This appeal involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance creating an offstreet parking district adjoining a Cabela's store. Plaintiff, a resident of the City, filed a complaint against the City and its mayor and city council members, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The district court found the action was barred by the general four-year statute of limitations because it was commenced more than four years after the ordinance was adopted. At issue on appeal was when the statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court reversed without reaching the constitutionality of the ordinance because the Court could not tell from the face of Plaintiff's complaint when Plaintiff's cause of action accrued for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Remanded. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

This case concerned the valuation of property owned by Plaintiff on which Plaintiff built a continuing care retirement community. In 2007, the assessor determined that Plaintiff's property had a fair market value of $117,621,000 and an assessment value of $82,334,600. Plaintiff challenged the valuation. The board of assessment appeals upheld the assessor's valuation. Plaintiff appealed, alleging it was aggrieved by the actions of the board because the assessor's valuation of the property exceeded seventy percent of its true and actual value on the assessment date. The trial court denied the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Plaintiff failed to establish aggrievement under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a was not clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court properly determined that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving the town's assessment of the property was manifestly excessive under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-119. View "Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding" on Justia Law

MASC filed an action in the district court seeking a declaration that South Carolina municipalities were entitled to assess municipal business license taxes based on, or measured by, the total flood insurance premiums collected in the particular municipality by insurance companies under an arrangement with FEMA. The district court denied the insurance companies' motion for summary judgment on grounds of preemption and sovereign immunity. The flood insurance premiums were federal property that could not be taxed and the participating private insurance companies, in their operation of and participation with the National Flood Insurance Program, were federal instrumentalities so closely connected with the federal government that they were immune from taxation. The federal government did not consent to this tax, and it was therefore invalid. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to MASC and denial of summary judgment to the insurance companies. View "Municipal Assoc. of SC v. USAA General Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed from the tax court's order that prevented the Commissioner from collecting City Wide's outstanding employment taxes for seven taxable quarters. The tax court held that the Commissioner was time barred from collecting these taxes under section 6501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and that the tolling provisions under section 6501(c)(1) and (2) of the I.R.C. did not apply. The court held that an accountant who filed fraudulent tax returns on behalf of a company in order to embezzle money otherwise owed to the Commissioner intentionally evaded taxes, thereby triggering the tolling provision under section 6501(c)(1). Accordingly, the court held that the Commissioner could assess City Wide's taxes for those seven quarters at any time. View "City Wide Transit, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant requested her medical records from a medical clinic. Pursuant to its contract with Appellant's medical care provider, Healthport, Inc., a private company that fulfills such requests for medical records, obtained and sold Appellant the copies of her requested medical records. Healthport collected sales tax on charges for services rendered in retrieving and copying the medical records. Appellant subsequently filed a class-action complaint against Healthport for violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), unjust enrichment, and a declaratory judgment that Healthport illegally collected the sales tax. Healthport impleaded the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DF&A) by filing a counterclaim and a third-party complaint seeking declaratory judgment on whether the State's tax statutes require the collection of sales tax on labor and copy charges associated with the production of medical records. The circuit court granted Healthport's and DF&A's motions for summary judgment, finding that sales tax applied to the sale of copies of medical records and that this conclusion rendered Appellant's additional claims moot. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal without prejudice for lack of a proper Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate, as the circuit court's Rule 54(b) certificate failed to comply with Rule 54(b). View "Holbrook v. Healthport, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Taxpayers bought two parcels located within a residential subdivision that was zoned residential. In 2009, the county assessor reclassified the property from residential to agricultural. The assessor assumed a commercial use on the property and thus valued it as commercial. The county board of equalization affirmed the assessor's determinations. Taxpayers appealed to the State Tax Commission (STC). A hearing officer found the appropriate classification for the property was commercial and that it should be assessed at the commercial rate as opposed to the agricultural rate. The STC affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The circuit court affirmed the STC's decision as being supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the STC's application of the factors set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 137.016.5 to Taxpayers' property was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. View "Bateman v. Rinehart" on Justia Law

Crispin worked as a CPA and as CFO of an energy company; his wholly-owned S-corporation has engaged in leasing, structured finance, aircraft acquisition, and mortgage-backed securities investing for more than 20 years. The business purchases aircraft costing $1 million to $10 million and leases them for 10 years before reselling. A Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (CARDS) transaction is a tax-avoidance scheme that purports to generate large “paper” losses deductible from ordinary income. In 2000 the IRS warned against taking tax deductions based on artificial losses generated by inflated bases in certain assets. After the IRS discovered the widespread use of CARDS, before Crispin filed the contested return, the IRS issued another Notice addressed to CARDS transactions and imposed disclosure obligations on CARDS promoters and users. Crispin used a CARDS transaction, involving aircraft financing, to shelter $7 million of income for the 2001 tax year. The tax court held that he was not entitled to an ordinary loss deduction and was liable for an accuracy-related penalty (26 U.S.C. 6662), finding that the transaction lacked economic substance and that he had not relied reasonably or in good faith on the advice of an independent and qualified tax professional. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Crispin v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation in this case involved the Legislature's enactment of "Special Acts" for nine county boards of education requiring them to divert a portion of their regular levy receipts in support of their local libraries. The Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) originally brought suit in circuit court, alleging that one such Act's requirement that the BOE contribute to the funding of the Kanawha County Public Library violated equal protection. The Supreme Court agreed and found the statute unconstitutional. In response, the Legislature amended the statute. The County BOE then filed the instant action, arguing that the statute as amended violated equal protection. The circuit court invalidated as unconstitutional the Special Act to the extent it required the BOE to divert a portion of its regular levy receipts in support of the Library or transfer the funding obligation to its excess levy, and enjoined the Library and the West Virginia BOE from enforcing the Special Act as it pertained to the County BOE's library funding obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act, to the extent it obligated the County BOE to divert a portion of its regular or excess levy receipts to the Library, was unconstitutional and unenforceable. View "Kanawha County Pub. Library Bd. v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

After Ian Burch's motor home was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, the trooper found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and $15,000 in cash in the vehicle. The State filed criminal charges against Burch. The district court found the trooper had unlawfully extended the scope and length of the stop and suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle. The charges against Burch were later dismissed. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently issued a tax assessment notice indicating Burch owed $17,761 in taxes and penalties on the drugs found in his motor home. The Court of Tax Appeals (COTA) granted summary judgment to KDOR on its assessment of taxes and civil penalties against Burch under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA erred in granting summary judgment to KDOR because it failed to consider and apply the exclusionary rule to the drugs upon which the taxes were assessed. Remanded to COTA for consideration of the exclusionary rule. View "In re Tax Appeal of Burch" on Justia Law

In 2010, voters in the Fayetteville School District approved a 2.75 new-debt-service mills that would be a continuing debt service tax until the retirement of proposed bonds to be issued for the purpose of erecting and maintaining new and existing school facilities. The surplus revenues produced by debt service millage would be used for other school purposes. In 2011, certificates issued by the Washington County tax collector resulted in 1.45 mills of that 2.75-mill ad valorem increase being applied to the retirement of redevelopment-district bonds issued in 2005. The School District sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court found that the assessor's certification was incorrect and that the tax collector improperly applied the 1.45 mills. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the present cause of action was not barred by res judicata; (2) Ark. Code Ann. 14-168-301(18)(B)(i) did not impair the bond-purchase contract and financing of the redevelopment bonds; and (3) the 2.75 expressly pledged the new millage to a bond in accordance with section 14-168-301(18)(B)(i). View "City of Fayetteville v. Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law