The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the question of how non-rental residential properties subject to housing-subsidy covenants should be valued for property-tax purposes. Taxpayers in two cases consolidated for the purposes of this opinion contended that the governing statute mandates an automatic reduction in valuation for properties subject to these covenants or, (what is effectively) equivalent, a mandatory tax exemption on a portion of the property's value. The towns in which these properties are located contended instead that the applicable statute requires that municipal listers give individualized consideration to the effect these covenants may have on the fair market value of a given property when they determine the appropriate assessed value for the allocation of property taxes. The Vermont League of Cities and Towns and the Vermont Assessors and Listers Association joined the towns as amici curiae. The Supreme Court agreed with the towns that the existence of a housing-subsidy covenant was but one of many factors listers and assessors must take under advisement in ascertaining a property's fair market value.  View "Franks v. Town of Essex" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ind. Code 6-1.1-24-3(b), which provides that a mortgagee annually request by certified mail a copy of notice that a parcel of real property is eligible for sale under the tax sale statutes. Here a bank, which held a mortgage on certain property, failed to submit a form affirmatively requesting from the county auditor to mail notice of a pending sale of the real property. Therefore, the bank was not notified that its mortgaged property was tax delinquent until after the property had been sold and the buyer requested a tax deed. The buyer filed a petition to direct the county auditor to issue a tax deed for the property, and the bank filed a response challenging the tax sale notice statutes as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court issued an order holding that the statute was unconstitutional and denying the buyer's petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 6-1.1-24-3(b) was constitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remanded. View "M & M Inv. Group, LLC v. Ahlemeyer Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-6-218 grants tax exemption to intangible personal property and defines intangible personal property. The statute lists "goodwill" as the one non-exhaustive example of intangible property that lacks physical existence. The Department of Revenue implements the statute with Mont. Admin. R. 42.22.110. In 2010, the Department amended its definitions of intangible personal property and goodwill. The district court found that the new definitions of intangibles and goodwill imposed additional and contradictory requirements on state law and that the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported the Department's new rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Department's regulation defining goodwill was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(b); (2) the Department's regulation defining intangible personal property was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(a); and (3) the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported its new rules. View "Gold Creek Cellular of Mont. Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Revenue " on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

Ann Whitty, Tratillia McCall, and other class-action plaintiffs filed suit against Montgomery County and Janet Buskey (in her capacity as Montgomery County Revenue Commissioner. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their case by the Montgomery Circuit Court. Whitty and McCall, on behalf of themselves and a purported class of similarly situated property owners, filed suit seeking class certification of Montgomery County property owners whose properties were sold because of delinquent ad valorem taxes, where the sales produced an excess over the taxes, interest, penalties and costs due. Following discovery, a question of standing arose with regard to the class representatives. The County and the revenue commissioner moved to dismiss and/or to strike amended complaints, arguing that Whitty and McCall lacked "standing" to pursue the claims in their original complaint and, therefore, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action at its outset. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint insofar as it related to the claims alleged by Whitty and McCall. However the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it included a dismissal of the claims of the additional plaintiffs added by amendments to the original complaint. The trial court was not without subject-matter jurisdiction over claims originally alleged by McCall; therefore, the various amendments to the complaint adding additional plaintiffs were viable. View "Whitty et al. v. Montgomery County et al. " on Justia Law

Trip Network, Inc. and several other online travel companies appealed a superior court judgment dismissing their petition for a writ of mandamus. The companies were defendants in a civil suit filed by the City of Atlanta. The City sought to recover hotel-occupancy taxes, but the case was dismissed when the trial court concluded the City did not exhaust its administrative remedies. The City appealed and the Supreme Court reversed. Atlanta then sued the companies in superior court for back taxes and a permanent injunction to require the companies to collect hotel-occupancy taxes from hotel guests. In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court ordered the injunction and granted summary judgment to the companies on the back taxes issue. As part of the ruling, the Supreme Court found the trial court had not ruled on the City's claim for conversion. Following the issuance of the remittitur, the superior court ordered the parties to brief the court on whether any claims remained pending and how such claims should have been concluded. The companies argued that after the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling, the case was closed, and sought the writ of mandamus to effectively close the case. The Supreme Court concluded that mandamus was not the appropriate remedy for the travel companies to resolve this matter, and that the trial court properly dismissed their petition. View "Trip Network, Inc. v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Entities (Cencast) that remit payroll and employment taxes on behalf of motion picture and television production companies filed Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act employment tax returns, treating each employee as being in an “employment” relationship with Cencast rather than with the production companies. This reduced the overall tax payments because of statutory caps on FUTA and FICA taxes. The amount of tax that was avoided is equal to the additional amounts of FUTA and FICA tax that individual production companies would have been liable for had they conducted their own payroll services and filed their own returns. The United States Court of Federal Claims rejected Cencast’s refund claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the scope of Cencast’s liability for employment taxes under the (FICA) is determined by reference to the employees’ “employment” relationships with the common law employers for which Cencast remits taxes (the production companies). Those common law employers cannot decrease their liability by retaining entities such as Cencast to actually make wage payments to the employees. The court further noted that some of the individuals classified as employees were independent contractors, so that Cencast was barred from seeking refunds. View "Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant formed RJT Investments X, LLC and began acting as RJT's tax matters partner. Thompson, later that year, entered into an illegal "Son-of-BOSS" tax shelter transaction using RJT in order to offset capital gains of approximately $21.5 million. On appeal, appellant and his wife challenged the Tax Court's order dismissing their petition challenging a notice of deficiency issued by the IRS. The court agreed with its sister circuits that outside basis was an affected item that must be determined at the partner level. Because the Tax Court did not determine appellant's outside basis in RJT, the IRS properly issued a notice of deficiency under I.R.S. Code 6230(a)(2)(A)(i). Accordingly, the Tax Court had jurisdiction over appellants' petition challenging the notice. View "Thompson, et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law

AmBase purchased Carteret, a federally chartered stock savings bank or thrift, and then filed consolidated income tax returns with Carteret. The dispute in this appeal related to AmBase's 1992 consolidated federal income tax return. The court held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction and affirmed its grant of AmBase's claimed deduction to the extent that it offset Carteret's post-seizure income for the 1992 tax year. Further, the court concluded that the district court should grant AmBase's claimed deduction to the extent that it derived from Carteret's post-seizure bad debts for the 1992 tax year. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "AmBase Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

This tax refund suit is one among several arising from a series of limited partnerships managed by AMCOR in the 1980s. Taxpayers asserted that the IRS erroneously assessed additional taxes and interest against them in connection with their investments in various partnerships in the 1980s and sought refunds of the federal income taxes and penalty interest paid. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the statute of limitations claims. Concluding that the district court did have jurisdiction over the penalty claims, the court held that, under Weiner v. United States, the assessment penalty interest against taxpayers was erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government and rendered judgment for taxpayers on this issue. View "Irvine, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law