Pulaski County issued an assessment and taxation of property owned by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). On behalf of UAMS, Appellant (the University) filed a tax-exemption application seeking an exemption from ad valorem property taxes based on sovereign immunity. The county assessor's office and county equalization board denied the request. The county court also denied the exemption. On appeal, the circuit court denied the University's motion for summary judgment and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the University's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the University failed to establish an exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. View "Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

In 2003, after more than a decade of litigation, the IRS assessed penalties under now-repealed I.R.C. 6621(c), which penalizes “substantial” underpayments of tax “attributable to tax motivated transactions” against the 19 partners of the Dillon Oil Technology Partnership in tax years 1983 and 1984. The partners paid the tax and penalties in 2004, and, in 2006, initiated a refund suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1 I.R.C.7422(h), which provides that individual partners may not bring tax challenges relating to subject matter “attributable to a partnership item.” Such claims must be brought in a partnership-level suit by the partnership representative or Tax Matters Partner. The Federal Circuit affirmed, calling the claim an impermissible collateral attack. View "Bush v. United States" on Justia Law

Morpho, a California-based corporation that designs and builds explosives and other threat detection technology, contracted with the FAA on behalf of its then-newly established TSA, to supply its Explosive Detection System (EDS) to United States airports. Morpho subsequently sought an increase of the contract price to compensate for state assessments as "after-imposed taxes" pursuant to Clause 3.4.2-7(c) of the Acquisition Management System (AMS). The court denied Morpho's petition for review, agreeing with the TSA's rejection of Morpho's claim on the ground that the taxes at issue did not satisfy the after-imposed tax exception's precise terms. View "Morpho Detection, Inc. v. TSA" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Department of Revenue audited Relator and assessed Relator for the amount of sales tax he collected from his customers but failed to remit to the State. The Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) adjusted the initial assessment and assessed tax. The tax court upheld the Commissioner's assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2011, Plaintiff submitted to the Commissioner documents and an informal request for a refund based on his repayment of sales tax to his customers. The Commissioner responded to Relator by letter, in which he denied Plaintiff's request for a refund. Plaintiff appealed to the tax court. The tax court concluded it lacked subject matter over the appeal, holding that the Commissioner's letter was not an appealable order of the Commissioner because it was merely administrative correspondence. However, the court also denied Relator's claim for a refund. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the tax court's decision as to its jurisdiction, holding that the Commissioner's consideration of Relator's refund claim was a final decision on the claim that could be appealed; and (2) affirmed the tax court's decision on the merits of Relator's refund claim, holding that Relator's arguments either lacked merit or were barred by res judicata. View "Schober v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his ex-wife both claimed their two children as dependents on their state individual income tax returns. The Minnesota Department of Revenue determined that only Plaintiff's ex-wife was entitled to claim the children as dependents and that Plaintiff had underpaid his state taxes. Plaintiff appealed. The extended deadline for filing Plaintiff's notice of appeal was December 27. On December 22, Plaintiff mailed his notice of appeal to the tax court and the Department of Revenue. The Department received the notice on December 27, but the notice sent to the court was marked by the court as filed on December 28. The The tax court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Plaintiff had not timely filed his notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the mailbox rule does not extend to statutorily created rights of appeal; and (2) Plaintiff failed to present direct evidence in support of his assertion that his notice of appeal arrived on December 27. View "Harbaugh v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Paula Ehrmantraut-Kiosee sought tax deductions for educational expenses incurred in pursuit of a doctoral degree in psychology. The Montana Department of Revenue disallowed the deductions sought by Paula individually in 2007, and jointly with Randy Myrup in 2008 and 2009. The Office of Dispute Resolution affirmed the disallowance, and the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) upheld the disallowance. The district court denied Taxpayers' petition for judicial review. After noting that educational expenses will be deemed nondeductible as qualification for a new trade or business if the education is a step towards obtaining a certification that, once obtained, would qualify the taxpayer to perform tasks significantly different from those the taxpayer performed before receiving the education, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the findings of STAB and the district court that Paula pursued her education in an effort to become a clinical psychologist, rather than simply to improve her skills as a counselor, were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) therefore, Taxpayers failed to demonstrate that the educational expenses were deductible under either 26 C.F.R. 1.162-5(a)(1) or (2). View "Myrup v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Eagle Rental was a licensed used car dealer. Daniel Bickford and his wife were the company's vice president and treasurer. In 2003, Eagle Rental began purchasing Cadillac Escalades and trading them in to dealers for newer models. The Bickfords were unable to sell their Escalade inventory for several years and drove the Escalades on personal business. The tax assessor assessed use taxes on four of those Escalades. The business and consumer docket affirmed the assessment. Eagle Rental appealed, arguing it did not owe use tax because the Bickfords operated the Escalades with dealer plates for their personal use in accordance with Maine's dealer plate statute. Read together, the dealer plate and taxation statutes provide that dealers and their immediate families may use dealer plates on vehicles in a dealer's inventory for their personal use without being subject to use tax until the vehicles to which the plates are attached are withdrawn from inventory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Rental did not meet its burden of proving that the Escalades were not withdrawn from inventory, and accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded they were subject to use tax. View "Eagle Rental, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

BDI elected under I.R.C. 1362(a) to be treated as an S-corporation, not subject to federal taxation because its profits and losses passed through to Barden, its sole shareholder. MSC owns the Majestic Star Casino and Hotel. BDI acquired MSC in 2005. BDI elected to treat MSC as a QSub (I.R.C. 1361(b)(3)(B), not as a separate tax entity. MSC, therefore, paid no federal taxes. In 2009, MSC and its affiliates filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions. Barden and BDI were not debtors. After the petition, Barden caused revocation of BDI’s status as an S-corporation; MSC’s QSub status automatically terminated because it was no longer wholly owned by an S-corp. Neither BDI nor Barden sought authorization from the debtors or from the Bankruptcy Court. MSC allegedly was unaware that it had a new obligation to pay income taxes. As of first date federal taxes would have been due, the debtors had paid no federal income taxes. The Bankruptcy Court permitted conversion of MSC to a limited liability company, so that MSC would no longer qualify for QSub status, even if the Revocation had not occurred. The debtors sought to avoid the Revocation, which, they alleged, caused an unlawful post-petition transfer of property. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the debtors. The Third Circuit vacated and directed that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "In Re:Majestic Star Casino LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney, appealed pro se from the tax court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and sustaining a proposed levy to collect outstanding income tax liabilities owed by petitioner and his wife for the 2000, 2001, and 2002 taxable years. The court concluded that petitioner's argument that the settlement officer with the IRS Appeals Office abused his discretion by issuing a determination on the proposed levy without first affording petitioner an in-person collection due process hearing was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Michigan State Real Estate Transfer Tax, MICH.COMP.LAWS 207.521, and the County Real Estate Transfer Tax, section 207.501, impose a tax when a deed or other instrument of conveyance is recorded during the transfer of real property. The tax is imposed upon “the person who is the seller or grantor.” State and county plaintiffs sought to recover transfer taxes for real property transfers recorded by Fannie Mae, a corporation chartered by Congress to “establish secondary market facilities for residential mortgages,” in order to “provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages,” and “promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation,” 12 U.S.C. 1716; Freddie Mac, also a corporation chartered by Congress for substantially the same purposes; and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, an independent federal agency, created under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. 4617, which placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorships, 12 U.S.C. 4617(a)(2). When Congress created defendants, it expressly exempted them from “all” state and local taxes except for taxes on real property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, reasoning that “transfer taxes are excise taxes, not taxes on real property. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Genesee Cty, v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law