EAR, a subchapter S corporation, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In the years before its petition, EAR made federal income tax payments on behalf of its shareholders; eight of the payments in the two years preceding its petition. Once in Chapter 11, EAR, acting as debtor in possession, filed an adversary complaint against the government seeking to recover all nine payments as fraudulent transfers: the eight most recent payments under 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1), which provides for recovery of transfers made within two years of the filing, and the ninth under 11 U.S.C. 544(b), which enables a trustee to bring a state‐law fraudulent‐transfer action. EAR asserted that the IRS was precluded from raising sovereign immunity as a defense. The U.S. agreed to disgorge the eight payments, but contested EAR’s ability to recover the ninth payment under 544(b). The bankruptcy court rejected the government’s theory, finding that 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(1) abolished federal immunity from suit under listed bankruptcy causes of action, including section 544. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that 106(a)(1) does not displace the actual‐creditor requirement in section 544(b)(1). Ordinarily, a creditor cannot bring an Illinois fraudulent‐transfer claim against the IRS; therefore, under 544(b)(1), neither can the debtor in possession.View "United States v. Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011 Rizzo filed a voluntary petition for personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a general discharge. Despite his discharge, the Michigan Department of Treasury sent collection letters demanding that he pay $72,286.39 in delinquent Single Business Tax that had been assessed against a company, for which Rizzo had been an officer. Rizzo filed an adversary action, contending that his personal liability for the unpaid SBT had been discharged in bankruptcy. Treasury claimed that liability for the SBT deficiency is a nondischargeable “excise tax” debt under 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(E). The bankruptcy court agreed and dismissed. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rizzo’s argument that the debt was derivative, not primary, and therefore not an excise tax. Rizzo conceded that the unpaid SBT was an “excise tax” deficiency as to the company and did not dispute that he was personally liable for the company’s unpaid tax under state law. Michigan law simply confers derivative liability upon Rizzo for precisely the same excise tax deficiency that was assessed against the company. View "Rizzo v. MI Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

These appeals concerned whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were exempt from the payment of state and local taxes imposed on the transfer of real property in Maryland and South Carolina. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac claimed that they were exempt from such transfer taxes under 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2) and 1452(e) respectively. The district courts in Maryland and South Carolina rejected the Counties' claims, concluding that the general tax exemptions applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while not applicable to real property taxes, did cover real property transfer taxes, thus making a distinction between property and transfer taxes. The district courts also concluded that Congress acted within its Commerce Clause power. The court held that the real property exclusions from the general tax exemptions of section 1723a(c)(2) and 1452(e) did not include transfer and recordation taxes; in the absence of a particular constitutional right that would trigger heightened scrutiny, the court held that a congressional exemption from state taxation under the Commerce Clause was subject to rational-basis review; Congress could exempt Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from state and local transfer taxes, even though they were collected in the context of interstate transactions, because the taxes could substantially interfere with or obstruct the constitutionally justified missions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in bolstering the secondary mortgage market; and the Counties' remaining arguments for finding the statutory tax exemptions unconstitutional were rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district courts. View "Montgomery County, Maryland v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc." on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court's holding in a Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 26 U.S.C. 6221-6234, proceeding that valuation misstatement and substantial understatement tax penalties were inapplicable to NPR. The court concluded that, in this partnership-level proceeding, (1) valuation misstatement penalties under section 6662(e) and (h) were applicable; (2) a substantial underpayment penalty under section 6662(d) was applicable because there was no substantial authority for the tax treatment of the transactions at issue; (3) NPR failed to carry its burden of establishing a reasonable-cause defense under section 6664; and (4) the Taxpayers' respective, individual reasonable-cause defenses under section 6664 were partner-level defenses that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the finality of the notice of a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA); reversed regarding the valuation misstatement and substantial underpayment penalties; reversed regarding NPR's reasonable-cause defense; and vacated regarding Taxpayers' reasonable-cause defenses. View "NPR Investments, L.L.C. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed the Tax Court's judgments upholding in part the deficiency asserted by the Commissioner related to research and development tax credits claimed by Farouk Systems, a company which petitioners were investors. The court concluded that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by limiting petitioners to the introduction of dozens of sample records of its laboratory tests as opposed to the over 4,500 pages that petitioners sought to admit where introduction of all the records would have resulted in needless delay, wasted time, and unnecessary cumulative evidence, which substantially outweighed the minimal probative value of the additional records; the court rejected petitioners' argument that the Tax Court's conclusion that they had not proven their case amounted to acceptance of a reversal of an unrecorded concession that the Commissioner would not "challenge the sufficiency of available documentary substantiation;" petitioners' argument that the Tax Court imposed an inappropriate "standard of exactitude" that required them to produce specific documentation was unsupported by the record; the Tax Court did not err in refusing to estimate the amount of credit due petitioners for the qualified services performed; the Tax Court's implicit inclusion that petitioners had not proven that Defendant Shami engaged in direct supervision was not clearly erroneous; the Tax Court did not clearly err in finding that petitioners had not proven whether Defendants Shami and McCall had engaged in qualified research and, if so, how much of their time was spent on such activities; petitioners waived their argument alleging that the Tax Court's findings was clearly erroneous because it ignored the fact that Shami was credited as an inventor on certain patents; and the Tax Court's failure to include the supply costs as proper qualified research expenses when calculating each petitioner's deficiency was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Shami, et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law

Cheryl and John Gallenstein, Kentucky residents, purchased a boat in Indiana. The couple docked their boat in Indiana but chose Cincinnati as the hailing port. In 2003, the Division of Watercraft of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources issued a registration certificate to Cheryl. in 2005, the Ohio tax commissioner assessed a use tax, imposed a penalty, and assessed pre-assessment interest, determining that Cheryl’s use of the boat in Ohio, combined with her declaration of Cincinnati as the boat’s hailing port and her registration of the boat in Ohio created a nexus between the boat and Ohio and that she did not qualify for the transient use exception. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in affirming the commissioner’s use tax, penalty, and pre-assessment interest because Cheryl qualified for the transient use exception contained in Ohio Rev. Code 5741.02(C)(4). View "Gallenstein v. Testa" on Justia Law

A Foundation, a nonprofit corporation, completely controlled an LLC, which owned and controlled a LP, which owned apartments. The Foundation was a community housing development organization (CHDO), but the LLC and LP were not. The day the LLC acquired the LP, it applied for a tax exemption under Tex. Tax Code Ann. 11.182, which provides exemptions for properties that a CHDO owns. The Galveston Central Appraisal District denied the exemption because the LLC did not own the property. The Foundation and the LP then sued for a declaration that they were entitled to the exemption. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a CHDO’s equitable ownership of property qualifies for an exemption under section 11.182(b) and that Plaintiffs’ application for an exemption was timely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under AHF-Arbors at Huntsville I, LLC v. Walker County Appraisal District, equitable title to property was sufficient for the CHDO in this case to qualify for the tax exemption under section 11.182; and (2) The Foundation’s application was timely. View "Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. TRQ Captain's Landing" on Justia Law

Appellant sought review of orders and decisions issued by the Tax Court affirming the IRS's decision to impose a levy on his property to collect overdue income taxes. Appellant raised several challenges emanating from an IRS Office of Appeals Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing which resulted in the contested levy. The court denied the IRS's motion to transfer this case to the Eighth Circuit; the court had no occasion to decide in this case whether a taxpayer who is seeking review of a CDP decision on a collection method may file in a court of appeals other than the D.C. Circuit if the parties have not stipulated to venue in another circuit; nothing in the record indicated that the CDP hearing was tainted by ex parte communications between the Settlement Officer and other IRS employees; appellant failed to timely raise his claim regarding the senior Tax Court judge's recusal; the Tax Court's dismissal of appellant's tax liability for the year 2003 was moot; and appellant's challenge to the notice of determination imposing the levy was rejected where the court had no grounds to overturn the IRS's levy determination in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the Tax Court. View "Byers v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Maine-based law firm with affiliated law offices in other states. In an effort to determine the proper Maine income tax treatment for distributions to its New Hampshire partners, Plaintiff filed a Freedom of Access Act (Act) request with the Maine Revenue Service and the State Tax Assessor, ultimately seeking all allocation and apportionment formulas, methodologies, or calculations applicable to the determination of Maine income tax for nonresident partners in a partnership. The Revenue Service filed for in camera review of seven documents. After reviewing the documents in camera, the superior court determined that the documents were confidential and thus not subject to redaction or disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the documents that were covered by Plaintiff’s request for information consisted entirely of information deemed confidential pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 36, 191(1), which excepts certain tax information and records from the definition of public records pursuant to the Act. View "Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios LLP v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the sale of the Chronicle Publishing Company. After the Martin Family Trusts formed a tiered partnership structure, the Martin heirs commenced a series of transactions designed to create losses that would offset the taxable gain realized from the Chronicle Publishing sale. On appeal, taxpayers argued that the 2000-A Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) was time-barred by the restrictive language in the extension agreements. The court agreed with the district court that the extension agreements between the IRS and First Step encompassed adjustments made in the 2000-A FPAA that were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship; the FPAA to 2000-A extended the limitations period for assessing tax beyond the extension agreements and through the present litigation; however, the agreements did not extend to adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA that were not directly attributable to First Ship; and because the district court held more broadly that "the extension agreements encompass the adjustments made by the IRS in the FPAA issued to 2000-A," the court remanded to the district court to make a determination of which adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States" on Justia Law