Acting on the bad advice of his accountant, plaintiff, the executor of an estate, filed the estate-tax return several months late. Consequently, the IRS assessed significant penalties against the estate. Plaintiff initiated this action seeking a refund of the penalty. The court concluded that it was plaintiff's duty to ascertain the correct extended filing deadline. By relying on his accountant's advice about that nonsubstantive matter, he failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, and he could not show reasonable cause to excuse the penalty. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Knappe v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Teton County voters approved a Teton County Housing Authority (TCHA) sponsored ballot initiative enabling a specific purpose excise tax (SPET) to raise $5 million for TCHA's affordable housing program. In 2007, TCHA purchased a five-acre property on Cheney Lane. Later that year, Plaintiffs, residents of the Cheney Lane neighborhood, initiated a declaratory judgment action against TCHA, alleging violations of SPET limitations, breach of investment duties, and violations of Wyoming statutory limits on public financing. Two weeks after the district court heard arguments on the motion to dismiss, the Village Road Coalition (VRC), a nonprofit corporation consisting of residents of a neighborhood near the Cheney Lane property, filed a motion to intervene. The district court denied the motion. The court subsequently granted TCHA's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because VRC's interests and relief sought were duplicative of those presented by Plaintiffs, the district court did not err in denying the motion to intervene; and (2) the district court properly dismissed TCHA's action for lack of standing, as Plaintiffs failed to allege a tangible interest that had been harmed by the acquisition of the property. View "Village Road Coal. v. Teton County Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Four corporations acknowledged they owed the federal government more than $24 million in taxes and penalties, but before the IRS could collect its dues, the corporations transferred all of their assets to other entities. At issue was whether the previous owner of the four corporations, a trust (Trust), was liable to the IRS for the corporations' unpaid taxes and penalties. The tax court looked to state substantive law to determine the Trust's liability and concluded that the Trust could not be held liable because the IRS (1) failed to prove the Trust had knowledge of the new shareholders' asset-stripping scheme, and (2) did not show that any of the corporation's assets were transferred directly to the Trust. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the tax court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust could be held liable for the corporations' taxes and penalties; but (2) the tax court misconstrued Massachusetts fraudulent transfer law in making its decision. Remanded for a determination of whether the conditions for liability were met in this case. View "Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Hospital sought full tax refunds in relation to Hospital's attempt to reclassify certain services from either "inpatient" or "outpatient" hospital services to "physicians' services" for purposes of the West Virginia Health Care Provider Tax Act. The Office of Tax Appeals denied Hospital's request, and the circuit court affirmed. In seeking to reclassify items of overhead as "physicians' services," Hospital focused on its use of certain billing codes that were required by federal law. The Tax Commission argued that Hospital's reliance on these billing codes to identify what qualifies as "physicians' services" under the Act was misplaced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the overhead items at issue did not qualify as "physicians' services" under the Act. View "Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Lorensen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Amazon.com and Overstock.com. Both companies were formed in states other than New York, were located in states other than New York, and sold their merchandise solely through the Internet. At issue was N.Y. Tax Law 1101(b)(8)(vi) (the Internet tax), which was amended in 2008 to provide that vendors who paid New York residents to actively solicit business in the State would be required to pay New York taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the Internet tax, alleging that it was unconstitutional on its face as a violation the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Internet tax did not subject online retailers without a physical presence in the State to New York sales and compensating use taxes; and (2) the tax did not create an irrational, irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the State. View "Overstock.com, Inc. v State Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

In 1969, the Cities of Atlanta and College Park entered into an agreement for purposes of expanding Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. One of the provisions of the granted Atlanta the exclusive right to collect and levy occupation taxes from businesses located at the Airport that were within the city limits of College Park. In 2007, after commissioning a study for the purpose of reassessing this relationship, College Park informed Atlanta and Airport businesses that it would no longer honor the 1969 Agreement and that it would seek to collect occupation taxes from the Airport businesses including Atlanta's proprietary business operations. Atlanta filed a declaratory action in seeking a judgment that the 1969 Agreement controlled the collection of occupation taxes from businesses operating at the Airport within College Park. Both Atlanta and College Park moved for partial summary judgment, and, in ruling on the cross motions, the trial court found that Atlanta and College Park's 1969 Agreement was unenforceable. The trial court further ruled that OCGA 48-13-13 (5), which prohibited local governments from levying an occupation tax on any "local authority," precluded College Park from levying an occupation tax on Atlanta's proprietary operations because Atlanta met the definition of a "local authority" under the statute. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment invalidating the 1969 Agreement, but reversed the trial court's finding that the term "local authority" as used in OCGA 48-13-13 (5) included smunicipalities. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the City of Atlanta was not a "local authority" as that term is used in the statute. View "City of Atlanta v. City of College Park" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant John Schoppe petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of a Tax Court decision that found him liable for tax deficiencies for the years 2002-2007. While the case was proceeding before the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. That filing prompted the Court to request a supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the automatic bankruptcy stay would apply to appellant's appeal before the Tenth Circuit. Finding that 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code did not stay this appeal, the Court reviewed the Tax Court decision and affirmed it. View "Schoppe v. CIR" on Justia Law

Robert Mesteller brought suit to challenge Gwinnett County and its Board of Commissioners' (County) Solid Waste Ordinance. He appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. Relying upon the Home Rule provision of the Georgia Constitution (among others), the County adopted the Solid Waste Collection and Disposal Ordinance of 2010. Under the Ordinance, the County was divided into five zones, each to be serviced by a private waste management company. The County collected fees for the waste collection services through annual tax assessment notices, which it then remits to the five service providers, minus the service fee. Mesteller received a property tax bill that showed a fee for solid waste collection services. Acting pro se, he sued the County and the members of its Board of Commissioners, individually and as members of the Board, alleging the assessment and collection of the fee violated the Georgia Constitution. After notice and a hearing, the superior court granted the County's motion for summary judgment. Mesteller contended on appeal that the County was without authority to use the annual property tax bill to assess or collect fees for solid waste services because by contracting with private waste management companies to collect solid waste, the County was not, in fact, "provid[ing] solid waste collection services" within the meaning of OCGA 12-8-39.3 (a), and therefore not authorized to place the collection fee on the tax bill of a property owner or to enforce the collection of the fee as set forth in the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that Mestellar's argument "reveal[ed] a misunderstanding of the precedents of [the] Court." As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. View "Mestellar v. Gwinnett County" on Justia Law

To facilitate the transition to a competitive market for the supply of electricity, the Legislature provided that consumers would receive certain credits over the period of a year to mitigate a large projected increase in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (BGE) rates for the supply of electricity. The overall scheme involving credits, charges, and bond financing was known as the rate stabilization plan. Following passage of the rate stabilization law, BGE took the position that the legislation had the effect of deferring part of its franchise tax liability during the period that credits were applied to customers' bills. The Department of Assessments rejected BGE's position. BGE filed a refund claim, which was rejected. The tax court upheld the Department's denial. The circuit court concluded that the deferral credit affected BGE's distribution revenues for purposes of computing its franchise tax liability, that the tax court decision would subject BGE to double taxation, and that BGE was entitled to the claimed refund. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, in establishing the rate stabilization plan, the legislature neither intentionally nor inadvertently provided for the credits and charges to affect BGE's franchise tax liability. Remanded. View "Dep't of Assessments v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

On their 2007 Minnesota individual income tax return, John and Deborah Billion claimed a $55,904 deduction for carryover losses incurred in 2005 by a Minnesota subchapter S corporation in which John Billion was a shareholder. The Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue disallowed the Billions' deduction, resulting in an assessment of $3,736 in additional Minnesota income taxes for the 2007 tax year. The tax court upheld the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Billions were entitled to a carryover net operating loss deduction of $7,834 on their 2007 individual income tax return; but (2) the tax court did not err in its judgment in all other respects. Remanded for recalculation of the Billions' Minnesota income tax liability for the 2007 tax year. View "Billion v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law