Plaintiff, a Delaware LLC operating in Montana, purchased a cable television network infrastructure in Montana in 2003. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in response to certain actions taken by the State of Montana Department of Revenue. Specifically, Plaintiff sought (1) to prevent the Department from issuing revised assessments of Plaintiff for tax years 2007 through 2009 and to prevent the Department from issuing any other revised assessments, and (2) a declaration that the Department had illegally assessed all of Plaintiff's property as class thirteen property. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on the Department's ability to issue retroactive assessments and directed the Department to refund with interest the payments that Plaintiff had made under protest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding (1) Plaintiff owned exclusively class eight property because, under Montana law, Plaintiff was subject to assessment under class thirteen; and (2) the Department lacked authority to issue revised assessments for Plaintiff's property for tax years 2007 through 2009 where the Department's discovery and subsequent reclassification arose from the audit's revelation of inaccuracies in Plaintiff's self-classification. View "Bresnan Commc'ns, LLC v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against Kathleen Haag and her husband seeking to reduce to judgment federal income tax liabilities for several years. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, concluding that Haag's claim that she was entitled to "innocent spouse" relief was barred by the two-year limitations period. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Haag eventually filed a fourth suit asserting that Lantz v. Commissioner had invalidated the two-year limitations period on requests for innocent spouse relief. The tax court and First Circuit held that res judicata applied. At this point, Lantz had been reversed, but the IRS had issued Notice 2011-70, which stated that taxpayers whose innocent spouse relief claims had been litigated previously and barred by the statute of limitations would not be subject to collection under certain circumstances. The First Circuit concluded that Notice 2011-70 did not apply to Haag. Haag then filed this complaint, arguing that Notice 2011-70 afforded her equitable relief from the judgment and that the First Circuit's prior finding to the contrary was mere dicta. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding, once again, that Notice 2011-70 was inapplicable to Haag. View "Haag v. United States" on Justia Law

This case concerned Merit Energy Company's 2006 natural gas severance and ad valorem tax liability for wells located in several counties. Merit was a take-in-kind interest owner, which is a party who elects to take a portion of the mineral produced rather than receive monetary remuneration for its share of the production. The State Board of Equalization (SBOE) determined that Merit failed to timely appeal several final Wyoming Department of Revenue (DOR) decisions regarding the amount of taxable gas it had received and dismissed Merit's appeal. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in affirming the SBOE's dismissal as untimely; and (2) even if the Court permitted Merit to appeal the notice of valuation change sent by the DOR, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Merit from doing so. View "Merit Energy Co. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were a group of travel companies that enable customers to make online travel arrangements, including hotel reservations. Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Local Law 43, a hotel room occupancy tax applicable to online travel companies. Alternatively, Plaintiffs contended that the law did not apply to them because their service fees were not "rent" within the meaning of the state enabling legislation. Supreme Court held (1) the law was constitutional, and (2) the plain language of the state statute authorized the City's tax. The Appellate Division reversed, holding (1) the enabling legislation did not provide the City with broad taxation powers to tax Plaintiffs' fees, and (2) the City's tax was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the City had the authority to enact the tax and that the Appellate Division erred when it declared the tax unconstitutional. View "Expedia, Inc. v. City of New York Dep't of Fin." on Justia Law

Hartney, a fuel oil retailer with a home office in Forest View, in Cook County, accepted purchase orders in the Village of Mark, in Putnam County, through a business with which it contracted. No Hartney employees were involved there. By so structuring sales, Hartney avoided liability for retail occupation taxes of Cook County, Forest View, and the Regional Transportation Authority. Hartney’s interpretation of the law was consistent with regulations published at the time. However, The Illinois Department of Revenue determined, through audit, that Hartney’s sales were attributable to the company’s Forest View office, rather than the Mark location reported by the company, and issued a notice of tax liability. Hartney paid penalties of $23,111,939 under protest and filed suit. The court agreed that the bright-line test for the situs of sale is where purchase orders are accepted. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court, court disagreed. The court found the “Jurisdictional Questions” regulations of the Administrative Code inconsistent with the statutes and case law. The legislature has not adopted a single-factor test for the situs of retail activity. The court’s own precedent calls for fact-intensive inquiry where there is a composite of many activities, and the legislature, by consistently employing the “business of selling” language, has effectively invoked that precedent. The Department of Revenue must abate Hartney’s penalties and tax liability for the relevant period because Hartney’s actions were consistent with its regulations in effect at the time.View "Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Village of Forest View" on Justia Law

WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bd of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist/ No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bd. of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

Phillip Morris sought review of the USDA's decision regarding the implementation of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act (FETRA), 7 U.S.C. 518 et seq. Phillip Morris challenged the USDA's decision to use 2003 tax rates instead of current tax rates in calculating how these assessments were to be allocated across manufacturers of different tobacco products. The court concluded that USDA's decision was a permissible interpretation of FETRA; there was no clear indication in the text of the statute, or in Congress's prior or subsequent action, that Congress intended for USDA to take a different course; and there was similarly no basis for concluding that USDA filled that gap with an unreasonable interpretation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of USDA's motion for summary judgment. View "Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

In November 2002, Appellee Beverly Roethlein, an Allentown taxpayer, filed a class action complaint against Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd., and Michelle Portnoff, Esquire (the firm's sole shareholder) seeking recovery for unjust enrichment and violations of Section 502 of Act 6, Pennsylvania’s Loan Interest and Protection Law. Portnoff serves as a private tax collector for various municipalities and school districts, and had contracts with 22 municipalities to represent them in the collection of delinquent real estate taxes. Taxpayers would be charged $150 for the opening of a file and preparation of a demand letter; $150 for the filing of a lien and preparation of a second letter; and $150 for preparation and filing of a writ of scire facias. The contracts required the municipalities to enact an ordinance or resolution authorizing Portnoff to impose legal fees upon the delinquent taxpayer. From the time a file was sent to her for collection, Portnoff began charging 10% interest on the principal. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Loan Interest and Protection Law provided taxpayers with a cause of action to challenge costs imposed for the collection of delinquent taxes or to seek damages and attorneys’ fees for improperly-imposed costs. Furthermore, at issue was whether Section 7103 of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act authorized a municipality to recover the administrative costs it incurs in collecting delinquent taxes. After review, the Court concluded that Act 6 does not provide a cause of action for claims which do not involve the loan or use of money. Furthermore, the Court concluded Section 7103 of the MCTLA allows a municipality to recover fees it pays to a third-party tax collector for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Assoc." on Justia Law

Appellants requested a tax refund from the City of Worthington in connection with municipal income tax they paid on stock-option income earned from 2005 through 2007, as reported on Form 1040, Schedule C of their federal income tax return. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of Appellants' refund based on its view that Ohio Rev. Code 718.01 governed the case because the City's definition of net profits in former Worthington Codified Ordinance 1701.15, which defined net profit for purposes of the City's income tax for an individual taxpayer "as the individual's profit, other than amounts required to be reported on schedule C," contravened the statutory definition of net profits set forth in section 718.01(A)(7). The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the City to refund the municipal taxes paid by Appellants on Schedule C during the tax years at issue, holding that the decision of the BTA was unreasonable and unlawful because the General Assembly did not exercise its power to limit or restrict the municipal power of taxation through section 718.01, and therefore, the statutory provisions at issue did not preclude the refund. View "Gesler v. City of Worthington Income Tax Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law