Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries
Scott v. County of Riverside
Owners of timeshare estates in a resort sued the County of Riverside, challenging the legality of an annual fee charged for separate property tax assessments. The owners argued that the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the assessment, constituting a tax that required voter approval, which had not been obtained. The trial court rejected the owners' argument and ruled in favor of the County.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered judgment for the County, finding that the fee did not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the separate assessment. The court considered various costs, including those related to a new computer system and assessment appeals, even though these costs were not included in the original budget used to set the fee.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County did not meet its burden to prove that the $23 fee was not a tax requiring voter approval under Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The court found that the County's methodology for setting the fee was flawed, as it included costs unrelated to the specific service of providing separate timeshare assessments and did not accurately reflect the actual cost of the service. The court also ruled that the trial court erred in considering costs incurred after the fiscal year used to set the fee.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate refund amount and to decide on the declaratory, injunctive, and/or writ relief sought by the owners. The County must prove the reasonable and necessary costs of providing the separate assessment service, excluding costs for valuing the timeshare project as a whole. View "Scott v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law
Powertel Memphis, Inc. v. Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board
T-Mobile sought a refund for statutory service fees paid to the Kentucky Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, arguing that the fees did not apply to prepaid cellular customers based on a prior court decision. The Board denied the refund request, leading T-Mobile to file a lawsuit in Franklin Circuit Court. The trial court ruled against T-Mobile, stating that it did not meet the common law refund requirements as outlined in Inland Container Corporation v. Mason County, which necessitates that payments be involuntary or made under misrepresentation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that T-Mobile's payments were voluntary and not subject to refund. T-Mobile then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The Supreme Court granted review, heard oral arguments, and examined the record.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that T-Mobile was not entitled to a common law refund because the payments were voluntary and not made under misrepresentation. The court emphasized that the payments were not collectible by summary process or fine and imprisonment, and T-Mobile had the opportunity to challenge the fees in court before paying them. Additionally, the court found no evidence of actual misrepresentation by the Board. Therefore, T-Mobile's claim for a common law refund was denied. View "Powertel Memphis, Inc. v. Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board" on Justia Law
Aramark Corp. v. Harris
Aramark Corporation provides food services to clients in various industries, purchasing food, labor, and materials from third-party vendors. Under management-fee contracts, clients reimburse Aramark for these purchases and pay a management fee. Aramark sought a refund for the commercial-activity tax (CAT) it paid on these reimbursements, arguing that it acted as an agent for its clients and thus the reimbursements should be excluded from gross receipts under the CAT statute.The Tax Commissioner denied Aramark's refund claim, determining that Aramark did not meet the requirements for the gross-receipts exclusion. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that Aramark failed to establish an agency relationship with its clients as required by the statute. The board found that Aramark did not have the authority to bind its clients to its activities with third-party vendors and that the reimbursements constituted gross receipts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals' decision. The court held that Aramark did not qualify for the gross-receipts exclusion under the CAT statute because it did not act as an agent for its clients. The court found that Aramark kept the reimbursements for itself and did not hold them on behalf of its clients. Additionally, the court disapproved of the approach used in a previous case, Willoughby Hills, which required a showing of actual authority to establish an agency relationship for CAT purposes. The court concluded that the reimbursements Aramark received from its clients were taxable gross receipts and rejected Aramark's alternative argument that the reimbursements did not contribute to the production of gross income. View "Aramark Corp. v. Harris" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Supreme Court of Ohio, Tax Law
THE ICON AT NORMAN APTS, LP v. DOUGLAS WARR, CLEVELAND COUNTY ASSESSOR
A limited partnership, owning an apartment complex in Norman, Oklahoma, transferred its general and limited partnership interests to new owners in 2022. The Cleveland County Assessor subsequently increased the fair cash value of the property from $18,437,401 in 2022 to $42,500,000 in 2023, exceeding the constitutionally allowed 5% annual increase for ad valorem taxation. The partnership, Icon, protested this increase, arguing that the transfer of partnership interests did not constitute a transfer of property title.The Cleveland County Board of Equalization denied Icon's protest, and the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review granted summary judgment in favor of the Assessor, concluding that the transfer of partnership interests was equivalent to a transfer of property title, thus lifting the 5% cap on valuation increases. Icon appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the transfer of partnership interests should be treated as a transfer of property title under Okla. Const. art. 10, §8B. The court held that the transfer of partnership interests was a transfer of personal property, not real property, and did not constitute a transfer, change, or conveyance of the property title. Therefore, the 5% cap on annual increases in property valuation for ad valorem taxation should not have been lifted. The court vacated the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review's order and remanded the case. View "THE ICON AT NORMAN APTS, LP v. DOUGLAS WARR, CLEVELAND COUNTY ASSESSOR" on Justia Law
Scott v. Alabama Department of Revenue
Walter F. Scott III filed an appeal against the Alabama Department of Revenue, challenging the Jefferson County Board of Equalization's valuation of 176 parcels of real property for property-tax purposes. Scott identified himself as "Agent for Owners" in his notice of appeal. The Department, Jefferson County, and the Board moved to dismiss Scott's appeal, arguing that he had incorrectly filed the tax appeal and had not paid the necessary filing fees.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Scott was improperly attempting to aggregate 176 separate and distinct parcels of property into one lawsuit for the purpose of appealing tax assessments on each parcel. The court concluded that each parcel required a separately filed lawsuit accompanied by the appropriate filing fees. Scott then appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the tax appeal. The court held that the relevant statutes, §§ 40-3-24 and 40-3-25, Ala. Code 1975, do not require a taxpayer to appeal each assessment separately. The court found that the language of the statutes allows for multiple contested assessments to be included in a single appeal to the circuit court. The court also noted that consolidating challenges to multiple parcels into one appeal is consistent with the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not address whether multiple owners could use a single appeal to contest the assessments of multiple parcels, as this issue had not been sufficiently explored at this point in the action. View "Scott v. Alabama Department of Revenue" on Justia Law
Commissioner v. Zuch
In 2012, Jennifer Zuch and her then-husband Patrick Gennardo filed late 2010 federal tax returns. Gennardo's return showed a significant balance due, which he addressed by submitting an offer in compromise, involving $50,000 in estimated tax payments. The IRS applied these payments to Gennardo's account. Zuch later amended her return, reporting additional income and resulting in $28,000 in taxes due. She argued that the $50,000 should be credited to her account, entitling her to a refund, but the IRS disagreed and placed a levy on her property. Zuch requested a collection due process hearing, which upheld the levy. She appealed to the Tax Court.The Tax Court initially reviewed the case but dismissed it as moot after Zuch's tax liability was reduced to zero through overpayments applied by the IRS. The court ruled it lacked jurisdiction since there was no longer a basis for a levy. Zuch appealed to the Third Circuit, which vacated the dismissal, holding that the IRS's abandonment of the levy did not moot the proceedings, as the Tax Court could still address the underlying tax dispute.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §6330 to resolve disputes when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy. The Court reasoned that the Tax Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the determination of whether a levy may proceed. Once the levy is no longer in question, the Tax Court cannot address the underlying tax liability. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Commissioner v. Zuch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Fike
From 2016 to 2021, Irene Michelle Fike worked at an accounting firm and later as an independent contractor for a client, J.M., and J.M.'s family. Fike used her access to J.M.'s financial accounts to pay her personal credit card bills and make purchases from online retailers. She concealed her fraud by misrepresenting J.M.'s expenditures in financial reports. Fike defrauded J.M. of $363,657.67 between April 2018 and September 2022.Fike pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in 2024. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sentenced her to thirty-six months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court also ordered her to pay $405,867.08 in restitution, which included the principal amount stolen and $42,209.41 in prejudgment interest. Fike appealed, arguing that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) does not authorize prejudgment interest and that the interest calculation was speculative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the MVRA allows for prejudgment interest to ensure full compensation for the victim's losses. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest, as it was necessary to make J.M. whole. The court also determined that the district court had a sufficient basis for calculating the interest, relying on J.M.'s declaration of losses, which was submitted under penalty of perjury and provided a reliable basis for the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fike" on Justia Law
Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Conmac Investments, Inc., an Arkansas company, owns, leases, and manages farms. Between 2004 and 2013, Conmac purchased farmland and negotiated to receive rights to "base acres," which entitle the owner to subsidy payments from the USDA. Initially, Conmac did not claim deductions for amortization of these base acres on its tax returns from 2004 to 2008. In 2009, Conmac began amortizing its base acres without filing an "Application for Change of Accounting Method" and claimed amortization deductions for the years 2009 through 2014. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions, leading Conmac to petition the Tax Court.The United States Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, determining that Conmac's decision to amortize base acres constituted a change in the method of accounting, which required IRS approval. Conmac appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that Conmac's initiation of amortization for base acres in 2009 was indeed a change in the method of accounting. According to Treasury Regulation § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2), changing the treatment of an asset from nonamortizable to amortizable is a change in the method of accounting. The court rejected Conmac's argument that the change was due to a change in underlying facts, noting that Conmac's realization about the amortization of base acres did not constitute a change in underlying facts but rather a change in the timing of cost recovery.The court also addressed the Section 481 adjustment, concluding that the "year of the change" was 2013, when the Commissioner changed Conmac's method of accounting, thus triggering the adjustment to prevent duplicated deductions or omitted income. The judgment of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law
Kelly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Between 2007 and 2010, the taxpayer transferred millions of dollars between his business entities, characterizing them as loans. On December 31, 2010, he canceled many of these purported loans. On his 2010 income tax return, he reported $145 million of cancellation-of-debt (COD) income but excluded it due to his personal insolvency. He also reported a short-term capital loss of nearly $87 million due to a nonbusiness bad debt write-off, claiming that the discharged debt automatically rendered it worthless. The IRS disagreed and disallowed the deduction.The taxpayer challenged the IRS's decision in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had not established that the debts were worthless in 2010 and could not be deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 166. The court also found that the taxpayer had not proven the insolvency of the entities involved, which would have allowed the COD income to flow through to him. As a result, the Tax Court determined income tax deficiencies of over $5 million for the taxpayer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Tax Court did not err in requiring the taxpayer to prove the worthlessness of his discharged debts and in declining to presume worthlessness because COD income arose from that discharge. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's interpretation of the relevant tax statutes and found that the taxpayer had failed to provide sufficient objective evidence to demonstrate the worthlessness of the debts. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, resulting in the taxpayer's appeal being denied. View "Kelly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Pottstown SD v. Mont Co Bd
In 2017, Tower Health, a non-profit corporation, acquired Pottstown Hospital, an acute care facility in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Tower Health created a non-profit LLC, Pottstown Hospital, LLC, to manage the hospital. The hospital provides various health services, including emergency care, inpatient and outpatient services, and community outreach. The hospital applied for a charitable real estate tax exemption for three properties, which was initially granted by the Montgomery County Board of Assessment Appeals.The Pottstown School District appealed the exemption to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the hospital did not operate entirely free from a profit motive due to high executive compensation and the relationship with Tower Health. The trial court found that the hospital met the criteria for a purely public charity under the HUP test, including operating free from a private profit motive, and upheld the tax exemption. The court noted that the hospital provided substantial uncompensated care and that executive compensation was reasonable and within market value.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, focusing on the compensation of Tower Health's executives and the management fees charged to the hospital. The court concluded that the hospital did not operate free from a private profit motive, as a substantial portion of executive compensation was tied to financial performance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that the compensation of Tower Health's executives and the management fees were not relevant to the hospital's tax exemption status. The court emphasized that only the hospital's operations and executive compensation should be considered. The court found that the hospital's executive compensation was reasonable and within market value, thus meeting the HUP test. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and reinstated the trial court's order granting the tax exemption. View "Pottstown SD v. Mont Co Bd" on Justia Law