Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government by unlawfully evading tax obligations. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court concluded that the district court did not err in adopting an IRS agent's restitution calculations; the district court's oral and written findings were sufficiently thorough to support its restitution order; the district court did not clearly err by relying on the agent's testimony that the boating-related expenses were personal expenses that were unlawfully deducted as business expenses; and the court rejected defendant's arguments regarding the restitution payment schedule and defendant's complexity exception argument under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(3)(B). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Wirth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, president and owner of WestCorp, sued the government for a refund of an IRS tax penalty that he paid. At issue was the treatment of admittedly incomplete payments WestCorp made from 2000-2001. To maximize its recovery, the IRS applied those payments first toward WestCorp's non-trust fund taxes rather than dividing the payments proportionally between WestCorp's trust fund and non-trust fund taxes. The court agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts show, as a matter of law, that plaintiff willfully failed to pay the trust fund taxes at issue; the court also agreed with the district court that the IRS properly allocated the undesignated payments at issue; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the IRS should nonetheless have applied at least part of the undesignated payments toward WestCorp's trust fund obligations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Westerman v. United States" on Justia Law

Windsor and Spyer, two women, married in Canada in 2007. Their home state, New York, recognized the marriage. Spyer died in 2009 and left her estate to Windsor, who sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses. Her claim was barred by section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. 1738C, which defined “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude same-sex partners for purposes of federal law. Windsor paid $363,053 in taxes and sought a refund, which the IRS denied. Windsor sued, challenging DOMA. The Department of Justice declined to defend section 3’s constitutionality. The district court ordered a refund, finding section 3 unconstitutional. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, 5-4, first holding that the government retained a stake, sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction, because the unpaid refund is “a real and immediate economic injury.” There was sufficient argument for section 3’s constitutionality to satisfy prudential concerns. DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons under the Fifth Amendment. Regulation of marriage has traditionally been within the authority of the states. DOMA, applicable to more than 1,000 federal statues and all federal regulations, was directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York and 11 other states have sought to protect. DOMA is inconsistent with the principle that marriage laws may vary from state to state, but are consistent within each state. A state’s decision to give a class of persons the right to marry confers a dignity and status of immense import. New York’s decision was a proper exercise of its sovereign authority. By seeking to injure the class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violated basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the federal government. Constitutional guarantees of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of the group. DOMA’s history and text indicate a purpose and practical effect to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and a stigma upon those entering into same-sex marriages made lawful by the states. The law deprived some couples married under the laws of their states, but not others, of rights and responsibilities, creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same state; it diminished the stability and predictability of basic personal relations. View "United States v. Windsor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling in favor of the Colorado Department of Local Affairs’ interpretation of CRS 39-4-102. The Court held that Qwest Corporation as a public utility, is valued centrally and therefore was not entitled to the intangible property exemption or the cost cap valuation method found elsewhere in Colorado’s tax statutes. The Court also held that this valuation method did not violate Qwest’s constitutional guarantee under the Equal Protection Clause nor did it violate Qwest’s rights under the Uniform Taxation Clause of the Colorado Constitution. View "Qwest v. Colorado Division of Property Taxation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court combined several taxpayers' appeals for the purpose of this opinion. In each, taxpayers owned two (or more) separate S-corporations, and attributed profits and losses from each businesses to their Michigan tax returns, arguing that the multiple businesses were unitary corporations. In each case, plaintiffs owned a Michigan company and a foreign company, but combined the profits and losses from both for credits on their Michigan returns. The Department of the Treasury disallowed the unitary classification. The Supreme Court held that under Michigan tax law, individual taxpayers may combine the profits and losses from unitary flow-through businesses and then apportion that income on the basis of those businesses’ combined apportionment factors. View "Malpass v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from eleven notices of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAAs) issued by the IRS with respect to three Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) treated as partnerships for tax purposes. The IRS claimed that the partnerships' transactions provided one partner with an illegal tax shelter to avoid taxes on his unrelated personal capital gain of the same approximate amount. The court affirmed the district court's determinations that (1) the FOCus transactions lacked economic substance and must be disregarded for tax purposes; (2) the negligence penalty was applicable and the partnerships were not entitled to the reasonable cause defense; and (3) the valuation misstatement penalty was inapplicable. The court vacated and rendered judgment for plaintiffs as to the remaining claims addressing the FPAAs premised on the government's alternative theory under Treasury Regulation 1.701-2 and the district court's approval of the alternative substantial understatement penalty. View "Nevada Partners Fund, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue audited Appellant for a three-year period. The Department determined that Appellant had omitted certain tangible personal property from its tax returns during the relevant years and billed Appellant for $151,943 in ad valorem taxes. Appellant paid the new assessments without protest. Appellant later filed a refund claim for a portion of the taxes, that the Department had improperly classified certain machinery, resulting in Appellant's overpayment. The Department denied the refund claim because Appellant had paid without protest. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed, and the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant properly followed the appropriate administrative remedies in accordance with the Court's recent decision in Cromwell Louisville Associates, LLP v. Commonwealth. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Cox Interior, Inc." on Justia Law

Equifax, Inc. appealed the State Tax Commission's income tax assessment. Equifax contended its Mississippi taxable income was zero; after an audit, the Commission found that the standard apportionment method prescribed by regulation did not fairly reflect Equifax's business in the state. The Commission used an alternative method and then issued assessments against Equifax. After exhausting administrative remedies, Equifax petitioned the Chancery Court for relief. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chancery Court did not err, and that the alternative apportionment method was not a violation of the State Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Chancery Court's judgment. View "Equifax, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Illinois Tax Delinquency Amnesty Act established a period, October 1, 2003 until November 17, 2003, during which "all taxes due" from 1983 through the first half of 2002 could be paid without interest or penalties. Tax liabilities not paid within the amnesty period would incur interest at 200%. Illinois Department of Revenue regulations provided that a taxpayer participating in the program must pay its entire tax liability regardless of whether that liability was known to the Department or the taxpayer. Those who were unsure of their tax liability were to pay a good-faith estimate during the amnesty period. An audit of the plaintiffs’ federal tax returns for 1998 and 1999 began in 2000 and ended in 2004, after the amnesty period expired and caused changes in their Illinois tax liability. The plaintiffs paid the taxes, along with single interest, but the Department assessed an interest penalty of 200%, (more than $2 million), which they paid under protest before filing suit. The circuit and appellate courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in favor of the Department. The phrase “all taxes due” means taxes due when initial returns are required to be filed, rather than taxes known to be due during the amnesty period. Taxpayers who were under IRS audit and were, therefore, uncertain about their ultimate Illinois tax liability could participate in the amnesty program by making a good-faith estimate pursuant to the regulations and making payment based on it. There was no constitutional violation because those in the plaintiffs’ position had an opportunity to avoid 200% interest by making a good-faith estimate of tax liability and paying it during the amnesty period, with the possibility of a refund. View "Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamer" on Justia Law

Appellants John Sherman and Christopher D. Eichler appealed a trial court’s judgment confirming and validating a bond issuance by the City of Atlanta. At the bond validation hearing, the City successfully disputed Appellants’ standing to become parties and raise objections in this case, because no competent evidence was admitted to show that either Appellant was a Georgia citizen and Atlanta resident, which were the prerequisites to becoming a party under the Revenue Bond Law. Appellants appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law