Ten valuation complaints were filed by a salaried employee on behalf of a corporate entity as the property owner. In each case, the county board of revision (BOR) ordered a decrease in value. The school board argued before the board of tax appeals (BTA) that the original complaints should be dismissed because a salaried employee of the corporation who was not himself a lawyer but purported to act on behalf of the corporate owner signed the complaints. The school board acknowledged that Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A)(1) explicitly authorizes salaried corporate employees to file on behalf of the corporate owner but argued that the statute cannot be given effect because that kind of filing constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. The BTA granted the school board's motion and ordered that the appeals be remanded to the BOR to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaints properly invoked the jurisdiction of the BOR where the legislature acted within its authority in amending section 5715.19(A)(1) to permit a salaried employee of a corporation who is not a lawyer to file a complaint on behalf of the corporation. Remanded. View "Marysville Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Union County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2006, Taxpayers acquired a two-story building pursuant to a contract by which they acquired a business on the first floor of the building. Thus, the asset purchase included personal property consisting of restaurant equipment and a covenant not to compete, as well as the realty. In 2007, the auditor used the entire aggregate price, $325,000, as the property value even though in 2006 the auditor had determined the value to be only $116,700. The county board of revision (BOR) reduced the value to $175,000. The board of tax appeals reinstated the $325,000 aggregate price as the value of the property. The Supreme Court ordered the value be modified to $160,000, a figure supported by the mortgage loan secured by the real property, holding that the adoption of the full sale price was unreasonable and unlawful. View "Sapina v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated a public golf course and rented golf carts to golfers. The director of revenue issued an assessment of unpaid sales taxes on the golf cart rentals, finding that because the cart rentals were mandatory, they were subject to sales tax regardless of the fact that Plaintiff had paid sales tax when it purchased the carts. The administrative hearing commission reversed, finding that Plaintiff did not owe sales tax on the golf cart rentals because it previously paid sales tax on its purchase or lease of the carts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020.1(8) and Westwood Country Club v. Director of Revenue, Plaintiff was not required to charge sales tax on the golf cart rentals. View "PF Golf, LLC v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law

Action Recycling moved to quash summonses from the IRS to produce records that Action Recycling had already produced for the IRS to review, arguing that the summonses for those records were issued in violation of the prohibition on summonses for information already in the possession of the IRS. The documents at issue were reviewed by an IRS agent who eventually left the IRS, the IRS then transferred the open investigation to another agent, and the new agent sought to further review the documents. The court held that an IRS Revenue Agent's review of records did not automatically give the IRS permanent possession of all of the information in those records and that a later summons for the same records was permissible under the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Powell. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to quash. View "Action Recycling, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant traveled from South Korea to the United States and, while present in the United States, he gambled at slot machines frequently. The IRS contended that appellant must pay taxes on every winning pull at the slot machine and appellant disputed that interpretation pursuant to Tax Code 871, arguing that the IRS should calculate his winnings on at least a per-session basis. The court concluded that Section 871 allowed non-resident aliens, such as appellant, to calculate winnings or losses on a per-session basis. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Tax Court and remanded to the Tax Court so the parties could determine the proper amount of appellant's tax liability. View "Park, et al. v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the IRS's determination that the gross income petitioners reported in 2003 and 2004 based on their ownership of a controlled foreign corporation should have been taxed at the rate of petitioners' ordinary income rather than the lower tax rate they had claimed. At issue was whether amounts included in petitioners' gross income for 2003 and 2004 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 951(a)(1)(B) and 956 (collectively, "section 951 inclusions") constituted qualified dividend income under 26 U.S.C. 1(h)(11). The court concluded that section 951 inclusions did not constitute actual dividends because actual dividends required a distribution by a corporation and receipt by a shareholder and these section 951 inclusions involved no distribution or change in ownership; Congress clearly did not intend to deem as dividends the section 951 inclusions at issue here; and petitioners' reliance on other non-binding sources were unavailing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the tax court. View "Rodriguez, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Ryan failed to pay federal income taxes 2006-2010 and owed $136,898.93. In 2011, the IRS recorded a tax lien, 26 U.S.C. 6326. Ryan filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. 1301. He had personal possessions worth $1,625. He admitted to the tax liabilities, and alleged that his residence had been sold for delinquent real estate taxes and that he did not own a bank account, vehicle, or retirement account. In an adversary proceeding, he alleged that the secured claim for 2009 taxes was limited $1,625 and that the remaining claim was unsecured, 11 U.S.C. 506(a), and void, 11 U.S.C. 506(d). The bankruptcy court held that section 506(d), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, did not allow Ryan to void, or “strip down” the lien. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 506(d) provides: To the extent that a lien secures a claim that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) or such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to failure to file a proof of such claim. “Allowed secured claim” in 506(d) is not defined by 506(a), but means a claim that is allowed under 502 and secured by a lien enforceable under state law. View "Ryan v. United States" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the common issue centered on whether Vermont laws allowed the Town of Colchester to consider certain intangible factors in assessing seasonal lakefront camps located on leased land. The Supreme Court held that the Town was not precluded from considering such factors in assessing properties. View "Lesage v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

Respondent owned four parcels of real property in Clark County. Respondent challenged the Clark County Assessor's assessment for the tax year 2011-2012 with the County Board of Equalization, which lowered the valuation. Clark County in turn appealed the revised assessment to the State Board of Equalization, which increased the valuation. Respondent ultimately petitioned the district court in Carson City for judicial review. Clark County and the Assessor filed a motion for change of venue, contending that the action should be maintained in the district court in Clark County because Respondent's property was located outside of Carson City. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute provides that a property owner with property located in any county in the State may file a property tax valuation action in any district court in the state; and (2) the Carson City district court was an appropriate venue for filing the property tax valuation challenge because it was a court of competent jurisdiction as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.420(2). View " County of Clark v. Howard Hughes Co., LLC" on Justia Law