalty and the interest they paid on that penalty. The IRS denied the claim. Plaintiffs filed suit in the district court, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there was at least a dispute of material fact as to whether (1) the IRS was equitably estopped from assessing this fee, (2) they had reasonable cause not to pay the relevant taxes with the time provided by statute, and (3) the IRS had ever provided them with proper notice and demand for payment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of their claims. View "Shafmaster v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' suit against the government after the government alleged that plaintiffs failed to file adequate tax returns. The court understood plaintiffs' pro se appeal to contend that the government had waived the limitations defense by failing to raise it in its first dispositive motion. The court expressed no opinion on the government's jurisdictional argument and concluded instead that the government had not forfeited its limitations defense. The court also found plaintiffs' argument that the statute of limitations should have been tolled was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. View "Kim, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a grand jury investigation and the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to a target and his wife, which required the production of records concerning their foreign financial accounts. The government conducted an investigation of, among other things, the Target and his wife's failure to disclose tax returns on foreign accounts and failure to file certain government forms for these alleged accounts. The Target and his wife refused to comply with the subpoenas by producing their records, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court joined its sister circuits and concluded that the subpoenaed records fell within the Required Records Exception and affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion to compel. View "In re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, American citizens, had bank accounts in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, in 2008 when the UBS tax-evasion scandal broke. The accounts were large and the plaintiffs had not disclosed the existence of the accounts or the interest earned on the accounts on their federal income tax returns, as required. Pursuant to an IRS amnesty program, they disclosed the interest and paid a penalty. They brought a class action to recover from UBS the penalties, interest, and other costs, plus profits they claim UBS made from the class as a result of the fraud and other wrongful acts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the “plaintiffs are tax cheats,” and rejecting an argument that UBS was obligated to give them accurate tax advice and failed to do so. Plaintiffs did not argue that they asked UBS to advise them on U.S. tax law or that the bank volunteered advice. The court stated that: “This is like suing one’s parents to recover tax penalties one has paid, on the ground that the parents had failed to bring one up to be an honest person who would not evade taxes.” The court noted, but did not decide, choice of law issues. View "Thomas v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the valuation and corresponding tax assessment of seventy-nine condominium units owned by Pope Properties / Charleston LLC (Pope Properties). The Kanawha Assessor determined that for ad valorem tax purposes for 2011, the seventy-nine units should be valued as follows: $63,700 for each of Pope Properties' sixteen one-bedroom units and $70,000 for each of its sixty-three two-bedroom units. The Board of Equalization and Review upheld the determination. Pope Properties appealed, contending that the units should be valued at $42,000 for each of the one-bedroom units and $49,000 for each of the two-bedroom units. At issue on appeal was the Assessor's use of the market data approach in determining the value of the units rather than the income approach to valuation advocated by Pope Properties. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Assessor did not err in choosing or applying the market data approach in this case. View "Pope Props. / Charleston LLC v. Kanawha County Assessor " on Justia Law

In 1995, Katelyn Janson was severely injured in an automobile accident. A lawsuit ended with a settlement in which two annuities were established, both of which guaranteed payments to Katelyn starting in 2001 and established that, if Katelyn died before fifteen years expired, annuity payments would be made to her estate. Katelyn's mother and conservator, Candy Bradison, moved Katelyn to Wyoming in 2001 and to Minnesota in 2003. In 2006, Katelyn died. In 2010, Bradison sought, on behalf of Katelyn's estate, a refund of the amount the estate previously paid to the Minnesota Department of Revenue, arguing (1) the annuity payments were not includable in Katelyn's estate because Katelyn did not own the annuities; and (2) Katelyn was a Wyoming domiciliary at the time of her death. The tax court concluded (1) Katelyn was a Minnesota domiciliary at the time of her death; and (2) the annuity payments were includable in Katelyn's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Katelyn's intangible property had a situs in Minnesota at the time of her death and could be taxed in accordance with Minnesota's estate tax provisions; and (2) Katelyn was the beneficial owner of the annuity payments, and the value of the payments was properly included in her estate. View "Bradison vs. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law