Country Vintner sued Gallo, under North Carolina law over the wholesale distribution of an Argentinian wine. At issue on appeal was what expenses related to electronically stored information (ESI) were taxable under the federal taxation-of-costs statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). The district court entered an order taxing only the costs of converting electronic files to non-editable formats, and transferring files onto CDs. The court agreed with the district court's finding that only the conversion of native files to TIFF and PDF formats, and the transfers of files onto CDs, constituted "making copies" under section 1920(f), and that none of Gallo's expenses constituted fees for exemplification. View "The Country Vintner v. E & J Gallo Winery" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a class action lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, a resident of Defendant City, challenging the City's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of the taxes paid. The trial court ruled that class claims for a refund were barred under Woosley v. State and dismissed the case. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that Plaintiff could file a class claim for a TUT refund under the recently decided Ardon v. City of Los Angeles. In Ardon, the Supreme Court held that the Government Claims Act (Act) permits a class action claim by taxpayers against a local government entity for the refund of an unlawful tax in the absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth in an applicable governing claims statute. The City appealed, asserting that its municipal code contained an "applicable governing claims statute" barring class action claims for a tax refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a local ordinance is not a "statute" within the meaning of the Act. View "McWilliams v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Living Word Bible Camp, a tax-exempt organization, owned property in Itasca County. Living Word sought to obtain the necessary governmental approvals to use the property as a summer bible camp and retreat center. Itasca County classified the property as tax-exempt from 2001 to 2007 then reclassified the property as taxable as of 2008. Living Word challenged the reclassification for the 2008 and 2009 assessments. The tax court affirmed the County's reclassification because Living Word had failed to make sufficient progress in obtaining the necessary governmental approvals for its proposed use of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court (1) erred in concluding that Living Word was not entitled to an exemption because it was not using the property in furtherance of a charitable purpose; and (2) erred in determining that Living Word's current activities on the property could not be considered in determining whether that use was sufficient to qualify as a tax-exempt use. Remanded. View "Living Word Bible Camp v. County of Itasca" on Justia Law

Eden Prairie Mall, LLC (EPM) owned a mall. Included in the mall parcel for property tax purposes were the mall's in-line tenants, five anchor tenants, and a movie theater complex. EPM sought review of the tax court's market value determinations for the mall and one of its anchor tenants for the assessment dates of 2005 and 2006. The tax court adopted the market values for the mall parcel proposed by Hennepin County in its post-trial brief, which were higher than the value opinions presented by either party's appraiser at trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the tax court's value determinations were not supported by the record and remanded with instructions for the tax court to explain its reasoning and describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. On remand, the tax court adopted market values that exceeded its earlier determinations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court failed to follow the Court's remand instructions because the tax court failed to explain its reasoning and describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. Remanded. View "Eden Prairie Mall, LLC v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

The subject property was located at 44 Lafayette Road in Saint Paul. Relators challenged the County's assessments for the assessment dates 2007, 2008, and 2009. After trial, the tax court adopted the market values proposed by the County in its post-trial brief, which were higher than the value opinions presented by either party's appraiser at trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the tax court to explain its reasoning for rejecting the appraisal testimony and to describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. On remand, the tax court again adopted market values that exceeded the parties' appraisal opinions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court failed to follow the Court's remand instructions in its calculation of parking income and expenses. Remanded for a further evidentiary hearing regarding the appropriate calculation of net parking income. View "444 Lafayette, LLC v. County of Ramsey" on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the tax court's determination related to a deficiency in petitioners' federal income tax involving distributions from petitioners' variable universal life insurance policy. The Commissioner asserted that surrender charges could never be considered under I.R.C. 402(b)(2), and maintained that petitioners actually received the full stated policy values of their respective policies. The court affirmed the tax court's determination that the "amount actually distributed" when petitioners received ownership of the policies after their employer wound down their employees' benefit trust was "the fair market value of what was actually distributed." Further, the surrender charges associated with a variable universal life insurance policy could permissibly be considered as part of the general inquiry into a policy's fair market value. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision. View "Schwab v. CIR" on Justia Law

Retirement accounts are exempt from creditors’ claims in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 22(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12). The debtor inherited, from her mother, a non-spousal individual retirement account worth about $300,000. The bankruptcy court held that the inherited IRA was not exempt from claims by the debtor’s creditors. The district court reversed. Noting a conflict with other circuits, the Seventh Circuit reversed, reinstating the bankruptcy court holding. The court noted that while it remains sheltered from taxation until the money is withdrawn, many of the account’s other attributes changed. No new contributions can be made, and the balance cannot be rolled over or merged with any other account. 26 U.S.C. 408(d)(3)(C); instead of being dedicated to the debtor/heir’s retirement years, the inherited IRA must begin distributing its assets within a year of the original owner’s death. 26 U.S.C. 402(c)(11)(A). View "Rameker v. Clark" on Justia Law

Relator was at all times relevant to this case employed by the National Basketball Association as a referee. Relator did not file Minnesota income tax returns for the 2003 and 2004 tax years but subsequently filed a 2003 state tax return as a part-year Minnesota resident. The Commissioner of Revenue determined that Relator was a full-time, legal resident of Minnesota during the relevant tax years. Relator appealed, asserting that, in 2003, he established his domicile in Florida. The Commissioner again determined that Relator was a full-time Minnesota resident during the 2003 and 2004 tax years, and the tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the tax court's decision, and the court correctly concluded that Relator failed to carry his burden of overcoming the legal presumption that he remained domiciled in Minnesota during the 2003 and 2004 tax years. View "Mauer v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Vento co-founded a technology company, OSI. When OSI was sold, the Ventos, their daughters, and Vento-controlled entities realized $180 million in capital gains for the 2001 tax year. The Ventos previously lived in and still maintain homes in the U.S., but first visited the Virgin Islands in 2001 and bought a residence there. Residents of the Virgin Islands pay income taxes to the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue (VIBIR) rather than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). All of the Ventos filed 2001 income tax returns with the VIBIR. The United States claims that they should have filed those returns with the IRS and assessed deficiencies and penalties that totaled over $9 million more than those assessed by the VIBIR. The district court found that the Ventos were not bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands as of December 31, 2001. The Third Circuit reversed in part, concluding that the parents were bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands, but that the daughters, who were not dependents, were not. View "Vento v. Dir. of VI Bureau of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) used improper or illegal methods of assessing Plaintiff's Montana properties for property tax purposes in 2009 and 2010. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DOR on Plaintiff's claims, ruling that Plaintiff's substantive arguments could not be brought directly in a Montana district court without first appealing to the administrative tax appeals boards. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's challenges to the methods and procedures of assessment used by DOR to assess Plaintiff's property must be raised through the administrative tax appeal process; (2) Plaintiff's claim that DOR failed to equalize its valuation of Plaintiff's property is the type of challenge that must be pursued administratively; and (3) the district court did not err when it granted DOR summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the 2009 assessment of its property was illegal or improper because the assessment was made too late. View "CHS, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law