Saint Charles County was the sole owner and operator of the Saint Charles County Family Arena (Arena). After collecting taxes for several years on the fees, charges, and sales at the Arena, the County sought a refund for a three-year period. Specifically, the County sought a tax exemption pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(17). The Director of Revenue denied the County's claims, and the Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County was not entitled to the sales and use tax exemption it claimed where it did not present clear and unequivocal proof it met the requirements of Section 144.030.2(17) to be entitled to an exemption. View "Saint Charles County v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In assessing the value of electric power plants for purposes of property taxation, assessors may not include the value of intangible assets and rights in the value of taxable property. An electric company purchased "emission reduction credits" (ERCs), which the company had to purchase to obtain authorization to construct an electric power plant and to operate it at certain air-pollutant emission levels. These ERCs constituted intangible rights for property taxation purposes. In assessing the value of the power plant using the replacement cost method, the State Board of Equalization (Board) estimated the cost of replacing the ERCs. In also using an income approach in assessing the plant, the Board failed to attribute a portion or the plant's income stream to the ERCs and to deduct that value from the plant's projected income stream prior to taxation. In analyzing the Board's valuation of the power plant, the Supreme Court held (1) the Board improperly taxed the power company's ERCs when it added their replacement cost to the power plant's taxable value; and (2) the Board was not required to deduct a value attributable to the ERCs under an income approach. Remanded. View "Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Department imposed penalties on plaintiffs for their violation of a New York law that taxes the sale of cigarettes and provides for the issuance of tax stamps evidencing payment of the required taxes. On appeal, the Department challenged a permanent injunction issued by the district court forbidding it from imposing penalties on plaintiffs under N.Y. Tax Law 481(1)(b)(i). The court concluded that the district court was barred by the comity doctrine from granting injunctive and declaratory relief to plaintiffs because such relief would interfere with the state's administration of its tax laws; the district court erred in finding that section 481(1)(b)(i) constituted a criminal penalty; and, instead, the court concluded that section 481(1)(b)(i) provided for a civil penalty and plaintiffs therefore did not suffer double jeopardy when the Department imposed the penalties on them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the suit with prejudice. View "Abuzaid, et al. v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Taxpayers are owners and operators of Travia's Inc., a small bar and grill. The company is organized as a S-corporation. They appealed the Department of Taxes' (DOT) assessment of meals tax and alcoholic beverage tax for the audit years 2006, 2007, and 2008, and corporate income and personal income tax for the audit years 2005, 2006, and 2007.  Following a hearing, the Commissioner of Taxes affirmed the Department's assessments. Taxpayers appealed the Commissioner's determination to the civil division, which affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that taxpayers did not meet their burden of demonstrating the assessments were incorrect, and therefore upheld the Commissioner's determination. View "Travia's Inc., and Mellion" on Justia Law

This case arose when the IRS gave Fred Bame an erroneous tax refund of over $500,000. After Fred died and the government was unable to collect from his estate, the government filed suit against his ex-wife and two corporations she owned to recover the money. On appeal, the ex-wife and the corporate defendants challenged the district court's award based on unjust enrichment to the government. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the government where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the ex-wife's good faith defense. Further, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the ex-wife's entitlement to the money Fred transferred to her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Bames, et al." on Justia Law

After Washington County assessed the value of one of properties owned by Kohl's Department Stores for the years 2007-2009, Kohl's challenged the valuation. The tax court adjusted the County's assessment by increasing the valuations for 2007 and 2008 and decreasing the valuation for 2009. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the tax court not err (1) by failing to adjust its capitalization rate to account for the property taxes paid by the owner on vacant space and for the neighborhood's excessive vacancy; and (2) when it calculated the property's fair market rent using comparable leases rather than a percentage of retail sales method. View "Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. County of Washington" on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-211 requires the Department of Revenue (Department) to reappraise all residential property in the state every six years. The Department assessed the value of Plaintiff's property in 2008 and used the 2008 appraisal to establish Plaintiff's tax liability for the six-year tax cycle ending in 2014. Plaintiff argued that section 15-7-111, as applied, violated its right to equal protection. The State Tax Appeal Board rejected the claim. The district court, however, concluded that section 15-7-111 violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection because the six-year tax cycle caused some taxpayers to pay a disproportionate share of taxes due to their over-assessed property value and other taxpayers to pay less than their fair share of taxes due to their under-assessed property value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that similarly situated taxpayers, for a short time, may pay divergent taxes, and such a divergence in taxes does not violate equal protection privileges. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Effective in 2010, the Legislature changed the manner in which wind energy generation facilities are taxed. The change (1) exempted personal property used by wind energy generation facilities from the personal property tax and imposed a new tax based upon the facility's nameplate capacity, and (2) allowed taxpayers who had paid personal property tax prior to 2010 to claim a credit against nameplate capacity taxes assessed for the year 2010 and onward. Plaintiffs, Nebraska taxpayers, challenged the constitutionality of the credit. The district court determined that the credit provision of the new statute constituted an improper commutation of taxes and was therefore unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the nameplate capacity tax credit did not violate the constitutional prohibition against commutation of taxes because the prohibition does not apply to an excise tax, and the tax in this case was an excise tax; and (2) the statute authorizing the credit was not special legislation prohibited by the state constitution. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Banks v. Heineman" on Justia Law

A group of property owners filed suit against the Diamondhead Fire Protection District (DFPD) board of commissioners and several current and former DFPD officers, seeking declaratory judgment that a fee charged for fire-protection services was an impermissible tax. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the DFPD. The property owners appealed, challenging: (1) whether the monthly fee is an illegal tax; and (2) whether the power to tax should be construed narrowly. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly decided that the challenged fees for DFPD's services were lawful. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

New York Life challenged the IRS's determination that the company could not deduct policyholder dividend amounts until the tax year of payment. The court concluded that, with respect to the two claimed deductions, "all events" had not yet occurred to fix the company's liability in the tax years in which the company took the deductions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the liability for the dividends was contingent and it did not satisfy the regulatory requirements for deduction of an accrued expense. View "New York Life Ins. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law