The Commissioner of Revenue ordered Sharon Soyka to pay income taxes, penalties, and interest for the 2007 tax year. Soyka had sixty days to appeal the Commissioner's order to the tax court. Instead, Soyka filed her notice of appeal to the Commissioner, who forwarded the documents to the tax court. The tax court dismissed Soyka's appeal as untimely filed because Soyka did not file her notice of appeal until more than a month after it was due and because Soyka did not file a request seeking an extension of time. The Supreme Court affirmed the tax court's dismissal of Soyka's appeal, holding (1) Soyka's failure to file her notice of appeal before the expiration of the statutory deadline deprived the tax court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal; and (2) because the tax court did not receive a copy of Soyka's extension request until the statutory period had expired, Soyka was not entitled to an extension of time to file her appeal. View "Soyka v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Boeri, a citizen of Italy, has never lived or worked in the U.S. He worked for Verizon in Italy for 11 years, Brazil for 5 years, Argentina for 5 years, and the Dominican Republic for 15 years. In 2003 Boeri chose to participate in Verizon’s Management Voluntary Separation Plan, and was awarded a gross separation payment of $247,177 in 2004. Verizon withheld a total of $70,559, including U.S. income tax withholding, Social Security tax, and Medicare tax. In 2009 Boeri filed a nonresident alien income tax return for the 2004 tax year, seeking a refund. The IRS denied the request as untimely. The IRS Appeals Office denied an administrative appeal in 2011. Boeri appealed to the Claims Court, arguing that he is not seeking a refund of a tax overpayment, but correction of erroneous withholding and that these circumstances are not within the scope of the three-year look-back provision of 26 U.S.C. 6511(b)(2)(A). The Claims Court dismissed, reasoning that sections 6513(b)(1) and (c)(2) specify when advance payments of income tax and social security and Medicare taxes are deemed paid, and that the payments for which Boeri sought a refund were deemed paid on April 15, 2005. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Boeri v. United States" on Justia Law

The Tribe and CTGW brought suit against the County for imposing property taxes on the Great Wolf Lodge located on the Grand Mound Property, which was tribal land held in trust by the government. At issue was whether state and local governments have the power to tax permanent improvements built on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held in trust for an Indian tribe. The court concluded that Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones made it clear that where the United States owns land covered by 21 U.S.C. 465, and holds it in trust for the use of a tribe, section 465 exempts permanent improvements on that land from state and local taxation. Accordingly, under Mescalero, the County was barred from taxing the Great Wolf Lodge during the time in which the Grand Mound Property was owned by the United States and held in trust under section 465. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County. View "Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty." on Justia Law

Appellant Centex International filed consolidated income tax returns for three of its corporate affiliates. It appealed an Administrative Law Court order that upheld the state Department of Revenue's denial of its claim for tax credits for the 2002-2005 tax years. Finding no error in the ALC's calculation of the tax, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Centex International v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

Appellant was subject to an increased personal-property tax assessment. The tax commissioner subsequently issued final-assessment certificates, which included instructions for appealing the assessment. Instead of instructing Appellant to appeal directly to the board of tax appeals, which is the correct procedure for appealing a final assessment, the commissioner instructed Appellant to petition for reassessment with the tax commissioner. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for reassessment. Instead of conducting a substantive review of the petition, the commissioner dismissed the petition because Appellant did not appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred in determining that Appellant had committed a fatal procedural error when it followed the appeal instructions given by the tax commissioner. Remanded with instructions to issue a final determination that addresses the assessment on the merits. View "Crown Commc'n, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2008, the taxpayers filed petitions for redetermination based on IRS notices of deficiency. The cases were consolidated for trial. With respect to Seven W, a calendar-year taxpayer, the Tax Court rejected a deficiency for calendar year 2000, but affirmed deficiencies for the years 2001 through 2003. With respect to Highland, a fiscal-year taxpayer, the court affirmed deficiencies for the fiscal years ending on April 30, 2003, and April 30, 2004. Although the opinions correctly identified the taxpayer with its respective tax liability, the decisions, entered in 2011, incorrectly stated that Seven W was responsible for deficiencies in fiscal years ending in April 2003, and April 2004, and that Highland was responsible for deficiencies for calendar years 2001 through 2003. The Commissioner discovered the error and sought to vacate the decisions. The Taxpayers did not object to correcting the errors, but did object to vacatur of the original decisions. The Tax Court vacated its decisions and entered new decisions correctly setting forth the respective deficiencies of Seven W and Highland. The Seventh Circuit vacated, with instructions to reinstate and correct the original decisions. Absent fraud that infected the Tax Court’s decision, the Tax Court cannot vacate a decision that has become final. View "Seven W. Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Gray filed returns for tax years 2001 through 2004 after the IRS notified her in 2006 that it planned to assess her tax liability on its own. The IRS accepted Gray’s calculations, but imposed penalties for late filing and payment, 26 U.S.C. 6651. When Gray did not pay, the IRS filed liens. Gray timely requested a Collections Due Process hearing, 26 U.S.C. 6330, at which she unsuccessfully argued that penalties, liens, and levies should be eliminated. The IRS then mailed Gray “notices of determination” approving liens and levies. Gray sought review in Tax Court, waiting more than 30 days to file. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Gray’s petitions were untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute creates a 30-day time limit for appealing CDP determinations, 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1); no longer period applied to Gray’s cases. Gray then claimed that IRS employees engaged in wide-ranging wrongdoing in dealing with her and sought damages for unauthorized tax collection, 26 U.S.C. 7433. More than six months later, after the IRS moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Gray filed an administrative claim. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the exhaustion requirement is not actually jurisdictional, but is still mandatory. View "Gray v. United States" on Justia Law

Gray filed returns for tax years 2001 through 2004 after the IRS notified her in 2006 that it planned to assess her tax liability on its own. The IRS accepted Gray’s calculations, but imposed statutory penalties for late filing and late payment, 26 U.S.C. 6651. When Gray did not pay the taxes or penalties, the IRS filed liens. Gray timely requested a Collections Due Process hearing, 26 U.S.C. 6330, at which she unsuccessfully argued that her statutory penalties should be eliminated and the liens and levies withdrawn. After the hearing, the IRS mailed Gray “notices of determination” approving liens and levies to collect the delinquent taxes. Gray sought review in Tax Court, but waited more than 30 days to file her petitions. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Gray’s petitions were untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the statute explicitly creates a 30-day time limit for appealing CDP determinations, 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1); no longer time limit applied to Gray’s cases. View "Gray v. Comm'r Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The IRS challenged the district court's judgment upholding the bankruptcy court's decision to grant the objection of the reorganized Worldcom debtors to the IRS's proof of claim for taxes owed and the debtors' refund motion for the taxes WorldCom had already paid. At issue was whether WorldCom must pay federal excise taxes on the purchase of a telecommunications service that connected people using dial-up modems to the Internet. The court held that WorldCom purchased a "local telephone service" when it paid for the telecommunications service and that WorldCom must therefore pay federal communication excise taxes on those transactions. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: WorldCom, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1990 Plummer, a recognized expert in horse-breeding and the tax consequences of related investments, created the Mare Lease Program to enable investors to participate in his horse-breeding business and take advantage of tax code provision classification of horse-breeding investments as farming expenses, with a five-year net operating loss carryback period instead of the typical two years, 26 U.S.C. 172(b)(1)(G). Plummer’s investors would lease a mare, which would be paired with a stallion, and investors could sell resulting foals, deducting the amount of the initial investment while realizing the gain from owning a thoroughbred foal. If they kept foals for at least two years, the sale qualified for the long-term capital gains tax rate, 26 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A). Between 2001 and 2005, the Program generated more than $600 million. Law and accounting firms hired by defendants purportedly vetted the Program. Plummer and other defendants began funneling Program funds into an oil-and-gas lease scheme. It was later discovered that the Program’s assets were substantially overvalued or nonexistent. Investors sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), also alleging fraud and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment and awarded $49.4 million with prejudgment interest of $15.6 million. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that there was no genuine dispute over any material facts. View "West Hills Farms, LLC v. ClassicStar Farms, Inc." on Justia Law